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ABSTRACT
THE PARABLE AS MIRROR: AN EXAMINATION OF THE USE OF
PARABLES IN THE WORKS OF KIERKEGAARD

Russell Hamer
Marquette University, 2018

This dissertation focuses on an exploration of the use of parables in the works of
Soren Kierkegaard. While some work has been done on Kierkegaard’s poetic style, very
little attention has been paid to his metaphors, despite their prevalent use in his works.
Much of the scholarship instead treats his parables as mere examples of philosophical
concepts. In this work, I argue that Kierkegaard’s parables function primarily to cause the
reader to see him or herself truly. The parables work like mirrors, reflecting our true
selves back onto ourself. In this way, the parables prompt Kierkegaard’s readers to
overcome the illusion of Christendom and to instead recognize the requirements that
authentic Christianity places upon them.
My dissertation begins with an examination of the purpose that Kierkegaard saw
for his authorship. By focusing on his later works, I argue that Kierkegaard primarily
wanted to bring the religious forward in his readers. He thought that in order to
accomplish this he needed to start with works describing the life that he thought most of
his readers lived, a life of pleasure seeking, and to slowly move them towards the
religious. I then present Kierkegaard’s view of what Christianity essentially consists of,
subjectivity, and of the style of communication that is tied to subjectivity. Kierkegaard
claims that when communicating subjective truths that we must employ an indirect style.
I go on to argue that parables very much fit into this style and that they work to cause
tension on the part of the reader. The reader of the parable must choose between various
competing interpretations that the parable presents, and in choosing how to interpret the
parable, the reader reveals and discloses him or herself. I follow this up with an
examination of a number of parables from different works of Kierkegaard, showing how
they function in this manner. I end by arguing that Kierkegaard’s parables are designed to
function like mirrors, revealing ourselves to us.
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Throughout this dissertation, I use a number of abbreviations to refer to
Kierkegaard’s works. Unless otherwise noted, the following abbreviations refer to the
following works. Further information can be found in my bibliography.
CD = Christian Discourses: The Crisis and a Crisis in the life of an Actress
CUP = Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments
E/O = Either/Or
FT = Fear and Trembling ; Repetition
FSE = For Self Examination ; Judge for Yourselves
PF = Philosophical Fragments ; Johannes Climacus
PIC = Practice in Christianity
SUD = The Sickness Unto Death
JP = Journals and Papers
POV = The Point of View
TD = Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions
UDVS = Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits
WOL = Works of Love
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Introduction

Kierkegaard is often praised for his poetic writing style. Throughout his works,
especially his pseudonymous ones, Kierkegaard often breaks from philosophical prose
and instead uses extended metaphors, fairy tales, parables, and allegories. This jarring
change, which occurs quite often, is rarely explained by the pseudonyms. If these
parables are supposed to teach something to the reader, one would expect the teaching to
be outlined by the author. My project will examine the place of the parable in
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works in order to uncover why Kierkegaard uses them in a
broad sense, but I will also show how some of the individual parables function within
their respective works. In examining this issue, I will put forth an argument explaining
why Kierkegaard must remain secretive about the purpose of the parables and how this
secrecy plays an important role in Kierkegaard’s authorship.
It’s quite common for philosophers to use metaphors or analogies in their works.
A good metaphor can help explain a complicated concept by referring the audience to a
concept that is already understood. Aristotle’s classic example of Achilles describes him
as “rushing like a lion”. This metaphor tells us much about the way that Achilles ran into
battle. Though the description of his battle charge would not be complicated to describe
without metaphor, the use of the lion metaphor explains the situation to the reader and
thus simplifies the problem of understanding. The use of metaphor in this manner is quite
commonplace, and indeed much of our language is inherently metaphorical. Yet, in these
situations, the metaphor functions as an explanation that seeks to simplify the task of
understanding. Metaphors also act as examples quite often. In order to explain a concept,
one might refer to a metaphorical example as a way to elucidate the idea.
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Despite the commonality of metaphors and analogies in philosophical works,
parables are a little rarer.1 We see parables in the works of Plato quite a bit, but the
parabolic form never quite caught on for philosophy as a discipline. However,
Kierkegaard uses parables so prolifically that Oden was able to select the best ones and
publish an entire book just consisting of Kierkegaard’s parables. This curiosity alone
makes the question of Kierkegaard’s parables worth investigating, but the issue becomes
much more pronounced when one examines the problem of indirect communication.
Kierkegaard, in many of his writings, was concerned with the way in which certain truths
could be communicated. He claimed that there were some things that could not be
communicated directly, but instead required indirect communication. Given that he finds
this important, and that there are a number of clues throughout his works that he is trying
to indirectly communicate with his readers, it is of much importance to recognize the
effect and purpose of the parables that Kierkegaard has strewn throughout his works.
In order to see how these parables function in Kierkegaard’s corpus, we will also
need to examine the purpose that he saw for his authorship. In The Point of View, we see
Kierkegaard looking back on his works and describing his goals as an author. He claims
that he was trying to turn people into Christians. He doesn’t do this by arguing for the
truths of Christianity, but rather by trying to turn individuals inward and to cause each
individual reader to seek redemption in Christ. If we are to examine the purpose of the
parable in Kierkegaard’s work, we must do so specifically with this viewpoint in mind.
Given that Kierkegaard wants to make his readers Christians and that he doesn’t intend to

1

Though my project will provide a definition of parable, defining the exact limit of the parable versus the
metaphor, per se, will be outside the bounds of my examination. When I reference parable, I will be
broadly referring to an extended metaphor, or a very short story. I do not differentiate a parable from an
allegory, a fairy tale, or a fable for the purposes of my project.
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do so by convincing them via rational discourse, how does the parable function? It is
meaningful for us to ask both why Kierkegaard brings in parables and whether or not
those parables help to achieve his goal as an author.
Given that the vast majority of Kierkegaard’s writings are in philosophical prose
and not parable, what importance is there in the selection of parables that we find? How
do they function within the individual works and how do they help Kierkegaard achieve
his larger goals? This project will endeavor to answer these questions and to argue that
Kierkegaard’s parables hold a central importance when we examine the authorship from
Kierkegaard’s own point of view.
This project will argue that parables and story-telling were, for Kierkegaard, of
central importance. Kierkegaard stated that one of his goals was to change individuals,
and not merely convince them of certain philosophical truths (though he also did that).
There appear to be some effects, if my argument is successful, both for Kierkegaard
studies and for philosophy more broadly. As far as Kierkegaard studies are concerned, if
the parables are really as valuable as the prose, then we need to give them equal
consideration and study. We need to engage with the fields of hermeneutics and literary
studies as much as with philosophy of religion if we are to be good Kierkegaardians. We
cannot dismiss the parables as mere examples to prove the point of the prose but must
recognize them as being unique tools used for a specific goal. If I am right, then any
attempt to understand Kierkegaard that lacks an understanding of his parables will be
incomplete.
Beyond the scope of Kierkegaard studies, I see even broader implications for the
success of my thesis. There is an open question as to the purpose of philosophy, both in
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the academic and general sense, in contemporary life. Academic philosophy seems more
and more isolated from the general public and yet seemingly desires for the public to
recognize its value. Articles in academic journals, conference proceedings, course
offerings, and committee work seem to take up the majority of the time of most academic
philosophers. Academic philosophy almost takes a Reaganomics approach hoping that
philosophical insights will somehow trickle down into the general public. I think that this
approach is wrong-headed and that, instead, Kierkegaard was on to something, though it
seems he was ultimately unsuccessful with his own audience.
If we want philosophy to connect with the general public and have a marked
effect on the lives of lay individuals, we might want to start telling stories. Our duty, as
those who have left the cave in search of truth, must be to return to the cave and unbind
those still there. But as Plato notes, we will be ridiculed upon our return. Kierkegaard
hopes to have bridged this gap and provided a way to motivate, reorient, and change
those who are reading our works, and he tries to do so with parable. Thus, in a day and
age when academic departments are losing funding, when the humanities are seen are
more and more irrelevant in the eyes of the government and the general public, we must
change our tactics. If my argument about Kierkegaard is successful, and if Kierkegaard is
right, we must start telling stories.
Chapter 1

This argument is broken into five chapters, the first four of which provide a piece
of the puzzle, with the fifth chapter combining the pieces to form my argument. In
Chapter one I will examine the purpose that Kierkegaard sees for his own authorship. In
order to understand why Kierkegaard uses parables in his works, we need to understand
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the overall intent for his works. In his journals and in The Point of View Kierkegaard
explicitly expressed his reasons for writing. He was dismayed with the current state of
Christianity in Denmark and thought that most Danes were only Christians by name.
Thus, he sought to cultivate the religious in his audience, though this was no simple task.
One could not take the approach of Martin Luther and declare all of Denmark to be
lacking the truly Christian. Kierkegaard knew that such an approach would be
problematic, saying, “If it is an illusion that all are Christians, and if something is to be
done, it must be done indirectly, not by someone who loudly declares himself to be an
extraordinary Christian, but by someone who, better informed, even declares himself not
to be a Christian.”2 Kierkegaard was of the opinion that, as a Christian, approaching
someone and rebuking them for their lack of a Christian religious life would only cause
the rebuker to become an outcast. The public would ignore that individual, and the cause
championed by that person would be lost. Thus, he planned to write a number of
pseudonymous books by authors who claimed that they were not Christians, while at the
same time publishing religious works under his own name. Kierkegaard envisioned three
realms of existence, the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. He saw that most
individuals existed in the aesthetic realm of life, and thus his writings began there.
Kierkegaard wrote in the aesthetic vein, slowly moving towards the ethical and finally the
religious. Yet, while his writings began in the aesthetic, Kierkegaard wanted one thing
kept in mind, “but above all do not forget one thing... that it is the religious that is to
come forward.”3 Though his writings delve into a number of different issues, Kierkegaard
planned that in all things the Christian religious was the final end.

2 POV 43
3 Ibid 46
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Chapter 2

Following our discussion of the purpose that Kierkegaard sees for his authorship
in Chapter one, Chapter two will focus on the concept of indirect communication. Given
our knowledge of what Kierkegaard wants to do, we next examine how he does it.
Indirect communication functions as a way to communicate certain things, such as the
truth of Christianity that Kierkegaard is trying to spread. "Suppose someone wanted to
communicate that the truth is not the truth but that the way is the truth, that is that the
truth is only in the becoming, in the process of appropriation."4 If this is the case, if the
truth is not an object, but rather the truth is the way in which one comes to the truth, then
it must be communicated indirectly. If someone had climbed a mountain, and upon
reaching the peak had the realization that the entire point of the climb was coming to
understand that the actual journey was what truly mattered, that person cannot simply tell
this to someone else. When the end is not the truth, but instead the journey to truth is the
truth, communicating this to another deprives that individual of the possibility of making
the journey in the first place. Thus, Kierkegaard envisions a way in which we can
communicate these truths, and he calls it indirect communication. Indirect
communication is a way in which one can communicate subjective truths, or truths of
inwardness. “Objectively the emphasis is on what is said; subjectively the emphasis on
how it is said.”[emphasis in original]5,6 For Kierkegaard, the only way in which one can
communicate subjective truth is to focus not on what is said, but on how one says it. In

4 CUP 78
5 Ibid 202
6 Kierkegaard sees all truths split into two broad categories, objective and subjective truths. Objective
truths are truths about the world, facts of existence. Subjective truths are truths related to the individual,
or truths of inwardness.
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communicating a message in certain ways, one can deprive the receiver of the possibility
of understanding, internalizing, or appropriating the message. Thus, the focus of indirect
communication is on how something is said, and not specifically on what is said.
By examining the way in which the concept of indirect communication comes
into play in Kierkegaard’s work, we can better understand why parables are significant,
and how they fit into this approach. If Kierkegaard is trying to bring about a kind of
inwardness in his readers in order to bring them to the religious, then he specifically
wants to use indirect communication in order to do this. Indirect communication allows
for the communication of possibilities. The audience can then inhabit these possibilities
and consider them. By allowing for this process to occur, Kierkegaard creates a situation
in which by engaging the communication at all, the audience is turned inward, and one in
which this inward turn hopefully informs them of their untruth.
Chapter 3

Chapter three is going to examine the place that parables have in this grand
scheme, with specific reference to the relationship that the parable has to the reader.
Having established Kierkegaard’s goal to turn individuals inward as well as the
instrument to carry out that goal, indirect communication, we will next examine how
parables act as a kind of indirect communication. Central to this process will be the
concept of appropriation. For an individual to appropriate something they must grapple
with its meaning and come to an understanding of it, but in such a way that this process is
required in order to understand. One takes the meaning of the communication and makes
it their own. In this way, the parable is clearly presenting the reader with both the
opportunity for, and the requirement of, appropriation. However, as the knowledge is
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obscured by the nature of the parable, the only way in which to do this is to engage the
parable and to appropriate it. Were a parable to be followed by an explanation, as often
happens, the parable would lose strength, as the personal appropriation would no longer
be necessary. “Finally, the preacher must allow the parable to exercise its own power on
the hearers and not be reduced to moral precepts or theological ideas.”7 In this we can
recognize that the parable possesses more than just the concept within it. The parable is
not merely an idea hidden in a story, but rather it is a call to engage with an idea on a
personal, inward level. The ability of the parable to be appropriated by the individual is
one of the most important factors in the use of a parable versus a straightforward
explanation. The knowledge and experience gained from this kind of understanding are
much greater than that of an explanation or a moral teaching. The individual comes to
terms with the teaching him or herself and thus has gained a deeper understanding of it
than would be gained if the moral was simply explained to him or her. In his writings,
Kierkegaard presents parables in a way that allows for this process to take place.
Being that indirect communication is to drive the receiver to action, we can
understand specifically why Kierkegaard implements the use of parable in his writings. A
parable is an invitation to interpretation. Parables are able to provide the receiver with a
situation in which they must appropriate the text in order to understand it; they must
become active in their relationship to the text. “Metaphor provides Kierkegaard with the
dialectical tension and the middle ground - as a kind of no-man’s-land - that his indirect
communication requires of the reader to struggle with existence itself, to examine not
only life but ideas in life that ethically instruct and prompt the reader to choose.”8 The

7 Donahue 13
8 Lorentzen 62.
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parable is a call to action, a call to choice. In this, the parable fulfills the requirements of
an indirect communication. A parable does not plainly say what truth exists within it,
instead the reader must come to understand this internally. Operating in this capacity, the
parable functions as the perfect “how” of indirect communication by requiring
appropriation on the part of the reader.
Chapter 4

Having established that the use of parables fits nicely into what Kierkegaard
wants to accomplish as an author, along with an understanding of how the parable
functions, it is only fitting to next examine some of Kierkegaard’s parables themselves.
Kierkegaard saw his literature as guiding the reader through the stages of existence and
thus wrote a number of pseudonymous books both from and for a certain point of view,
specifically in relation to the different stages of existence. Either/Or, for instance,
explored the aesthetic life versus the ethical life and tries to push the reader out of the
aesthetic and towards the ethical. When we look at a text like Fear and Trembling we see
the challenge of the ethical, especially when it might conflict with the religious. In
Philosophical Fragments and the Postscript we finally see Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms
make the transition from the ethical to the religious, and specifically to the Christian
religious. In Chapter four, I will examine parables from these and other pseudonymous
texts and investigate the work that the parables do in their respective positions.
If we examine the parable of Agnes and the Merman, for instance, we see a
situation in which the merman is in the aesthetic, recognizes the ethical, and also faces
the divine. The merman recognizes the ethical categories of his actions and repents. He
understands that seducing Agnes and lying to her would be unethical and thus he halts his
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plan of action. However, given the recognition of the ethical, the merman can now make
another choice. He can either disclose himself to Agnes and tell her the truth of what he
had planned, or he can remain closed to Agnes. Johannes de Silentio, the pseudonymous
author of the book, does not inform the reader of which choice the merman makes.
Instead, the parable is left open ended and we are only informed of the possibilities. The
merman is given the options of the demonic and the religious, with Silentio clearly
favoring the choice of the religious. This choice is not described as an easy one for the
merman to make. Instead, the merman must choose through a kind of superhuman will.
The story of Agnes and the merman highlights the passage from the aesthetic to the
ethical and then focuses on the tension between the ethical and the religious. Given that
Fear and Trembling was written after Either/Or, but before the Postscript, currently
Kierkegaard sees his readers in this position. They are not yet ready for the religious but
can recognize the struggle that the ethical and the religious experience when they come
into contact. Here again we see the reader being led away from the aesthetic and towards
the religious.
Throughout these parables, of which more will be explored than what was here
mentioned, we see Kierkegaard building a road for his readers to follow. Kierkegaard
starts with the despair that the aesthetic brings and moves from the aesthetic to the ethical
life. He then recognizes the conflict between the ethical and the religious and nonetheless
accepts faith and thus moves into the religious. Finally, he ends with parables of the
practices that makes one truly Christian. The continual upward movement that we find in
the authorship as a whole is mirrored in the parables that we find along the way. But
these parables are not set up as mere examples for the reader, in order to promote greater
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understanding. Instead they function as indirect communications meant to take hold of
the reader and bring them on the upward journey.
Chapter 5

Remembering from Chapter one the claim that Kierkegaard is trying to turn us
inward, we can now fully understand how parables fit into his philosophy. Given that
Kierkegaard doesn’t think that it is within his power to make his readers Christian, the
parable cannot teach us anything new. We cannot be convinced by Kierkegaard that we
are not Christians and that we are in need of salvation. Instead, we must have the
condition to recognize the truth given to us by God. However, once possessing this
condition, we may choose to ignore it or refuse to act on it. It is to block this possibility
that we see the parable coming into use. Kierkegaard wishes to turn us inwards, to
recollect that truth that had already been revealed to us. To this end, Kierkegaard’s
parables function as mirrors. The parable presents an image of a character or situation. As
the reader strives to make sense of the parable, they seek to understand this situation or
this image, and in seeking to gain this understanding, they can only rely on their own
experiences. Thus, as they seek understanding of the parable, they must see themselves as
the character or in the situation that the parable presents. By doing this, they open the
possibility of facing the truth that Kierkegaard wants them to face, which is only a truth
about themselves. In thinking about how the merman must make his choice, I must think
of myself as a merman and in doing so I must imagine what it is like to admit fault in the
face of a perfect creature. This type of imagination does not reveal anything to me about
the merman or about some philosophical truth, instead it reveals something about myself.
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This is the subjective truth that Kierkegaard wants to engender, truth about the self that
can only be revealed using indirect communication.
Kierkegaard uses parables as mirrors, reflecting back upon us what we already
know to be true but which we deny. In this sense Kierkegaard operates as Socrates does.
He is the gadfly who wants to bring about recollection. Just as Socrates claims that he
knows nothing, so too do we see Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms make similar claims on a
number of occasions regarding Christianity. Thus, we can see how the parable functions
in Kierkegaard’s works and also why it’s important to carefully consider these parables.
If Kierkegaard wants to make us Christians but cannot actually do so, then he must
function as the teacher who is only able to cause his students to recollect the truth. In this
regard we see indirect communication and the use of parables playing an important role.
Kierkegaard uses parables as mirrors for his audience, slowly causing them to see the
truth in themselves, and using this self-awareness to guide them from the aesthetic to the
religious. The parable is able to do this in part because it does not address the reader, but
instead invites the reader to participate, and as the reader participates he or she comes to
see the truth for themselves.
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Chapter 1: Kierkegaard the Religious Critic

If history were taught in the form of stories,
it would never be forgotten – Rudyard Kipling

We begin our study of parables in the works of Kierkegaard by first examining
Kierkegaard’s intentions concerning his authorship. In order for us to understand why
Kierkegaard constantly employed parables in his writing and the function that those
parables serve, we must have an understanding of the goals that have been set out for the
authorship. Luckily for us, late in his career Kierkegaard published a number of works
that addressed this issue.9 Thus we start out our study of parables by digging into these
works and examining clues that Kierkegaard gives us concerning his intentions. Little of
what I present in this chapter is a novel or original interpretation of Kierkegaard. The vast
majority of what I present in this chapter has been covered in the scholarship to some
extent. My main contribution here lies in that I am bringing together parts of the
scholarship that are often not in conversation with one another. I’m working to both to
frame the arguments and concepts that the rest of this project will be concerned with and
rest upon, as well as to unify different works of scholarship and some of the later works
of Kierkegaard, which are often overlooked by the scholarship at large. Most scholars
focus on the early pseudonymous writings of Kierkegaard and while I will be examining
those works, I want to put them into conversation with the later writings, specifically The
Point of View and For Self-examination. In these works, we see Kierkegaard, maybe only
in hindsight, lay out what his goals were for his authorship.10 Thus we must begin by

9

The works have been collected in The Point of View and For Self-examination / Judge for Yourself.
Tietjen spends considerable time arguing that we should trust the content of The Point of View versus
scholars like Garff or Fenger who think it should be viewed with distrust. I find Tietjen’s arguments
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examining these goals, and with that approach framing our discussion, move on in later
chapters to explore Kierkegaard’s use of parables and how they relate to this goal.
Kierkegaard graciously informs us of his goals in The Point of View when he
writes, “The content, then, of this little book is: what I in truth am as an author, that I am
and was a religious author, that my whole authorship pertains to Christianity, to the issue:
becoming a Christian, with direct and indirect polemical aim at that enormous illusion,
Christendom, or the illusion that in such a country all are Christians of sorts.”11
Kierkegaard goes on to claim, “Because I am a religious author, it of course is on the
whole a matter of indifference to me whether a so-called esthetic public has found or
would be able to find some enjoyment through reading the esthetic works, or through
reading the esthetic in the works, which is the incognito and the deception in the service
of Christianity.”12 Though Kierkegaard lacks specificity here, we see that he is primarily
concerned with Christianity and that he sees his writings as being in service to
Christianity, centrally located around the problem of becoming a Christian.13 Though not
all of his writings have overtly dealt with religious themes, Kierkegaard claims that this
has all been a part of his deception. Regardless of the content of the individual works,
Kierkegaard claims that, taken as a totality, they are concerned with the issue of
becoming a Christian.

convincing and follow him in this respect. His argument centers around the claim that in order to
dismiss The Point of View, we seemingly must adopt a deconstructionist approach for which there is
very little justification.
11
POV 23
12
Ibid 24
13
For a wonderfully detailed examination of Kierkegaard’s religious authorship, refer to Lane’s
Kierkegaard and the Concept of Religious Authorship in which he defines a religious authorship as,
“Before God, to speak or write about God and the world (including religion and things religious), in a
religious way, with a religious concern or interest, to a specific audience.” Pg. 4. I share a similar
methodological approach as does Lane, in that I want to view Kierkegaard’s works through the lens that
he provides with his late writings.
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When looking at the question of intention, one might ask why the issue of
becoming a Christian would need require an author to use, as Kierkegaard just described,
deception and incognito. Why would Kierkegaard write in such a way that near the end of
his authorship he has to clearly state what his intentions have been all along, having used
this deception to obscure them until the very end? To answer this, let’s look at an
imagined discourse found in For Self-examination in which Kierkegaard describes a
scene between Martin Luther and a generic Danish Christian who is a contemporary of
Kierkegaard’s.14 We start by assuming that Luther has risen from the grave and has lived
in Kierkegaard’s Denmark and learned their ways. Having done so, Luther asks
Kierkegaard if Kierkegaard is a Christian. To this, Kierkegaard’s response is, as it always
is, that he is not a believer but rather that he is someone who has deep respect for true
belief. Kierkegaard continues to imagine a conversation that Luther would have with an
individual who did identify as a believer, an action that Kierkegaard thinks likely true of
members of the general populace in Denmark at the time. Luther asks this individual how
they suffer for Christianity. If they are indeed a believer, what have they sacrificed for
their faith? To this challenge the common man responds that he can give plenty of
assurances that he is indeed a believer. He goes on to demonstrate to Luther that he has a
number of books that all describe faith very well, so we can rest comfortably in his selfassured faith. Luther is angered by this response and says, “I do believe this man is crazy.
If it is true that you are able to describe faith, that merely shows that you are a poet, and if
you do it well, that you are a good poet – anything but that you are a believer.”15 This
imagined exchange introduces us to some of the issues that Kierkegaard is considering
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when he claims that his writings are all aimed at becoming a Christian. He faces a
situation in which most of his peers and countrymen identify as Christians. As we see,
however, he has very serious doubts about whether they are true Christians. Given these
doubts, Kierkegaard turns to the use of the incognito, deceptions, and indirect
communications in order to bring about the truly Christian in his audience.16 Thus in
order to understand why these methods were used, we must begin by examining that
problem that Kierkegaard saw himself needing to fight against.
Section 1: Everyone’s a Christian So No One’s a Christian
Recognizing that Kierkegaard’s intent is to bring the religious17 forward, one
might assume that his audience are the Danes who refuse to acknowledge the truths of
Christianity. After all, one cannot bring forward the religious in those who already
possess it. However, Kierkegaard's target audience was indeed those who professed
Christianity, but whom he thought failed to recognize what Christianity truly was.
Specifically looking at the Postscript, Muench argues that in order to interpret
Kierkegaard we must have an understanding of his audience.18 To this end Muench
presents a case that Kierkegaard is specifically targeting those who make Christianity too
easy. When we examine the language used in the Postscript when Climacus, the
pseudonymous author of the Postscript, writes that he will “make something more

Sketching out what the truly Christian looks like would be a book in itself. Instead, what I endeavor to
present is Kierkegaard’s demonstration of what is not Christian. While this only gives us a negative
understanding of the truly Christian, the purpose of this chapter is to outline and explain what
Kierkegaard is working against and seeking to overcome.
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concerned with. He specifies different forms of the religious, separating Religiousness A (a religious
approach that isn’t distinctly Christian) from Religiousness B (a religious approach that is distinctly
Christian) in Concluding Unscientific Postscript.
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difficult” and “So only one lack remains, even though not yet felt, the lack of difficulty”
we find evidence for the claim that Kierkegaard wishes to make Christianity more
difficult for his audience.19 Indeed, the majority of the Postscript demonstrates just how
difficult Christianity is, and what it requires of each individual. Kierkegaard looks at the
common Dane and sees individuals who regularly attend church services and have been
told their entire life that they are Christians. In this kind of a social setting, Kierkegaard
thinks that the majority of Danes consider themselves Christians. Yet Kierkegaard and
Climacus want to demonstrate that Christianity requires much more than regular church
attendance or the proper interpretation of doctrine.20 Thus their goal is to make
Christianity difficult, and their audience are those who find Christianity simple and
straightforward.
Given this audience, Kierkegaard thinks that, from the viewpoint of the religious,
most individuals are under a grand illusion. In The Point of View, when Kierkegaard is
retrospectively explaining his authorship, he writes,
“Everyone who in earnest and also with some clarity of vision considers what is
called Christendom, or the condition in a so-called Christian country, must
without any doubt immediately have serious misgivings. What does it mean, after
all, that all these thousands and thousands as a matter of course call themselves
Christians! These many, many people, of whom by far the great majority,
according to everything that can be discerned, have their lives in entirely different
categories, something one can ascertain by the simplest observations! People who
perhaps never once go to church, never think about God, never name his name
except when they curse! People to whom it has never occurred that their lives
should have some duty to God, people who either maintain that a certain civil
impunity is the highest or do not find even this to be entirely necessary! Yet all
these people, even those who insist that there is no God, they are all Christians,
call themselves Christians, are recognized as Christians by the state, are buried as
Christians by the Church, are discharged as Christians to eternity.”21
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Kierkegaard is surrounded by individuals who all consider themselves Christian, and who
are all considered Christian by the state and the church. Simply by virtue of being
Danish, one must be a Christian. The language that Kierkegaard uses here demonstrates
his anger with this approach, and thus help us understand the specific problem that he
wants to address. Denmark is functioning under a grand illusion, the illusion of
Christendom.
In order to explain how exactly this illusion functions, and what it has done to
Christendom in Kierkegaard’s Denmark, let us first examine one of Kierkegaard's
parables. In For Self-examination, Kierkegaard describes the situation of a lover who has
just received a letter from his beloved.22 The letter is written in a language that the lover
cannot understand and thus he needs to translate it before he can read it. The lover toils
away at translating the letter, a process that he completes in its entirety before he actually
reads the letter for its content. Having translated the letter, the lover realizes that it
contains a wish on the part of his beloved for him to accomplish something. Upon
reading of this wish, the lover sets off immediately and earnestly to complete his task.
Eventually when the lovers meet, the beloved reveals that the lover must have
mistranslated the letter, for the task that the lover completed was the wrong task.
Kierkegaard asks if in this situation the lover would be upset with himself for acting the
way that he did. Would he instead prefer to have taken a longer time translating, getting a
second opinion and making sure that his syntax and word choice were correct?
Kierkegaard claims that the lover would not have felt this way, but instead would be
pleased with the fact that he complied with his beloved's wish immediately, even if he
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didn't quite translate the wish properly. Kierkegaard goes on to describe how this relates
to Biblical scripture. He thinks that we can approach scripture in a similar way that the
lover approached the letter. We first need to translate but, given a translation, we have to
make a choice. We choose to either act upon what we find in scripture, or we choose to
seek precise knowledge of what scripture is communicating. Though Kierkegaard is
careful not to disparage scholarship,23 he argues that the correct way to approach
scripture is as an individual who desires to fulfill the commands and wishes found in
scripture. He writes, “If you understand only one single passage in all of Holy Scripture,
well, then you must do that first of all, but you do not have to sit down and ponder the
obscure passages.”24 Kierkegaard wants our response to the Bible to be one of action, and
not one of study. We are not to be interpreters of the Word, we are to be doers of the
Word.
While he is careful to mention that scholarship is a good thing, Kierkegaard warns
even the scholar from falling into the trap of only being a translator. He sees the Bible as
a document that has claims on the lives of its readers, and thus when we interact with the
Bible it should always cause us to act. To the extent that isn't happening, Kierkegaard
thinks that we aren't truly readers of the Bible, and are thus missing out on true
Christianity. He writes, “If you are a scholar, remember that if you do not read God's
Word in another way, it will turn out that after a lifetime of reading God's Word many
hours every day, you nevertheless have never read – God's Word.” Kierkegaard strongly
cautions us away from a reading of scripture that sees us primarily as interpreters of the
text, and not doers of the text. Instead he wants us to use scripture as a mirror for
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ourselves. We should approach scripture in such a way that we look to see ourselves in it.
We cannot merely look at the mirror, we have to see ourselves within it. In this way,
scripture propels us to action. By seeing ourselves in the mirror of the Word, we cannot
remain interpreters, for the Word has claims upon us and our actions, and thus we must
act as the Word compels us.25, 26
Kierkegaard sees himself as instead being surrounded by readers of the Word, and
not doers. The illusion of Christendom seems made up both of the fact that everyone
assumes that they are Christian, but also of the fact that Christianity has been altered into
a mere set of doctrines. Everyone reads the Bible only as a scholar, and not as a true
reader. In a short essay entitled Armed Neutrality Kierkegaard writes,
“I do not think that without exaggeration one can say that Christianity in our time
has been completely abolished. No, Christianity still exists and in its truth but as a
teaching, as a doctrine. What has been abolished and forgotten (and thus can be
said without exaggeration), however, is being a Christian, what it means to be a
Christian; or what has been lost, what seems to exist no longer, is the ideal picture
of being a Christian.27
Kierkegaard laments the attention that is being given to the doctrines of Christianity
without any focus on what it means to be a Christian. His attack on those who
concentrate on scholarship or translation without also acting on the commands of
scripture is echoed here in his complaint that Christianity has become solely doctrine.
Kierkegaard's Christianity requires action, it requires a kind of existential re-ordering of

Kierkegaard writes another parable to describe this point. Kierkegaard describes a land in which a royal
decree is laid out over a country. However, for some reason, everyone begins only to interpret the
decree. Scholarship and criticism arise and focus on the royal decree, and entire areas of study are built
around the royal decree. But would this not anger the king, for he only desires for the decree to be
followed? The full text can be found in FSE 33-34
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oneself.28 However, this is not what we get from the Christianity that Kierkegaard is
fighting against. Instead, doctrine is concerned with things like the proper interpretation
of scripture, as the next parable I bring up will demonstrate. This approach, for
Kierkegaard, is irrelevant to what Christianity truly requires of the individual.
Kierkegaard's concern with the focus on doctrine that he sees in his contemporary
world is mirrored in another great parable of his. In Judge For Yourself, Kierkegaard tells
the story of a theology student who, upon graduating, searches for a job far and wide.
After a long search he is finally able to find one, though it is only a small appointment.
Nonetheless he is happy with what he has found and looks forward to his new job.
However, to his dismay, he eventually learns that he will be paid a smaller amount than
he had initially thought. This upsets him greatly and he considers resigning the post. Yet,
he sticks with it and eventually is led to give his first sermon. He chooses his text and
gives a wonderful sermon on the verse, “But seek first His kingdom and His
righteousness.”29 The pastor’s sermon is well received yet a question remains. Is there not
some discrepancy between the pastor’s life and the verse that he is sermonizing? The
pastor himself is very clearly not seeking the kingdom of God first and foremost, but is
instead concerned with his salary. The response that Kierkegaard envisions the church
fathers giving is, “Quite right, that is just the way he should preach; this is what is
required of him. It all hinges on the doctrine and on its being proclaimed pure and
unadulterated.”30 Kierkegaard sees Christianity in his time as being solely focused on
doctrine. It doesn’t matter if the pastor follows the doctrine, his actions outside of his

This will be examined in more detail in Chapter 2.
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sermon are irrelevant. All that matters is that he gets the doctrine correct, and preaches it
in the right way. As long as this is done, Christianity is preserved as it should be. Finding
this whole approach problematic, Kierkegaard wishes to work against it. If all that you
have to do to be a good Christian is agree with the official Church doctrine, regardless of
what you believe or how you act, then it is quite easy for anyone to be a Christian. This
valuation of doctrine over existential requirements is what causes the illusion of
Christendom to fall over Kierkegaard's Denmark.
All of this paints a picture for us of what Kierkegaard thinks Christianity is not.
Christianity is not Christendom. Christendom is overly concerned with tradition, public
spectacle, formal organizations, and doctrine. Christendom wants to make sure that every
person goes to church weekly and that they participate in the community and beliefs
ascribed by the official church. Christendom thinks that it’s more important for the
individual to believe all the right things than for them to act in a certain way. From the
standpoint of Christendom, it doesn’t matter if you truly believe in Christ, as long as you
do what the church tells you to do and were baptized, then you are good to go. It is this
general approach to Christianity that Kierkegaard is fighting against. Given that this isn’t
what Kierkegaard thinks Christianity is, let us now take a quick detour into a description
of what Kierkegaard is aimed at: true Christianity.
As will be explained in much greater detail in chapter two, Kierkegaard thinks
that there are two different approaches to truth, the subjective and the objective. The
objective is concerned with knowledge and facts, while the subjective is concerned with
the relationship that the individual has to the truth. For Kierkegaard, both are necessary
parts of true Christianity. We must be passionate in our approach to the truth (subjective)
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but must also make claims that are objectively true, such as that Christ is God, or that we
are sinners. We cannot possess the objective truth but lack the subjective approach, for to
do so might land us somewhere close to Christendom. Such an approach is only
concerned with getting the answers correct, but not at all with transforming the
individual. At the same time, we can’t take a purely subjective approach, for true
Christianity requires us to worship Christ and to follow his commands, and not merely to
act on our passions. So both the objective and subjective are needed. However,
Kierkegaard claims multiple times in Postscript that Christianity is essentially subjective.
Though we need to make sure that we are worshipping the correct God, the most
important factor is that we are worshipping with passion and commitment. Thus, in
understanding what Christianity is for Kierkegaard, our first recognition is that
Christianity is focused around a changed individual. Christianity is not as much about the
content of our beliefs as it is about our direct relationship with the divine.
Kierkegaard envisions human existence as fitting into one of three stages. The
first stage is the aesthetic, and he thinks that the majority of human beings are in this
stage. The aesthetic stage is characterized by immediate pleasure. Individuals in this stage
are concerned with doing the most pleasurable thing as often as they can. All of their
goals in life are built around pleasure, and everything is done for that sole purpose. The
next stage is the ethical, which is marked by meaningful choice. The ethical stage is
where human beings make choices according to certain universal principles. These
principles, such as, “murder is wrong” guide our actions and form the basis for all of our
desires and wills. Beyond the ethical, we find the religious, which Kierkegaard then
separates further into two categories, Religiousness A and Religiousness B.
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Religiousness A is characterized by Kierkegaard as a religiousness of immanence.
It is generally accompanied by a sense of guilt before the divine. However, Religiousness
A is not distinctly Christian, and thus Climacus, for instance, characterizes Socrates as
having existed within Religiousness A. Where the ethical provides us with rules to live
by, Religiousness A is a recognition of something beyond those rules of morality, but
something which we cannot necessarily achieve or know. Thus, we feel a sense of guilt
before it, as we recognize our lack even if we don’t quite know what we are lacking. In
Practice in Christianity, Anti-Climacus identifies a type of offense that comes with
Religiousness A.31 He writes, “that is not related to Christ as Christ (the God-man) but to
him simply as an individual human being who comes into collision with an established
order.”32 This type of offense stems from an individual having come into conflict with the
existing way of doing things and pushing against it. This type of offense is not essentially
Christian, as it can occur in any situation in which an individual rebels against the
established order. For instance, Westphal notes that Socrates fighting against the old
guard of Athens would fulfill this requirement. So we see Religiousness A as being a
proto-Christianity, if you will. It comes into being by recognizing something beyond the
ethical, and feeling guilt in the face of that thing, but it doesn’t yet recognize Christ as
God.
Religiousness B, on the other hand, is the distinctly Christian religiousness.
Religiousness B is transcendent in nature and recognizes Christ as God. When this
recognition occurs, the individual sense of guilt is transformed into a sense of sin. Instead
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of being conscious of some lack, we become acutely conscious of our sin in the face of
God. This consciousness also breaks, for us, any connection that we might have thought
we had to the divine. In becoming conscious of sin we recognize that we are wholly other
from God. Westphal identifies a second kind of offense that accompanies Religiousness
B. This offense stems from, as Anti-Climacus puts it, “loftiness, that an individual human
being speaks or acts as if he were God, declares himself to be God.”33 As we move from
Religiousness A to B, we recognize that we are not the divine, and that we are wholly
different from the divine, and take offense. Religiousness B is thus the distinctly
Christian religiousness and that which Kierkegaard wants to drive his audience toward.
Westphal goes on to recognize a third type of religiousness, though one not
named by Kierkegaard. Westphal refers to this as Religiousness C, and it stems from his
analysis of the three types of offense. The first type comes as we enter into Religiousness
A, the second type as we enter into B, and thus he claims that the third type must come as
we enter into another form of religiousness, that of C. He claims that the third type of
offense comes from the recognition that God became a man, and a lowly one at that.
Christ was a human who suffered and bled, who was poor and lowly. This type of offense
comes as we enter into Religiousness C, which is characterized by the requirement to act
Christ-like, and very specifically, to have self-giving (agape) love for all of our
neighbors. Thus, though Climacus never seems to outright recognize it as such, the
attempt to imitate Christ, the fulfillment of Religiousness C, seems to be the goal that
Kierkegaard is driving towards. For this reason he finds the current state of Christendom
problematic and wishes to move his audience away from it, as Christendom is concerned
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with passively believing what you’ve been instructed to believe and not imitating Christ
and being a doer of the Word.
Recognizing the illusion of Christendom, Kierkegaard wishes to remove it. But
how does one go about removing an illusion that affects nearly every single individual?
Kierkegaard presents us with one option, writing,
“Every once in a while a pastor makes a little fuss in the pulpit about there being
something not quite right with all these many Christians – but all those who hear
him and who are present there, consequently all those he is speaking to, are
Christians, and of course he is not speaking to those he is speaking about. This is
most appropriately called simulated motion. -Every once in a while a religious
enthusiast appears. He makes an assault on Christendom; he makes a big noise,
denounces nearly all as not being Christians – and he accomplishes nothing. He
does not take into account that an illusion is not so easy to remove.”34
The direct approach is one that Kierkegaard does not find advisable. On one hand we
might end up preaching to the choir when we tell a group of Christians that there is
something wrong with Christianity. Those who hear our message will assume that we are
talking about some other group of Christians, perhaps some new heretical approach, or
some group from another society. Thus our message falls on deaf ears, for there is an
assumed difference in those we are talking to and those we are talking about. Our other
direct option of trying to remove the illusion is to confront everyone and denounce them
as not being Christians. But as Kierkegaard mentions, this fails to take into account the
strength of the illusion. If I consider my Christianity as something that is central to my
identity, in the same way that I consider my nationality central to my identity, how might
one tell me that that I am not actually a Christian? It would be as if Kierkegaard were to
say to one of his countrymen, “You are not Danish.” The Dane might respond, “But of
course I am Danish, I was born in Denmark, I speak Danish, and I pay taxes to Denmark,
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besides that I have lived here my whole life and so have my parents. How am I not
Danish?”35 The direct approach in which those who consider themselves Christians are
denounced will result only in those individuals dismissing the individual denouncing
them. They will consider him or her a religious extremist, one who is mentally unstable,
and thus one who should not be listened to. It might even go further as to solidify them in
their illusion, certain that their beliefs must be true.
Thus Kierkegaard envisions a number of considerations that the individual who
wishes to remove the illusion must constantly keep in mind. He first mentions that we
cannot remove the illusion directly, but rather that only by approaching the problem
indirectly can any progress be made.36 Kierkegaard ties this indirect approach to patience.
The individual who wants to remove the illusion of Christendom must act patiently, for
lacking patience will lead someone to make a direct attack. Given that Kierkegaard
describes this indirect strategy as “approach[ing] from behind” we can envision this as an
almost sneaky approach.37 In order to be indirect one must approach the target in such a
way that they are not aware. It takes time to do this as one must be very careful with their
movements. Kierkegaard writes, “Generally speaking, there is nothing that requires as
gentle a treatment as the removal of an illusion.”38 We might think of a doctor trying to
give a vaccine to a young child, distracting them while gently administering something
painful. Thus, Kierkegaard finds patience to be necessary to the indirect approach. To this
end, Kierkegaard claims that the religious author must start by becoming popular. In
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order to accomplish this, one must publish a book in the aesthetic vein.39 Having done
this, our author must continue in their writings to slowly move their audience towards a
religious goal. Kierkegaard's strategy revolves around this deception. The reader thinks
that the author is an aesthete, a lifestyle that the reader shares. Thus the reader engages
the author, convinced that they are like-minded. However, over time the author slowly
nudges the reader towards the religious, but in a way that the reader does not overtly
notice. If the change takes too long, the reader will think that the author has merely
changed their mind and is no longer an aesthete, and if the change happens too suddenly
then the reader will dismiss the author and move on. Thus the religious author who
wishes to strip the illusion from their reader must start with a deception, and with
patience slowly bring the religious forward.
Kierkegaard was cognizant of the treachery that was involved with his plan to
remove the illusion of Christendom.40 As was mentioned, such a course of action was
quite difficult and Kierkegaard imagined that if approached in any other manner, his
project would end with the public merely dismissing him.41 No one wants to be told that
they are indeed not a Christian when they consider themselves to be a Christian. Mooney
argues that this is partially due to the fact that no neutral standpoint exists for one’s own
self.42 I cannot analyze whether or not a deeply held belief is authentic from a neutral or
abstract standpoint, because such a belief is central to who I am. Thus, in order to
overcome the illusion, Kierkegaard turned to deception. To that end, Kierkegaard
For Kierkegaard, the aesthetic is the immediate. Thus an aesthetic publication is one that provides
immediate gratification or pleasure in the eyes of the reader.
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conceals his true goals from his contemporary audience.
This deception begins with the use of pseudonyms. The majority of Kierkegaard's
work was published pseudonymously. These pseudonyms took up a number of various
positions. As was noted, Kierkegaard thinks that a successful religious author needs to
start with an aesthetic work, and he did with Either/Or. His pseudonymous works then
slowly turned towards the religious across a number of texts. However, one important
thing to note is that none of the pseudonyms ever called themselves Christians. Instead,
they were always individuals who very much admired Christianity and who only sought
to more fully understand it. Kierkegaard declares, “If it is an illusion that all are
Christians, and if something is to be done, it must be done indirectly, not by someone
who loudly declares himself to be an extraordinary Christian, but by someone who, better
informed, even declares himself not to be a Christian.”43 If I declare myself a great
Christian who has access to the true teachings of Christ, which declare that you are doing
things entirely wrong, your reaction is likely to be a negative one. You will dismiss me or
think me a heretic or zealot. So instead, I should try to approach you as a non-Christian
who is merely interested in Christianity. This kind of an approach will leave you open to
exploring the questions without getting defensive concerning them. We see Kierkegaard
and his pseudonyms make this movement a number of times. When writing under his
own name, Kierkegaard constantly disavows that he is a good Christian. He instead refers
to himself as someone who knows what Christianity is; he claims no spiritual superiority,
only intellectual superiority.44 Also in the Postscript, Fear and Trembling, Practice in
Christianity, and many other works, we see Kierkegaard's pseudonyms claim that he is
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not a Christian nor a religious authority. Here we see Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms doing
something akin to Socrates in that they claim to not be a Christian just as Socrates claims
to not know the answers to the questions that he’s asking.45 Given his explanations
concerning the need for an indirect approach, we can only assume that Kierkegaard takes
this kind of an approach because he is trying to accomplish the very specific goal of
bringing the religious forward.
Part of this grand deception of Kierkegaard's involved an attempt to convince the
public that he could not have been the author of the pseudonymous works. He had a very
strict publishing strategy in which he would publish pseudonymous works at the same
time as works that he would list himself as the author. In this way, he hoped to dissuade
individuals who thought that he might be publishing the pseudonymous works by arguing
that he could not have written two books at once. He writes, “With my left hand I passed
Either/Or out into the world, with my right hand Two Upbuilding Discourses; but they all
or almost all took the left with their right.”46 Kierkegaard published Either/Or and Two
Upbuilding Discourses within 3 months of each other, and published Repetition, Fear
and Trembling, and Three Upbuilding Discourses all on the same day. He continued a
schedule of that sort throughout his career, publishing multiple works on the same day or
within days of each other to throw off suspicion that he was the author. These actions are
not merely for some sense of artistic fulfillment on Kierkegaard's part, but when we take
into account his claims about what the successful religious author needs to do, we see
how Kierkegaard's publishing are aimed at the religious. If Kierkegaard claims himself as
the author, or is suspected of being the author, the public will ignore his message. They
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will find some reason to dismiss him because of his personal life or something else. But
when the author is unknown, one has to contend with the work itself. So Kierkegaard
removes himself from the picture, and has his pseudonyms instead make the case for
Christianity, but make sure to do so from the standpoint of one who is not a Christian.
Beyond just his publishing strategy, Kierkegaard also tried to act day to day in a
manner that would not arouse suspicion. He describes how this was intentional when,
describing himself, he writes,
“Here was a religious author, but one who began as an esthetic author, and this
first part was the incognito, was the deception. Very early and very thoroughly
initiated into the secret that the world wants to be deceived, I was unable at that
time to choose to pursue this strategy. Quite the opposite, it was a matter of
deceiving inversely on the largest possible scale, of using all my familiarity with
people and their weaknesses and their obtusities – not in order to profit from them
but in order to annihilate myself, to weaken the impression of myself. The secret
of the deception that indulges the world, which wants to be deceived, consists
partly in forming a clique and all that goes with it, in joining one or two of those
mutual admiration societies whose members assist each other by word and pen for
the sake of worldly gain, and partly in hiding from the human throng, never being
seen, in order in this way to produce an effect on the imagination. Therefore the
very opposite had to be done. I had to exist and safeguard an existence in absolute
isolation, but I also had to make a point of being seen at every time of the day,
living, so to speak, on the street, associating myself with every Tom, Dick, and
Harry in the most casual situations. This is the truth's way of deceiving, the eversure way to weaken the impression of oneself in the world, furthermore certainly
also the way of self-renunciation taken by men quite different from me in order to
make people aware.”47
Here we see Kierkegaard describing the deception that he is employing. But beyond the
literary deception, he has to extend the deception into his life. Kierkegaard was well
known for going on daily walks throughout Copenhagen.48 In this passage we see the
method to his madness. Kierkegaard argued that a successful religious author must start
with aesthetic works and slowly lead to the religious, and also that in order for the
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religious to come forward, the author cannot claim to be a good religious individual. Thus
Kierkegaard needed to make himself into a nobody so that his works could stand on their
own. His strategy of double publishing and his daily walks seem to be a part of this. He
made it a point to be seen on his walks throughout the city and to engage with everyone
whom he saw, a skill for which he was quite well known. All of this seems to be for the
purpose of deception. It’s easy for us to imagine the public dismissing Kierkegaard’s
works once they found out who the author was. If you know that it’s Kierkegaard who is
challenging your religious beliefs, then you can find an excuse to disregard him. Maybe
you think of his failed engagement with his Regine Olsen as good reason to dismiss him,
or you laugh at the fact that Kierkegaard was, in all likelihood, a hunchback. Whatever
your reason, you can find flaws in the human that provide enough of a psychological
reason for you to dismiss the work. Yet, if the work has no real human individual
attached to it, you can only contend with the ideas found within it. His daily life was
warped in service to the goal of the religious author. In all that he did, both in writing and
in daily action, we see Kierkegaard wholly concerned with removing the illusion of
Christendom from Denmark.
In a short essay entitled On My Work as an Author, Kierkegaard lays out this
process from start to finish. He begins by mentioning that his works, taking as a totality,
can only be understood religiously,49 a claim that he echoes in other writings.50 By this,
Kierkegaard seems to mean that his writings as a whole only make sense when we
approach them as being aimed at what he considers the truly religious, which is a specific
variety of Christianity. Given his commitment to also bringing about the truly religious in
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his audience, we can see this as being part of the interpretive apparatus that is required of
us. Understanding that the writings are of this religious nature allows us to recognize how
they are a vast deception. Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writings work to deceive the
reader into the truth.51 But how exactly does the deception function, and over what is
Kierkegaard deceiving his audience? He gives us some clues at the end of the short essay.
He writes, “Here again, the movement is: to arrive at the simple; the movement is: from
the public to ‘the single individual.’ In other words, there is in a religious sense no public
but only individuals, because the religious is earnestness, and earnestness is: the single
individual.”52 There are a few ways to read this passage. Those who are interested in
reading Kierkegaard’s personal life into his philosophy, an approach that I don't think is
entirely problematic, but which I find fruitless if it is the primary concern, generally read
“the single individual” as referring to Regine Olsen, Kierkegaard's ex-fiancée. However, I
think that interpreting “the single individual” as a reference to Kierkegaard's audience is
much more fitting when we examine Kierkegaard’s overall views concerning his
authorship. Though he may well be referring to Regine in whole or in part, if we are to
take his other claims in The Point of View seriously, then we must recognize that at least
in part, Kierkegaard is addressing his Danish countrymen who consider themselves
Christian but who lack what Kierkegaard thinks is truly Christian. In this passage
Kierkegaard claims to want to separate the individual from the public at large, a public
which was under the illusion of Christendom. In order to have the best chance at
removing this illusion from the individual, the individual must be isolated, for otherwise
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the illusion will be perpetuated by the individual’s peers. By separating the individual,
Kierkegaard can then remove the illusion by re-revealing Christianity to the individual.
While the individual might still deceive themself and thus perpetuate the illusion,
removing the external influence provides Kierkegaard with the best possible chance at
removing the illusion.
In Mackey’s examination of Kierkegaard’s works, he distinguishes between the
possibility of a doctrinal goal in which Kierkegaard is looking to get the church to take a
specific stance on a theological issue and a poetic or existential goal in which
Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms are working to re-reveal Christianity to a public who
already assumed themselves to be Christians. Mackey’s work is primarily concerned with
arguing that we need to interpret Kierkegaard first and foremost as a poet and thus we
have to conclude that the poetic goal is of central importance.53 Kierkegaard is not
looking to convert pagans to Christianity, but rather to remove the illusion of
Christendom from those who already consider themselves Christian. He is looking to
make Christianity difficult to a populace who thinks it a simple matter of believing the
correct doctrines. His goal is to re-reveal Christianity in all of its awe and terror to the
isolated individual, therefore forcing them to reconcile the two worldviews: what
Kierkegaard considers the illusion of Christendom and what he considers the truly
Christian.
Section 2: With All Your Power, What Would You Do?

In examining Kierkegaard's goals and constraints for his authorship, we inevitably
run into the question of what Kierkegaard actually thinks he can do about the problem. If
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Kierkegaard is to remove the illusion of Christendom, then he must think that at least
some individuals who identify as Christian are not actually true Christians.54 Thus his
goal seems aimed at converting these contemporaries of his to Christianity. This goal
runs into a specific problem that Kierkegaard identifies as the problem of the teacher and
learner, hearkening us back to the paradox that we find in the Meno.55 Johannes
Climacus, Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author of Philosophical Fragments, begins his
book by reminding us of the paradox that Meno brings up in his dialogue with Socrates.
Socrates claimed that he did not know what virtue was, and thus could not answer Meno's
question as to whether virtue could be taught. Despite not knowing virtue, Socrates
engages Meno on the topic until Meno gives up in exasperation. He goes on the ask
Socrates how Socrates would search for virtue or recognize the correct answer if Socrates
knows nothing of virtue. Kierkegaard is dealing with a very similar problem. Meno's
paradox essentially boils down to the question of learning. How does one learn
something? For seemingly if we know nothing about a subject, we cannot recognize the
truth. So how does one gain the truth? For Kierkegaard this question is directly related to
the truth of Christianity. If one knows nothing of Christianity, how does one look for it?
If the divine truth of God has not been revealed to someone, how could they learn it? This
is an important question for us to engage, for it directly speaks to the purpose that
Kierkegaard sees for his authorship. If one can gain the truth through learning, then
Kierkegaard only needs to become the teacher. He needs to instruct his contemporaries
We have seen, thus far, some indications of what Christianity isn’t. True Christianity, for Kierkegaard, is
not doctrine, nor does it relate to social custom. We have seen this much in the parables that
Kierkegaard uses as criticisms of Danish Christendom. As will be explored in further detail in the next
chapter, Kierkegaard relates Christianity specifically to the subjective and indirect approach and thus we
get a glimpse of what authentic Christianity looks like. However, it is nonetheless outside the bounds of
this project to fully delineate authentic and inauthentic Christianity in the works of Kierkegaard.
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and then they can know the truth. But if the truth cannot be gained through learning, what
purpose can Kierkegaard's authorship serve?
Climacus examines this situation from start to finish. We start with ignorance, for
we do not yet know the truth. “The seeker [of truth] up until that moment must not have
possessed the truth, not even in the form of ignorance.”56 Our initial state is one in which
not merely do we not know the truth, but we don't know that we don't know. We lack the
Socratic wisdom of minimally being aware of our ignorance. This is also precisely the
position that Kierkegaard finds his audience in. Not only are his countrymen not true
Christians, they also do not know that they are not true Christians. They are under the
illusion of Christendom which has convinced them that they are all Christians. If you are
aware of your ignorance then you are only a seeker of the truth, but this is not the
position of Kierkegaard's contemporaries. For this reason, he refers to the default form of
existence as “untruth”. So the question that we must ask is this: How does one reveal the
truth to someone who is untruth?
Climacus goes on to phrase the question in terms of a teacher and a learner. The
learner is untruth and the task of the teacher is to bring the truth to the learner. So what
must the teacher do? Climacus starts with Socrates' response in the Meno, that of
recollection. Can the teacher cause the learner to recollect? In this situation, since the
learner is untruth, the only thing that the learner can recollect is untruth. Thus Climacus
finds that the teacher can cause the learner to recollect her untruth. However, recollecting
your untruth does not provide you with a pathway to find the truth. Instead, it only makes
you aware that you lack the truth. You still don't know what you are looking for, you
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merely know that you do not have it. In causing this recollection, the teacher isn't actually
giving you any amount of knowledge, but instead is turning you inwards, and it is this
inwardness that brings forward your awareness of your untruth. So in this situation, the
teacher isn't actually accomplishing much, for the teacher is only acting as the occasion
of recollection, not the occasion of truth. The teacher is not teaching truth to the learner,
rather, he is only propelling her to recollect.
Once the learner is aware of her untruth, how does she gain the truth? Climacus
writes, “Now, if the learner is to obtain the truth, the teacher must first bring it to him, but
not only that. Along with it, he must provide him with the condition for understanding
it.”57 As untruth, you don't yet possess the ability to even understand the truth, for you
only know untruth. The truth is wholly foreign to you and thus you must first gain what
Climacus calls the condition. The condition refers to the capability to recognize the truth.
If you lack the condition, then even if the truth were given to you, you could not
recognize it. Therefore, Climacus writes, “Ultimately, all instruction depends on the
presence of the condition; if it is lacking, then a teacher is capable of nothing, because in
the second case, the teacher, before beginning to teach, must transform, not reform, the
learner.”58 The condition is not something that can be taught, for it is a capability to
understand and recognize, and a capability is not the kind of thing that can be passed
from teacher to learner. Instead, the learner must be transformed; something about their
human constitution must change. They must become a different kind of creature, one who
possesses a new capability. For Climacus, no human teacher could cause this
transformation, and thus he labels this teacher a god. Only the god could transform the
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learner in such a way that she now possesses the condition. How exactly this process
occurs is not something that Climacus endeavors to explain, but given the description that
we find, the transformation of the individual appears to be miraculous in nature.
So the god transforms the learner and gives her the condition. Once possessing the
condition, she can learn the truth, but doing so is not merely an intellectual matter for as
will be explained in the next chapter, Kierkegaard thinks of Christianity as a way of
existing and not merely a set of beliefs. Climacus goes on to name the state of untruth,
sin. With this we can see the full picture that he is painting. Humans who are in sin do not
even recognize themselves as sinners, much less do they understand the truth of
Christianity. Thus the first step that must be taken is for the sinners to recognize
themselves as sinners. They must accept their untruth. Having done that, they must also
possess the condition. The condition has to be given by God, it is not something that can
be sought out and achieved through hard work. Only God can transform the sinners into
creatures who can recognize truth. Once the sinners recognize their state of sin and they
possess the condition, then they can begin to learn the truth of Christianity. Since this
process is not something that can be achieved solely by the sinners, Climacus is thus
disallowing any possibility of earning one’s salvation. For in order to earn one’s
salvation, one must assumedly do good, yet if one does not possess the condition, then
one lacks the ability to even understand what good is, much less do it. Salvation, and the
truth of Christianity, only come to us through divine grace.
Thus we see that Kierkegaard cannot act as the teacher, for only the god can be
the teacher that Climacus describes. In this situation, how can Kierkegaard function? He
provides us with some clues when we return to The Point of View.
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“A person may have the good fortune of doing a great deal for another, may have
the good fortune of leading him to the place to which he desires to lead him, and
to hold to what in essence is continually under discussion here, may have the
good fortune of helping that person to become a Christian. But this is not in my
power.”59
Kierkegaard seems very aware that he cannot cause a conversion. He cannot make others
Christian, for he cannot provide anyone with the condition. Again we return to Meno’s
problem in that if Kierkegaard speaks to those without the condition, they cannot
understand him, and if he speaks to those with the condition, he is wasting his time for
they already have access to the truth. In this situation, Kierkegaard's possibilities seem
very limited. Either he functions as the teacher who causes the learner to recollect their
untruth or he addresses himself to the learners who possess the condition and he functions
merely as a teacher who wishes to disseminate knowledge to his students in the same
manner that every teacher does. In the first case, Climacus thinks that the teachers job is
insufficient, as the teacher is not actually teaching anything to the learner. Instead the
learner is traveling down a path of self-discovery, and at best all that the teacher can do is
help to start them on that path. If this is Kierkegaard's plan for his authorship, then his
goals are rather mundane. This doesn't match up with what he's claimed to want out of his
authorship. In the second case, Kierkegaard would be functioning only as a standard
teacher. He would be ministering to those who already possess the condition and his
function would be to help them understand the truth in a greater sense. This more closely
matches his claims, but still does not directly addresses the goals that he has laid out for
his authorship. So if Kierkegaard operates as neither of these functions, what part does he
play in reference to the problem of the teacher and the learner?
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It's telling, I think, that Climacus constantly refers back to Socrates, and even
devotes some time to the concept of Socrates as the midwife. Climacus has maintained
that the teacher cannot provide the truth, nor can the teacher transform the learner, and in
this way I think that the midwife analogy is apt. The midwife cannot give birth, she can
only deliver the child, and here I think we find Kierkegaard's role, as he writes, “between
one human being and another to deliver is the highest; giving birth indeed belongs to the
god.”60 Kierkegaard's role is not to provide the truth, nor to give the individual the
condition, for neither are things that he can accomplish. Instead, he is here to help deliver
the truth. The truth that he is going to deliver is one that will be more fully explored in
chapter five, but suffice to say, Kierkegaard is helping us to birth the truth about
ourselves. He wants us to see ourselves truly and clearly. This truth, that we are sinners in
need of a savior, can only be given to us by God, and thus Kierkegaard is not providing
this. Instead he is helping us to receive it, to make sure that we do not turn away or that
we are not unduly harmed in the process. The midwife’s job is to safeguard the health of
the mother while bringing the child into the world. Kierkegaard is not trying to merely
teach, for such an approach would be overly concerned with knowledge. Instead he is
trying to bring the truth out of us, the recognition of what we truly are.61
Climacus later remarks that the teacher is the occasion for the learner to
understand herself. The teacher is not giving truth to the learner, but instead he is only
functioning as a vehicle for the learner's self-discovery. This matches the line of thinking
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that we find in The Point of View concerning the job of the teacher and the helper.
Kierkegaard writes that the individual who wants to help anyone must first humble
himself. “But all true helping begins with a humbling. The helper must first humble
himself under the person he wants to help and thereby understand that to help is not to
dominate but to serve.”62 This aligns with what path that we see Kierkegaard's authorship
taking. He thinks that most individuals live an aesthetic existence and thus he begins his
authorship with an aesthetic work. Over time he slowly tries to bring the religious
forward, but he only does this first after claiming that he is not a Christian, and also after
starting where his audience already is. “To be a teacher is not to say: This is the way it is,
nor is it to assign lessons and the like. No, to be a teacher is truly to be the learner.
Instruction begins with this, that you, the teacher, learn from the learner, place yourself in
what he has understood and how he has understood it.”63 When we combine the ideas that
the teacher must learn from the learner, that the teacher must humble himself beneath the
learner, and that Kierkegaard’s goal is to move his audience from the aesthetic mode of
existence to the religious, an image of the teacher comes forth. The teacher is not the
pastor who preaches from the pulpit. The teacher, for Kierkegaard, is the individual who
seeks to understand the learner and be humbled before her. This act of humbling allows
the teacher to connect with the learner and thus communicate on a level that the learner
understands. Kierkegaard seems to have this in mind when he claims that he needs to
start with the aesthetic, with the pleasure seeker. An individual who only seeks pleasure
in life will not understand the appeal of a strictly religious life, for such a thing lacks
pleasure. The pleasure seeker and the religious individual live in incommensurable
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paradigms. So in order to prompt the movement of the pleasure seeker towards the
religious, one must first become a pleasure seeker and speak in terms that the pleasure
seeker understands. This is what it is to be a teacher for Kierkegaard, and we can see this
not only in the structure of his authorship but also with the relatively narrow role that he
sees himself playing in the grand scheme of things. He is not the individual who shows a
sinner their sins, or who shows them the truth of Christianity. Instead, he is the teacher
who humbles himself before his audience and helps deliver the truth as a midwife,
specifically to an individual who possesses the condition.
How exactly does this midwifery occur?64 Kierkegaard identifies what his
authorship has been trying to accomplish when he writes, “[I have] worked to arouse
restlessness oriented toward inward deepening.”65 Kierkegaard, functioning as the
midwife, cannot actually communicate truth to his audience. So instead he sees his
function as being the agent of inwardness. He works to turn his audience inward, in this
hoping that they will see themselves in a true sense. If I am under the illusion of
Christendom and you wish for me to become a true Christian, two things seemingly must
happen. First, I must throw off the illusion, and second I must accept Christianity.
Kierkegaard readily acknowledges that he cannot bring about the second of those
occurrences. Thus he is aimed at the first. You cannot simply tell me that I am under the
illusion of Christendom, nor can you make me see it. In order for me to overcome the
illusion, I have to first recognize it. Thus, when Kierkegaard wishes to engender
inwardness, he is driving towards the only thing that can overcome the illusion, the single
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individual. The individual needs to turn inward and examine themselves in order to
recognize that there is a contradiction between the belief that they are a good Christian
and their actions which betray what Kierkegaard thinks is the truly Christian. Only when
this occurs can the individual move past the illusion and thus enter into the possibility of
true Christianity.
These two actions, the removal of the illusion and the acceptance of Christianity
must happen in an ordered fashion. I cannot truly accept Christianity while I am under the
illusion of Christendom. Thus, Kierkegaard’s goal is the removal of the illusion.
However, when we examine the acceptance of Christianity we realize that there is
actually specific content to Christianity that I must relate to properly. So, Kierkegaard’s
diatribe against doctrine doesn’t stem from the fact that doctrine is meaningless when it
comes to Christianity, but rather that doctrine should only come into play after the
illusion has been removed. Because of this, Kierkegaard often discusses Christian
doctrine and the truth of Christianity. The nature of God and Christianity, the nature of
our relationship with God, the possibility of salvation, and our consciousness of sin,
among many other things, are all relevant and important topics for Kierkegaard.66
However, only the individual who has turned from untruth and is trying to properly orient
themselves towards Christianity has concern for things of this sort as they relate to the
content and doctrine of Christianity. The problem that has arisen is that instead of
orienting ourselves properly and then examining the content so that we can be oriented
towards the correct thing, we have skipped the step of orientation. Thus, the illusion of
Christendom tells us that we don’t need to exist in a certain way, we just have to have the
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correct object of belief. As will be explored in the next chapter, this runs afoul of the idea
that Christianity is essentially subjective for Kierkegaard.
With his primary goal being to overcome the illusion of Christendom, and thus
engender inwardness in his audience, Kierkegaard's plan of action ends up being quite
different from the that of the church during his time. He writes,
“For a long time the strategy employed was to utilize everything to get as many as
possible, everyone is possible, to accept Christianity – but then not to be so very
scrupulous about whether what one got them to accept actually was Christianity.
My strategy was with the help of God to utilize everything to make clear what in
truth Christianity's requirement is.”67
By presenting those who think they are Christian with the requirements of true
Christianity, Kierkegaard is hoping that they will reject the illusion. This is not easily
accomplished though, and thus we see Kierkegaard engaging in what he refers to as the
vast deception, the use of pseudonyms, his daily walks, his publishing schedule, and the
way in which he addresses his audience as one who is not a Christian but who is merely
interested in what Christianity truly looks like. What we've examined thus far
demonstrates that Kierkegaard's hope for his authorship is that it will challenge the
individual to think and judge for themselves as to whether or not the illusion of
Christendom that they are under is true Christianity. Thus Kierkegaard wants to turn them
inward, for he cannot accomplish this realization for them.
Section 3: Who Gets Saved from Tonight’s Elimination?

The claim that Kierkegaard is trying to re-introduce Christianity to his
countrymen who are under the illusion of Christendom can lead us to also question the
breadth of applicability of Kierkegaard's works. As I've argued, Kierkegaard sees himself
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as the midwife, the author who can push the individual to turn inward and see
themselves, as if in a mirror. But to whom does this apply? If God is providing the
condition, something that Kierkegaard cannot do, who exactly has the condition? If the
condition is limited to a certain number of individuals then Kierkegaard's target audience
can only be those people, for he wants the religious to come forward, and the condition is
a prerequisite for the religious.
The question of theological universalism comes into play here. The doctrine of
theological universalism states that all persons will eventually experience salvation. If
Kierkegaard were to accept this approach, then his writings would serve to hasten the
salvation of some, perhaps. However, I concur with Mulder that there is good reason to
believe that Kierkegaard rejects the doctrine of universalism. Kierkegaard's pseudonym,
Climacus, describes faith as a decision. If faith, and thus salvation, require an act on the
part of the individual, then it is always possible for the individual to reject God, even if
God has provided them with the condition, for faith requires that act of willing. This is
the line of thought that Ferreira takes when examining different models of
Kierkegaardian faith. As Ferreira writes, “a model in which our eyes are opened but our
free activity is still needed, a model which is neither a deliberate decision nor totally
passive and inexplicable.”68 Ferreira argues that for Kierkegaard faith is not something
that you can accomplish by yourself, and simultaneously something that requires your
free activity. As was shown earlier, only God can reform the individual and thus convert
her from untruth to truth in ignorance. This conversion allows for the learner to recognize
that they lack the truth and they also now possess the ability to understand the truth when
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they come across it. Thus we see that God is required for salvation. The learner cannot
understand the truth and thus cannot save herself until God gives her the condition.
At the same time, the learner plays an important part in their reception of the
truth. There is some amount of free will that is involved in faith. Ferreira analyzes the
language that Climacus uses when describing the situation for the Socratic, the original
problem of learning that we find in the Meno, versus the situation of faith. In both
instances, Climacus refers to “willing” as a salient feature in overcoming ignorance.
However, Ferreira points out that when we look at the Socratic, Climacus says that we
need to will in order to understand the truth even if we already have the truth. On this
account of things, will doesn't seem to imply a deliberate decision, but instead a kind of
focus. For this reason, Ferreira argues that the “decision” of the individual when it comes
to the possession of faith is not a purely volitional act. God has already revealed the truth
and provided the learner with the condition. Yet, in order to fully understand the truth, to
appropriate it, we must actively attend, concentrate, and focus on it.69 This is the act of
willing, it is a shift in focus and perspective. So the will of the learner is not to save
themselves, or to accept the salvation of God, but instead to attend to the truth that has
been revealed to them in such a way that they bring it inward and become changed
individuals.
When we consider that this act of will is one that Kierkegaard finds necessary, we
can see the purpose that his authorship might serve. If he is a universalist then the
authorship serves no necessary function, for all will eventually be reconciled with God.
Instead, Kierkegaard seeks to affect those who already possess the condition and to
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reorient their attention inwards, thus nudging their will towards the kind of focus and
perspective that is needed for faith.70 This is not something that he can strictly cause, but
he hopes to influence his readers by drawing them inward, by creating a mirror for their
soul.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the purpose behind Kierkegaard’s writings. I’ve
argued that Kierkegaard wants to strip away the illusion of Christendom for his audience
and that he sees this as an important step in individuals being able to move towards
Christianity. I’ve shown that Kierkegaard cannot bring individuals to Christianity
himself, for such a thing can only be accomplished by God, and instead that he tries to
function as a philosophical-religious midwife. He works to properly orient us by bringing
about inwardness. This understanding of his goal as an author helps to frame what comes
in chapter two, which is an examination of Kierkegaard’s communication style. In order
for us to fully analyze Kierkegaard’s use of parables, we must first know what he’s trying
to accomplish as an author, as well as what principles guide his writing and
communication style.
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Chapter 2: Kierkegaard the Illusionist
“Behold, they are one people, and they all have the same language. And this is what they began to do, and
now nothing which they purpose to do will be impossible for them.” – Genesis 11:6

In this chapter, I will be trying to accomplish two different goals. First, an
understanding of indirect communication is necessary in order to examine the concept of
parable that will happen in later chapters, and thus I will work to develop such an
understanding. Secondly, a significant portion of this chapter will function as a literature
review, as there is very little literature on parables in Kierkegaard, but quite a bit on
indirect communication. Therefore, much of this chapter will proceed as explication
through literature review. I will oftentimes present an author’s view, followed by
criticism or support of mine, usually culminating in some kind of synthesis that presents a
full understanding of the different concepts that I engage.
If we accept that Kierkegaard’s goals are religious in nature, we next must ask
how he intends to accomplish those goals. I have already argued that Kierkegaard
recognizes his inability to turn people into Christians and thus that he is aimed at turning
individuals inward so that they can recognize the truth that God has already revealed to
them. While Kierkegaard spends a lot of time in both his pseudonymous and his named
works discussing Christian doctrine, he doesn’t seem to think that an explication of
doctrine is going to accomplish his goal, for reasons outlined in the last chapter. Instead,
he employs the use of indirect communication, which I will endeavor to explain in this
chapter.
In order to fully appreciate Kierkegaard’s doctrine of indirect communication, we
must first explore the approaches to truth that Johannes Climacus, one of Kierkegaard’s
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pseudonyms, writes about in Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical
Fragments. Climacus envisions two different approaches to truth, objective and
subjective. Both of these approaches can be taken towards the same object, but they will
give different outcomes. Climacus argues that the objective approach and the subjective
approach are paired with different forms of communication. He links indirect
communication with the subjective approach and this chapter will begin by exploring this
connection. Climacus is of the opinion that Christianity is ultimately subjective and thus
that communicating Christianity requires indirect communication. This is in line with the
argument that I put together in the last chapter, that Kierkegaard did not want to focus on
Christian doctrine, but instead on inwardness. Doctrine would be the kind of thing that is
connected to direct communication, for it is objective and factual, in a sense. By focusing
on indirect communication and subjectivity, we see Kierkegaard moving Christianity into
the realm of the individual, away from the objective and thus focusing on inwardness.
Examining Kierkegaard’s doctrine of indirect communication leads us into a few
questions surrounding interpretation. Kierkegaard admits that indirect communication is
needed for the religious approach and I’ve argued that, above all, he was a religious
author, and thus Kierkegaard himself needed to employ the indirect method. His
pseudonyms tip us off to this on a number of occasions. For instance, Fear and
Trembling begins with an epigraph that describes an incident of indirect
communication.71 Given these cues, it is reasonable for us to assume that some of
Kierkegaard’s works don’t intend to communicate exactly what is written on the page,
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and instead are an attempt to indirectly communicate with his audience. This situation
leads some scholars to take a suspicious approach to interpretations of Kierkegaard, as it
seems difficult for us to be sure if Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms are communicating
directly or indirectly, in jest or in earnestness. In this chapter I will examine some
arguments to determine whether or not we can trust the writings of Kierkegaard and
meaningfully interpret them. While it is clear that Kierkegaard employs indirect
communication throughout his works, and thus puts his readers in a kind of interpretive
limbo, I will argue that ultimately we can interpret Kierkegaard’s works by using indirect
communication as an interpretive lens.
Section 1: Is the Earth Not Round?

In order to understand the subjective approach and the style of communication
that is required of it, let’s first examine the objective approach. Kierkegaard, through his
pseudonyms, doesn’t spend a lot of time specifically describing objectivity, for the
objective approach should be familiar to most individuals. When we commonly think of
“truth” we think of truth in the objective sense -- that is, truth as something that is
independent of human beings. When we claim that mathematical truths are objective, we
traditionally mean that the mathematical truth will remain regardless of who is perceiving
it or if there is anyone at all to perceive it.72 Kierkegaard points towards this standard
view of truth and knowledge when he writes, “The way of objective reflection turns the
subjective individual into something accidental and thereby turns existence into an
indifferent, vanishing something… the truth also become indifferent, and that is precisely
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its objective validity.”73 The objective approach is concerned primarily with facts that are
independent of human beings. Indeed, as Climacus, the pseudonymous author of
Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, notes, the indifference of
objective truth towards the individual is precisely why we call it objective. Objective
truth and knowledge are independent of human existence, and it is this independence that
gives them the stability that we desire. We want mathematical truths to be objective, for
their objectivity gives them dependability, in that they rely on nothing other than the
nature of the universe.
Climacus notes that a certain kind of communication must be paired with
objectivity. He refers to this type of communication as direct communication. Direct
communication takes the form of a message that ignores both the communicator and
communicatee and their subjective outlooks on life. Instead, a direct communication
looks to clearly transmit information from one source to another. For example, if I were
to tell someone that today was Sunday, I would be directly communicating to that person,
in all likelihood. The context is very important here, as direct communication ideally
occurs in a vacuum of sorts. Had I been telling someone that today was Sunday in a
covert effort to get them to go to church, I would not be directly communicating.
However, if a stranger asked me what day it was and I responded that it was Sunday, I
would be directly communicating with that person. Direct communication has no other
agenda beyond what it communicates directly. Climacus uses the example of the
objective approach to God. “Let us take the knowledge of God as an example.
Objectively, what is reflected upon is that this is the true God.”74 Objectively, our
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concern with God is that we have the correct God, that scripture is accurate, and that our
beliefs correctly correlate with the beliefs that God intends us to have. How an individual
relates to the truth of God, or how that truth affects them are not of concern to the
objective approach. The style of communication that is used needs to reflect the concerns
of the communication. Thus, a direct communication of a religious nature will look to set
out doctrine. In order to directly communicate the objective truth of God to you, I need to
tell you all about God’s existence, God’s nature, God’s moral laws, and any relevant
history of the one true religion. However, at no point am I trying to motivate you to do
anything beyond accepting a certain proposition as true. In this sense, we might imagine
the religious studies professor as inhabiting the sphere of direct communication whereas
the priest or pastor would ideally inhabit the sphere of indirect communication. The
religious studies professor is trying to demonstrate to you the tenets of a certain religion,
outline its arguments and its history. You might be taught about the founders of the
religion or the different sects that grew and waned over time. However, at no point is it
incumbent upon the professor to make you an adherent of said religion. A course in
comparative religion is not designed to make you religious, it is designed to directly
impart knowledge about religions to you. And how does one best communicate this kind
of knowledge? By plainly laying out the facts. Direct communication functions in this
basic manner, that it sticks to objective and factual information and tries to communicate
it as clearly as possible.
Unfortunately, for Kierkegaard, the objective approach doesn’t fully encapsulate
everything that we want out of knowledge and truth. The objective approach is concerned
with factual knowledge and direct communication, and thus is unable to communicate
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something that might relate to or be dependent upon an individual. Climacus gives us the
following situation,
“Suppose, then, that someone wanted to communicate the following conviction:
truth is inwardness, objectively there is no truth, but the appropriation is the truth.
Suppose he had enough zeal and enthusiasm to get it said, because when people
heard it they would be saved. Suppose he said it on every occasion and moved not
only those who sweat easily but also the tough people – what then? Then there
would certainly be some laborers who had been standing idle in the marketplace
and only upon hearing this call would go forth to work in the vineyard – to
proclaim this teaching to all people. And what then? Then he would have
contradicted himself even more.”75
The application of inwardness is not contained within the objective approach and thus I
cannot communicate it directly. Inwardness and appropriation relate to one’s ability to
apply ideas to their own lives and become changed individuals. An explanation of the
concept of inwardness would fall under the objective approach, but ostensibly, one’s
desire for inwardness is not mere knowledge of a concept, but instead is a desire that
drives one to engender inwardness for oneself. The communication of that kind of
practical application falls outside the realm of the objective, for it will both depend upon
and be different for each individual. Thus, the limit of the objective approach
demonstrates the need for a different kind of knowledge.
The objective approach also is unable to fulfill the promise that it holds
concerning reliability. We like objective knowledge and objective truth because they are
not dependent upon any individual and thus are reliable and constant. Climacus draws
this into question with a wonderful little parable about a lunatic. Someone is able to
escape from an insane asylum and decides to head to the nearby town. However, this
lunatic is sane enough to realize that everyone will recognize him as belonging in the

75

Ibid 77

54
insane asylum and thus he will be returned. So, he decides to that he will demonstrate his
sanity to everyone by stating something that is objectively true. He takes a ball and puts it
in his coat tails, and with every step that he takes, the ball hits him and he announces,
“Boom! The earth is round.” Climacus writes, “But is the earth not round? Does the
madhouse demand yet another sacrifice on account of this assumption, as in those days
when everyone assumed it to be as flat as a pancake? Or is he lunatic, the man who hopes
to prove that he is not lunatic by stating a truth universally accepted and universally
regarded as objective?”76 The insane man’s inability to recognize the proper way in
which he should relate to an objective truth is what demonstrates his insanity. The lunatic
is indeed correct that the earth is round, but by failing to recognize the proper place for
that truth and the proper way that we should relate to that truth, he demonstrates his
insanity. Such a truth belongs in a geology or astronomy classroom and it should help
inform us in our scientific understanding of the world. It does not, contrary to the
lunatic’s assumption, demonstrate that one is not insane. Yet, the claim of insanity is
precisely what the objective approach makes of the subjective approach. “But the
objective way is of the opinion that it has a security that the subjective way does not
have. It is of the opinion that it avoids a danger that lies in wait for the subjective way,
and at its maximum that danger is madness. In a solely subjective definition of truth,
lunacy and truth are ultimately indistinguishable, because they may both have
inwardness.”77 The objective approach likes to point out that the solely subjective
approach is identical to madness, for truth just becomes whatever anyone says it is.
However, the parable tries to point out that a solely objective approach does something
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similar to us, for only through the subjective approach to truth are we able to properly
relate to the objective and thus avoid the madhouse. It is for these reasons that both
approaches to truth are necessary for Kierkegaard.
Kierkegaard sees nothing wrong with the study of Christian doctrine; his issue
stems from the transformation of Christianity into merely a set of doctrines. In that sense,
we must strive to keep Christianity from becoming something that is only objective, and
instead need to focus on the subjective approach to Christianity. The objective does not
give us what Kierkegaard wants; it does not make us Christians. Instead, we have to
adopt a subjective approach if we want to properly relate to the objective truth in the way
that the escaped lunatic was unable to.
Recognizing the value and importance of the subjective approach is paramount
specifically because Climacus thinks that Christianity is essentially subjective. He gives a
short example to argue this conclusion:
“If someone who lives in the midst of Christianity enters, with knowledge of the
true idea of God, the house of God, the house of the true God, and prays, but
prays in untruth, and if someone lives in an idolatrous land but prays with all the
passion of infinity, although his eyes are resting upon the image of an idol –
where, then, is there more truth? The one prays in truth to God although he is
worshipping an idol; the other prays in untruth to the true God and is therefore in
truth worshipping an idol.”78
For Climacus, the passionate approach to God is the correct one, even if something is
amiss objectively. In the situation that he describes we have one individual who has the
correct objectivity but is lacking subjectivity. Climacus concludes that this individual is
idolatrous. The view of subjectivity that we get from Climacus is one of intense
inwardness and appropriation, as we see in his example.79 The individual whose eyes are
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resting on the idol, though it is an idol, has nonetheless appropriated the idea of his idol.
He has been changed, both in person and in action, as demonstrated by the fact that his
prayer is full of passion. Thus, the proper approach to Christianity is one full of “the
passion of infinity.” Climacus wants us to approach God as individuals looking to be
changed, fully desiring God and humbling ourselves before God. This radical kind of
appropriation is what Climacus sees as the essence of Christianity as well as the essence
of subjectivity, which is why we must approach Christianity subjectively. Christianity for
Climacus consists of an individual standing before God and being conscious of their sin
and guilt.80 Accomplishing this requires us to humble ourselves before God and be
transformed. This kind of action is not the mere acceptance of the doctrine of sin, but
instead a kind of re-orienting of the self. If Kierkegaard wants to bring forth the Christian
in his audience, then teaching them the correct doctrine will not suffice, for Christianity is
a re-orienting of the self, not a mere agreement with doctrine. Thus, with Kierkegaard’s
religious goals in mind, we recognize that Kierkegaard must engender subjectivity.
Climacus further demonstrates the need for the subjective approach when he
directly compares it to the objective approach. “To objective reflection, truth becomes
something objective, an object, and the point is to disregard the subject. To subjective
reflection, truth becomes appropriation, inwardness, subjectivity, and the point is to
immerse oneself, existing, in subjectivity.”81 The goal of Christianity is not to
demonstrate something factual. Instead, Christianity is aimed at making disciples, making
individuals into certain kinds of people. This is the problem for the objective approach,
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for the objective approach wants to rid us of the person, as the individual only gets in the
way of the objective. Thus, Christianity has a need for the subjective. Climacus highlights
this when he writes, “The way of objective reflection turns the subjective individual into
something accidental and thereby turns existence into an indifferent, vanishing
something. The way to the objective truth goes away from the subject.”82 Kierkegaard’s
Christianity is built on this subjective approach, on putting the single individual before
God. It is for this reason that he must employ the style of communication that is
ultimately tied to the subjective approach to truth, indirect communication.
However, it is important to remember that for Climacus and Kierkegaard, the
objective approach isn’t meaningless or unimportant, nor is it separated from the
subjective approach. Kierkegaard spends a great deal of time explaining objective truths
that relate to Christianity. Ideally, we should be subjectively oriented towards these
objective truths. It’s true that Climacus claims that the subjective is more important than
the objective when it comes to Christianity, but that’s not to say that the objective is
irrelevant. Rather, we should be subjectively oriented towards the objective truth. This
overlap of subjectivity and objectivity is somewhat paradoxical, as we are taking two
uniquely different approaches to truth simultaneously, but Kierkegaard refers to
Christianity as a paradox, and so is right at home with such a claim.
The recognition that the truth of Christianity requires the subjective approach
immediately puts upon us the idea that the truth of Christianity also requires indirect
communication. Climacus also comes to this conclusion in the Postscript as soon as he
establishes that truth, specifically Christian truth, is subjectivity. He writes,
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“When I had comprehended this, it also became clear to me that if I wanted to
communicate anything about this, the main point must be that my presentation
would be made in an indirect form. That is, if inwardness is truth, results are
nothing but junk with which we should not bother one another, and wanting to
communicate results is an unnatural association of one person with another,
inasmuch as every human being is spirit and truth is the self-activity of
appropriation, which a result hinders.”83
If the truth of Christianity is ultimately subjectivity, inwardness, and appropriation as
Climacus claims, the only way that such a truth could be communicated would be
through indirect communication. Thus, if Kierkegaard desires to not only teach his
readers about true Christianity, but also wants to make them into Christians, he must
employ indirect communication in his works.
The necessity of indirect communication for Kierkegaard also fits into the
teacher/learner problem that was discussed in the previous chapter. Lane writes, “Indirect
communication is required because the teacher is not The Teacher (only God can do this)
but a fellow pupil (something the pupil must also know).”84 God does not need to
indirectly communicate, for God has the power to change the heart of an individual.
Kierkegaard does not possess such a power, to his dismay I’m sure. Viewed from the
standpoint of God as The Teacher, both Kierkegaard and his audience are learners. Given
this kind of epistemic equality, Kierkegaard can only bring about change through the use
of indirect communication, through trying to bring inwardness to his readers.
Kierkegaard needs to engender the kind of inwardness and appropriation (subjectivity)
that will be needed for the individual to be willing to put in the effort required for
salvation.85 The teacher is the one who brings objectivity, who increases knowledge. As a
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fellow pupil, Kierkegaard can only act towards increasing our motivations and our ability
to apply what The Teacher has taught us.
The necessity of indirect communication also arises when we examine what
Strawser calls “the problem of language.” Strawser quotes Kierkegaard at length in
drawing his conclusions.
In a rich draft of Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard concisely states what he more
gradually develops in the text.
Immediately, then, everything is true; but can consciousness not
remain in this immediacy? If this immediacy and that of animals were
identical, then the question of consciousness would be canceled; but the
consequence of that would be that a human being was an animal or that a
human being was inarticulate. That which therefore cancels immediacy is
language, if a person could not speak, he or she would remain in
immediacy.
This, he thought, could be expressed thusly: immediacy is reality,
language is ideality, as I speak I produce the contradiction. Thus, when I
want to express sense perception, the contradiction is there, for what I say
is something rather different than what I want to say. I cannot express
reality in language, since to characterize it I use ideality, which is a
contradiction, an untruth.
The possibility of doubt, then lies in the duplicity of consciousness
(KW VII 255; JP III 2320; PIV B 14:6).
Here Kierkegaard broaches the problem of language, and his analysis may be
interpreted as providing grounds for the rejection of a purely phenomenological
language.86,87
This problem of language provides the grounds for the necessity of indirect
communication. Language cannot perfectly communicate reality, for reality is immediate
while language is not. Direct communication has no hidden information; everything that
is being communicated is laid out before the reader. Indirect communication, on the other
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hand, uses language, but does so not to impart a specific idea like direct communication
does, but instead to present a certain possibility to the reader. Thus, if Kierkegaard is
trying to communicate a human reality, he has to do so indirectly. This approach helps to
engender immediacy because the reader is prompted to make a choice with respect to the
possibility that has been presented. The language itself still cannot perfectly represent
reality, but it can push the reader to exist in reality, by presenting him or her with a
choice.
This ties in with other claims that Kierkegaard makes regarding possibility and
actuality. Kierkegaard, as Climacus, writes, “But existence-actuality cannot be
communicated, and the subjective thinker has his own actuality in his own ethical
existence. If actuality is to be understood by a third party, it must be understood as
possibility, and a communicator who is conscious of this will therefore see to it, precisely
in order to be oriented to existence, that his existence-communication is in the form of
possibility.”88 Climacus recognizes here that existence-actuality cannot be
communicated, though he doesn’t get into the problem of language here. Instead, he
parses out the approach that needs to be taken by the individual who wants to
communicate actuality. This kind of existence-communication, the communication of the
idea of a type of personal existence, must be done as a possibility, as a hypothetical
option that the reader can pursue. This framing lends itself to indirect communication as
the ideal approach. If we are bringing forth an existence-communication as a message to
be indirectly communicated, we should offer it up not as a brute fact of existence, for that
would be a direct communication. Instead, we offer it up as a possibility, as a
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hypothetical, and thus offer it indirectly. By saying that Isaac could have replied in such
and such manner, and that if he did such and such would be the consequences, we offer
up a possible type of existence, one that invites the reader towards inwardness. Reading
about this possible woman causes the reader to think about what it’s like to exist as this
possible woman, and thus inwardness and appropriation are achieved. In this way, when
we examine the concept of language itself and how it relates to Kierkegaard’s Christian
goals, we recognize the need for indirect communication. This section has examined the
difference between the objective and subjective approaches and tied those approaches to
direct and indirect communication respectively. Having done so, I argued for the
necessity of indirect communication, but have yet to address a more basic question: what
is indirect communication?
Section 2: Speak if You Have Understanding

In contemporary philosophical literature, direct communication is the standard, as
the purpose of the literature is to communicate a specific idea. Direct communication
values clarity, a virtue of good philosophical prose. In this sense, what direct
communication is working to accomplish is the dissemination of knowledge. You read
Kant so that you can know about a priori intuitions, or Heidegger so that you can know
about Dasein. So, direct communication is concerned with the transfer of information
from one person or source to another. Ideally, nothing is lost in translation for a direct
communication. Kierkegaard breaks the process down, writing, “When I think of
communication, I think of four things: (1) Object (2) Communicator (3) Receiver (4)
Communication.”89 If someone is using direct communication then the communicator
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and the receiver should possess the same object. If I directly communicate to you that
gravity is one of the four fundamental forces of the universe, both you and I should
possess the same piece of knowledge. Thus, it should not matter who the communicator
or receivers are if the communication is direct and if the object is the type of thing that
can be directly communicated (as we have seen, Kierkegaard thinks that the essential
truth of Christianity does not fit this mold).
Kierkegaard strives to separate the two forms of communication by clarifying the
content that suits each style of communication. He writes, “All communication of
knowledge is direct communication. All communication of capability is indirect
communication.”90 As Daise notes, this gives us a distinction between knowing and
doing.91 Direct communication is linked to knowledge, information, facts, those types of
content that we consider objective. Indirect communication, on the other hand, is linked
to human capability. Capability here doesn’t refer to what we as humans could achieve in
some grand sense, but rather to the potential for human action. Indirect communication
gives us possibilities, potentialities. This drives our actions as we see the possible things
we can do and the possible people we can be. Thus, indirect communication is not merely
trying to communicate an inert capability, but it is trying to activate one that already lies
dormant within us. The communication of an existence-possibility, for instance, is not to
inform the receiver of a possible way to be, but rather to motivate the receiver to try to
exist as such. Thus, by inhabiting the existence-possibility, the individual has been
moved to act by the indirect communication. So, while direct communication only gives
us information which makes no necessary claims upon our existence or our actions,
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indirect communication makes claims on both.
Sometimes the distinction between direct and indirect communication is claimed
to be their relationship to interpretation. Direct communication seems to close
interpretation. If I directly communicate something to you, I’m trying to give you
information clearly and precisely. To that end, interpretation can get in the way, for if my
communication invites interpretation, then the content might change between the
communicator and the receiver. However, Daise argues against this approach,
demonstrating that it isn’t the relation to interpretation that delineates direct
communication from indirect communication. Referring to the one of the epigraphs that
end the Exordiums in Fear and Trembling, Daise writes,
“The form of what we identify as a piece of indirect communication may be
identical to a piece of direct communication. ‘When the child must be weaned, the
mother blackens her breast’ may be a piece of indirect communication (an
invitation to consider one’s relationship to a dependent person) or it may be a
report of child-rearing practice. In one context, interpretation as factual
presentation would be ludicrous; in another context, it would not. So it could not
be the form that makes the difference.”92
Though we might think of indirect communication as being something that invites
interpretation, Daise argues that there seems to be no way to perfectly distinguish indirect
communication from direct communication in that sense. Unless we are directed to
interpret in a non-factual manner, we would not know whether interpretation should be
open or closed, we can only make more or less informed guesses. The command to
interpret factually would also run into the same problem though, and thus does not offer a
useful solution to the problem. In certain contexts, interpreting non-factually might be
sensible, but at no point do we have perfect access to the contextual situatedness of any
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statement. So Daise argues that we can’t use the form of the communication to perfectly
distinguish whether it is direct or indirect, as the form itself can work both ways.93 In
chapter three we will be examining the form of parable and arguing that it works well as
a vehicle for indirect communication. However, the presence of a parable itself does not
indicate that the communication is necessarily indirect. Maybe the common parable of
the tortoise and the hare is just trying to communicate to us the relative speeds of
tortoises and rabbits. Thus Daise argues that it is not possible to judge the style of
communication based only on the form that the communication takes.
So how exactly can we identify something as an indirect communication versus a
direct one? Daise cannot identify a singular principle which helps us do so and likens this
distinction to the challenging prospect of distinguishing art and non-art. However, he
does offer some possible clues that we might look for. He takes the tragedy of Oedipus
Rex as a story about ignoring the hidden powers of the universe and an example of
indirect communication. “The same kind of point might be made in a sermon or a lecture,
and we would not be inclined to regard the sermon or lecture as a work of art. What is the
difference?”94 He points to the idea that the audience is “left to figure out” Oedipus Rex
for themselves. The lecture tells one precisely what to think and tries to communicate the
message as clearly as possible. But in the tragedy, there is not a clear message; it’s not
even obvious that there is a message at all. Daise continues with this idea, writing, “The
dramatic works presents a possible world in which the audience might locate itself and
which is such that the audience may feel more or less empathy towards each other,
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themselves, and their circumstances, but there is typically no authoritative editorial voice
that calls for a specific response.”95,96 The lack of an authoritative voice seems to point us
in the direction of indirect communication, Daise argues. While it doesn’t provide a kind
of litmus test, it does provide some evidence. The authoritative voice need not be an
individual, either. Any kind of regulative ideal can function as an authoritative voice. So,
in looking for something that counts as an indirect communication, Daise argues that we
can find clues in texts that lack authoritative voices, and thus function as a kind of art in
which the individual is left to decide for themselves both what it means and how to
respond.97
Kierkegaard, writing as Anti-Climacus in Practice in Christianity, seems to also
take up the approach that choice is an important part of indirect communication. In a
section entitled, “To Deny Direct Communication is to Require Faith,” Climacus writes,
“There is no direct communication and no direct reception: there is a choice.”98 And a
little bit later, “Faith is a choice, certainly not direct reception – and the recipient is the
one who is disclosed, whether he will believe or be offended.”99 There are two important
claims here. First, direct communication is antithetical to faith. This matches what was
shown earlier in that direct communication is related to the objective approach, and
Kierkegaard thinks that authentic Christianity requires the subjective. Here we see that
taken a little further in that it’s not only authentic Christianity that doesn’t coincide with
direct communication, but faith as a concept. The reason for this is the second important
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claim. Faith and direct communication are opposed to one another because faith requires
choice. Direct communication tries to deny choice, and the point of direct communication
and the objective approach is to remove the subjective from the situation. When
examining indirect communication, however, choice becomes a central component.
Indirect communication wants to engender choice in the receiver so that appropriation
and inwardness can come forward. How exactly this process works is not something that
Kierkegaard spells out for us, but is something that I will discuss in the next chapter
when examining how parables function as forms of indirect communication. Nonetheless,
we have a few distinct markers of indirect communication even if we do not possess a
perfect test. If a communication both lacks an authoritative voice and presents us with
possibilities that are designed to make us choose, we likely are dealing with an indirect
communication.
In one of his later works, writing as Anti-Climacus, Kierkegaard sheds a little
light on the concept of indirect communication. Anti-Climacus writes,
“Indirect communication can be an art of communication in redoubling the
communication; the art consists in making oneself, the communicator, into a
nobody, purely objective, and then continually placing the qualitative opposites in
a unity. This is what some pseudonymous writers are accustomed to calling the
double-reflection of the communication. For example, it is indirect
communication to place jest and earnestness together in such a way that the
composite is a dialectical knot – and then to be a nobody oneself. If anyone wants
to have anything to do with this kind of communication, he will have to untie the
knot himself.”100
Here we see Anti-Climacus putting forward two aspects of indirect communication. The
first aspect consists of creating something relatively opaque, for instance putting jest and
earnestness together. This opacity stems from the opposite natures that jest and
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earnestness possess. The second aspect is to then disappear, as an author, so that the
context of the writing is missing. In this type of a situation the receiver is left with two
options, either to ignore the passage or to untie the knot. Thus, the successful indirect
communication seeks to draw the receiver towards the untying. Anti-Climacus also goes
on to describe a second way in which indirect communication can appear. He writes,
“But indirect communication can also appear in another way, through the relation
between the communication and the communicator. The communicator is present
here, whereas in the first instance he was left out, yet, please note, by way of a
negative reflection. But our age actually knows no other kind of communication
than that mediocre method of dialecticizing. What it means to exist has been
completely forgotten. Any communication concerning existing requires a
communicator: in other words, the communicator is the reduplication of the
communication; to exist in what one understands is to reduplicate. But this
communication still cannot be called indirect communication just because there is
a communicator who himself exists in what he communicates. If, however, the
communicator himself is dialectically defined and his own being is based on
reflection, then all direct communication is impossible.”101
This second kind of indirect communication is the communication of something that is a
part of the communicator. Poole explains this quite well when he writes,
“Reduplication is different in kind from doubled reflection. Doubled reflection
implies a gap between the author who writes and the work that he is writing. It
indicated a dialectical relationship between them and emphasizes the fact that the
communicator is not, except in a joking sense, present in what he writes.
Reduplication is, however, quite different and implies that the communicator and
the communication are one and the same… to reduplicate is to exist in what one
understands.”102
And later,
“What was noncommitted becomes committed; what was aesthetic and ironic
becomes exposed and dangerous; what was merely intellectual becomes lived.”103
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Anti-Climacus remarks that the God-man, Jesus Christ, used this kind of communication.
Christ is trying to communicate his existence to his followers, but he cannot merely
directly state, “I am the Lord your God” and communicate it in such a manner. That type
of communication might functionally work for an impersonal conception of God, but not
for the God-man, the Christ. The God-man is already defined in existence for his
followers know him. They know him as a human being who eats and sleeps and talks to
them. Thus, for him to state that he is God causes a contradiction, for one seemingly
cannot be both human and God. This dialectical relationship, therefore is necessarily a
part of his communications and thus he cannot communicate directly. This, as AntiClimacus says, forces a choice on those around him: to believe or not to believe. With
Kierkegaard’s words in mind, and in order to better understand them, let us examine the
approaches to indirect communication that different scholars give us.
Poole points to a single quote of Kierkegaard’s as the central statement of what
indirect communication is. “Inwardness cannot be communicated directly, because
expressing it directly is externality (oriented outwardly, not inwardly), and expressing
inwardness directly is no proof at all that it is there (the direct outpouring of feeling is no
proof at all that one has it, but the tension of the contrastive form is the dynamometer of
inwardness).”104 Thus Poole looks at indirect communication as creating a kind of tension
that causes inwardness. Again, this does not help us identify an indirect communication
as such, but it does help us recognize the fruits of its labor. Poole goes on to identify two
ways in which indirect communication creates this kind of a tension. The first is a tension
that the author puts into the work itself. Poole describes this as a kind of “aesthetic”
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tension.105 The idea here is that the author creates a work the meaning of which the
receiver is unable to discern. There is a kind of play or doubleness in effect that obstructs
the receiver from directly apprehending the meaning of the work. Using Kierkegaard’s
terminology, Poole refers to this as double reflection. “It is, in few words, a question of
aesthetics, a manipulation of model away from meaning, a holding apart signifier and
signified.”106 So the first kind of tension that we see occurs when the communication
itself is intentionally made opaque by the communicator. This correlates with the first
aspect of the first kind of indirect communication that was mentioned just above. When
we add to this the absence of an author, and thus the absence of an authoritative voice, we
get the first kind of indirect communication, that which comes forward in double
reflection.
Daise takes a different approach. He examines indirect communication as a
communication of capability, as was mentioned above. If direct communication
communicates factual knowledge and indirect communication communicates human
capability, then we seem to have a working definition in hand. Daise argues that we
shouldn’t read this as being the imparting of an ability. When we speak of
communicating capability, we might mean that the receiver is gaining access to some
ability that they did not previously possess. Daise thinks that this would be a mistaken
approach, citing Kierkegaard’s papers, “The ethical must be communicated as an art,
because everyone knows it.”107 This would imply that the receiver already possesses what
the communicator is trying to communicate. In that sense the receiver is not gaining some
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new ability as we might imagine the communication of capability would imply. Instead,
Daise claims, “I have been led away from talking about communication of capability as
aiming at inducement of action to talking about it as inducement to adopting some sense
of oneself, from which some unspecified conduct would flow.”108 Daise’s point is that
indirect communication doesn’t give us anything new, but rather that it re-orients us
towards a certain capability that we already possessed. For instance, one might have
learned a musical instrument as a child and then forgotten their musical abilities. To
communicate capability in this situation wouldn’t be to somehow make that individual
good at playing the piano; instead it would be to bring forward the piano player already
present in the individual and thus bring forth a skill that was already present by reorienting the individual. This might remind us of Socrates’ theory of recollection that gets
put forward in the Meno, where learning is simply remembering things that our soul
already knows so that Socrates merely needs to ask the right questions to prompt
recollection. With indirect communication, the communicator needs not to impart new
information or new abilities to the receiver, but instead needs to turn the receiver towards
that which they already possess. Mackey also takes this approach, writing, “The success
of an indirect communication depends upon its capability to awaken in the recipient an
awareness that the possibilities it objectifies – alluring, exciting, or frightening – are his
own.”109
This all leads Daise to conclude that Kierkegaard wants indirect communication
to lead his readers into a kind of freedom. He writes,
“If the communicator is successful, the receiver acts without first reflecting.
Kierkegaardian indirect communication, or rather, indirect communication as
108
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used by Kierkegaard, aims at shaping the world in such a way that each recipient
of the communication is fundamentally free to choose to shape the world as one
sees fit. In fact, if the effort is successful, the receiver comes to see that one must
choose.”110
While I follow Daise’s construction of the concept of indirect communication up to this
point, he seems mistaken in his understanding of its goals. Kierkegaard spells out on a
number of occasions what he wants his writing to accomplish and thus while it is true that
Kierkegaard wants to force his audience to choose, he is not merely interested in this
choice for its own sake. Rather, the choice that Kierkegaard wants to put in front of his
readers is that of authentic Christianity. Kierkegaard does not want the receiver “to see
that one must choose,” but rather for the receiver to actually choose. He is not aimed at a
kind of epistemic positioning on the part of the receiver, but instead at a crisis of the will.
His goal isn’t fundamental freedom but fear and trembling before God. Thus, while I
follow much of Daise’s work on constructing an understanding of indirect
communication as a concept, I break with him on his application of that concept to
Kierkegaard’s own works and goals.
In addition, Daise’s earlier argument against the form being the recognizable
aspect of the indirect communication seemed to neglect the position of the author. Daise
neglected the authorial aspect of double reflection, the situation in which the author is “a
nobody.” So Daise seems to be correct in that the form itself is insufficient, for a
changing context could make something direct in one situation and indirect in another.
However, he fails to take into account the possibility of communicating something in
such a way that its context is manipulated. As I described in the previous chapter,
Kierkegaard went to great lengths to try to ensure that no one would know him as the
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author of his pseudonymous works. Besides publishing them under a different name, he
held to a specific publishing schedule and spent time out in public doing his best to
assuage any suspicions. This is the second aspect of double reflection. When the author is
separated from the work, the work loses much of its context. If I know nothing about
Johannes Climacus, I should not assume his intentions for writing or necessarily connect
him with any school of thought. Instead, I have to let the words on the page do all of the
speaking. Lacking context, the receiver is unable to identify a communication as direct or
indirect, which itself makes the case for its being an indirect communication in that it will
then elicit, if successful, a capability from the receiver: the ability to appropriate. This
kind of inwardness and appropriation is precisely what Kierkegaard defines as being
paradigmatic of the indirect and subjective approach on a number of occasions.
An issue that Poole has, as we will come to see, is that in his overall analysis of
Kierkegaard, he only seems to take the second kind of indirect communication,
redoubling, seriously. As I examine in the next section, Poole’s entire interpretive
apparatus is built on an examination of Kierkegaard’s personal life and thus Poole seeks
to locate the works of Kierkegaard in his life situations. By doing so, Poole is certainly
looking for reduplication, the communication of something that for the writer is a lived
existence. Finding the connections between Kierkegaard’s works and his love of Regine
Olsen, or his spat with the Corsair can do much to enrich our understanding of his works,
but it certainly should not define our entire understanding of his works. Poole ends up
interpreting the redoubling aspect of Kierkegaard’s works too intensely and in doing so
seems to neglect the double reflective aspects, that is, the parts of Kierkegaard’s works
for which an authoritative voice is absent and thus the reader is having to untie the knot
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made from jest and earnestness for him or herself. It is this aspect of Kierkegaard’s works
that I will primarily engage throughout this work.
As I worked to establish in Chapter One, Christianity does not function as a set of
doctrines for Kierkegaard, but rather as something individual, as a certain kind of
existence. As Climacus writes, “Christianity is not a doctrine but an existencecontradiction and an existence-communication.”111 As several of Kierkegaard’s
pseudonyms have suggested, direct communication cannot communicate an existence, for
doing so requires inwardness, which is the realm of indirect communication. 112 For this
reason, numerous scholars recognize the necessity of indirect communication for
Christianity. Lane sets this up by examining the function of something like apologetics
for Kierkegaard. If the goal is to persuade others of the truth of authentic Christianity,
Lane argues that apologetics is rather meaningless.113 Lane writes, “Kierkegaard seems to
say that it is either useless to argue for faith (because the argument will not bring faith) or
unnecessary for one who has faith. The Kierkegaardian argument against the kind of
position held by Evans is that it seems to want to put a net under the venture of faith – to
get rid of the risk.”114 Apologetics wants to reassure our reason that Christianity is an
acceptable venture, but that seems to deny the paradox of faith. Faith and Christianity, as
characterized by Kierkegaard, exist as paradoxes that require risk on the part of the
believer to be accepted. In Fear and Trembling, Abraham is portrayed as the paradigm of
faith because he believes that Isaac will not be taken from him, despite having no good
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reason to believe so. Reason would dictate that Isaac will be sacrificed, for God has
commanded it, yet Abraham believes otherwise and nonetheless obeys God. Faith for
Kierkegaard is not necessarily antithetical to reason, but it certainly goes beyond reason.
To this end, apologetics does not provide an individual with faith, for apologetics only
speaks to our reason. Apologetics would function as a kind of direct communication, a
setting forward of arguments that are designed to be logically valid and sound in order to
convince someone of their truth.
But this is not Kierkegaard’s Christianity, for Christianity requires the
communication of an existence. This is not to imply that Christianity lacks intellectual
content. Climacus writes, “Furthermore, to say that Christianity is empty of content
because it is not a doctrine is only chicanery.”115 Christianity for Climacus functions not
as a set of doctrines, but it nonetheless has intellectual content. Daise describes this as a
situation in which Christianity functions as a kind of regulative ideal.116 Authentic
Christianity makes claims upon our individual existence that require us to be a certain
kind of thing. Thus, Christianity requires us to exist in a specific way. This approach
gives Christianity content, for there exist regulations and directives that guide us.
However, the function of these regulations and directives is not for us to understand, but
for us to act. Therefore, while there is intellectual content, the content is there for the
purpose of action, of redirecting our individual existence. If Christianity functions in this
manner, indirect communication is a necessity in order to bring about this regulative
ideal.
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Section 3: To Believe or Not To Believe

Understanding the necessity of indirect communication leaves us with two things:
a recognition of the relationship between Christianity and certain kinds of
communication, and an awareness of the fact that, given his admitted goals, Kierkegaard
is committed to the use of indirect communication in his own works, for he is trying to
bring about authentic Christianity in his audience. Accepting that at least some of
Kierkegaard’s written works are intended to be indirect communications leaves us, as
scholars, in a tricky situation in that the scholarly reading of a work is usually a
disinterested reading. To that extent, the scholar struggles to recognize indirect
communication by its effect on the reader because the scholar is striving to be unaffected.
If we interpret everything as indirect communication, then we cannot even take seriously
Kierkegaard’s doctrine of indirect communication, for if such a thing is being
communicated indirectly to us, its purpose is to change us as individuals and not to
inform us of some piece of knowledge. If we reject any of it as indirect communication,
then Kierkegaard seems completely unable to accomplish his stated goals. This leads us
to the question of whether or not we can take Kierkegaard seriously. Maybe his whole
authorship consists of jokes made at the expense of Danish Hegelians. Given that we
cannot identify indirect communication based solely on its form, as Daise argued above,
we are left in interpretative limbo. It is precisely this limbo that has driven Poole to argue
that Kierkegaard’s works cannot be interpreted. In response to this, Tietjen has attempted
to develop a hermeneutics of trust when it comes to Kierkegaard’s authorship. In this
section, I’m going to examine both approaches so that we can seek to understand the
interpretive stance that we must take towards Kierkegaard’s works, given that they are at
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least on occasion indirect communications meant to reorient us towards Christianity on
an individual level.
In his book, Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication, Poole presents his
argument for why we cannot come up with a definitive interpretation of Kierkegaard’s
works. Overall he claims that Kierkegaard’s ironic style, his use of pseudonyms, and his
indirect communication, make it so that we can’t tell what Kierkegaard himself thinks.
Instead, we can only come up with disjointed views about certain small bits of text, but
no grand overarching understanding of Kierkegaard as an author. Poole points to a
number of reasons for this. First, we have Kierkegaard’s use of irony. Examining
Kierkegaard’ dissertation, The Concept of Irony, Poole writes,
“To revert, then, to the opening problem, which is the sense in which traditional
readings of the dissertation have always seemed in the end to run up against some
kind of fundamental unsayability in their task, might it not turn out to be the case
that the reason for their discomfiture lies in the fact that The Concept of Irony is a
piece of writing? It is not, in the usual academic sense, a piece of research, a piece
of explanation, or a piece of careful exposition that shows the candidate has
mastered all primary, secondary, and tertiary sources. It is a piece of writing.
That, of course, was what the examiners were not expecting. And since it is a
piece of writing, The Concept of Irony takes great pleasure in subverting the
assumptions in the reader’s mind.”117
“The Hegelian layout of the dissertation was meant to fox the original academic
examiners, and it has succeeded in foxing most academic readers ever since. The
work is about irony. True, the subtitle reads: “with Constant Reference to
Socrates.” Nevertheless, the work itself is about irony, and, given the Romantic
context in which both writer and readers of the 1841 dissertation were confined
(Schlegel, Schleiermacher), it is surely to be expected that a work so titled will
itself be ironic.”118
Poole examines Kierkegaard’s work and finds it full of irony, which is ironic given its
topic. Poole argues that instead of an explanation of irony and how irony worked for
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Socrates, Kierkegaard has entire sections that seem to be nonsense, or which create such
a spectacle that no one can disagree with them without looking foolish. Thus, Poole
thinks that Kierkegaard’s dissertation is not itself a work of philosophy, but a work of
ironic writing. If this is the case, then seemingly we cannot come up with a solid
interpretation of what Kierkegaard is doing. It is unclear if sometimes Kierkegaard is
defining irony in earnest or if he is doing so in jest. Some of his sections might represent
his authentic approach, but others might represent a subversion of the Hegelian approach
of his readers. If the work were philosophical at heart, then we should be able to use the
bits of irony that show up here and there to assist our understanding of the concepts that
are being explicated. However, Poole argues that it is clearly not a piece of philosophy,
but a piece of writing, that is, something designed and written entirely for the purpose of
playing with his readers. Poole writes, “The difficulty involved in coming to the plain
sense of The Concept of Irony is that Kierkegaard has taken a great deal of trouble to
make sure that there is no plain sense to be had.”119 From Poole’s point of view,
Kierkegaard does this intentionally. Kierkegaard did not get along very well with some of
his dissertation readers and was openly disdainful of their Hegelian approaches, and thus
Poole’s claim is that he wrote a dissertation that is impossible to interpret, as a final prank
to pull on them, in a sense.
The issue of irony is not limited to Kierkegaard’s dissertation, however. While the
dissertation is certainly an extreme example, we run into the problem of interpretation
whenever we encounter irony, as Muench pointed out above. Even when we examine
works like Fragments or Postscript, we see plenty of irony afloat. So, we are constantly,
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as readers, in the position of having to determine what is irony and what is not, and how
far to take the irony. If we try to read Kierkegaard as an honest writer, we will end up
accepting as true claims that he intended to only be ironical. If we approach Kierkegaard
with distrust, then we will take claims as irony that he intended truthfully. This leaves the
reader in the unfortunate position of never knowing exactly what Kierkegaard is trying to
communicate, and thus unable to interpret with any semblance of precision.
This inability to determine authorial intent extends beyond irony as well. Poole
examines Quidam’s Diary, a section in Stages on Life’s Way. Poole claims that the Diary
is both “tasteless and boring” and that the first person to translate it into English, Walter
Lowrie, shared similar sentiments. However, Poole claims that to thus assume that the
Diary lacks useful content or that it fails as a piece of writing, is to assume normative
authorial intent. Usually, philosophical authors want to persuade their audience of the
same position that they hold and are writing about. However, in reference to Quidam’s
Diary, Poole writes,
“There was no place to write from, there was nothing to be remembered, without
pain, of the past, and there was nothing to look forward to. The engagement to
Regine was broken off. The plan to convince her that he was a trifler had to
continue its hopeless path. There was nothing to do except kill time, and filling
the page with the flow of consciousness is the best way to do that. The
consciousness is, yes, not very attractive, but then the book was not written to
place the author in an attractive light, but rather to fuel the rumor that Magister
Kierkegaard was unattractive and insensitive. Lowrie is attesting rather to the
success of Kierkegaard’s writing plan than of its failure.”120
Poole maintains that it was Kierkegaard’s goal to produce a work that was boring,
meaningless, and that painted Kierkegaard himself in a poor light. Kierkegaard intended
to characterize himself in an unattractive manner so that he would appear so to Regine
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Olsen, his ex-fiancée. When life issues such as these can enter into an author’s works, it
causes an added layer of interpretation. Is Kierkegaard writing for Regine? Did he happen
to have a poorly written book? Is it intentionally poorly written? The audience cannot
absolutely determine the answers to these questions. Lacking a methodology or
framework with which to approach the work, Poole argues that we cannot provide a
singular authoritative interpretation, for the work itself eludes such an interpretation.
Thus, we run into issues relating to authorial intent both in situations in which
Kierkegaard employs the use of irony as well as situations in which Kierkegaard is
publishing for reasons related to his personal life versus his philosophical interests. Since
there is often no way to determine if something is or is not irony, or if Kierkegaard is
writing for personal reasons or not, Poole claims that we are left in interpretation
purgatory, unable to advance.
Poole adds in a third problem with interpretation; Kierkegaard published many of
his works pseudonymously. On a number of occasions, Kierkegaard stresses that the
viewpoints of his pseudonyms should not be confused with his own viewpoints.121 So
when we examine the pseudonymous works, we are faced with a seeming inability to
attribute any of the claims to Kierkegaard himself. Poole examines the language that’s
used and claims that the pseudonymous works are not merely a matter of assigning a fake
name to a book, but that they are written in entirely different voices. He writes, “Yet it is
not the voice of Soren Kierkegaard himself. To check that out, one has only to compare
his First and Last Declaration with the Appendix for an Understanding with the Reader
with which Johannes Climacus signs off. The two tones are incompatible, dissimilar to
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the point of alienation. No, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript is not by Soren
Kierkegaard himself as Walter Lowrie informs us.”122 By looking at the word choice, the
tone, and the language used, Poole argues that the pseudonyms are quite clearly different
individuals writing from different viewpoints. Thus, Poole claims that we cannot mistake
Climacus for Kierkegaard because Climacus does not write like Kierkegaard, nor does he
always present viewpoints that Kierkegaard would agree with. Instead, when Kierkegaard
writes as Climacus, he seems to be adopting an entire identity and one that is dissimilar to
his own. Poole goes on to claim that this problem has partly arisen because we read
multiple texts that are all translated by the same individual who has adopted certain
conventions when translating. The conventions tend to remain consistent across works,
which oftentimes obscures the unique tones of each work and each pseudonym. Poole
instead wants us to read the pseudonyms as Kierkegaard asked us to, as possibilities.
Poole claims that reading the pseudonyms as possibilities complicates our ability to
interpret Kierkegaard, as the possibilities all become something like thought experiments.
We might be able to interpret a work within itself, but lacking any kind of authorial intent
or authoritative voice, Poole thinks that we have to make do entirely with the text itself
and the context that it provides. We are still unable to draw on or compare with any of the
other pseudonymous works to help us understand. Thus, our third interpretive problem
lies with the pseudonyms.
The fourth, and final problem that Poole examines when trying to interpret
Kierkegaard’s works relates to his doctrine of indirect communication and his personal
life. As has been mentioned, part of Kierkegaard’s plan involved the distance from the

122

Ibid 143

81
texts that he intentionally created for himself as the author. By spending time around
town, by looking like a “trifler”, by publishing according to a very specific plan,
Kierkegaard worked to problematize any kind of authorial voice in his pseudonymous
works. As was mentioned above, indirect communication seems to require the lack of an
authoritative voice, and as Kierkegaard mentioned in Practice in Christianity, the author
needs to “be a nobody”. However, when the Corsair affair happens, Kierkegaard is no
longer afforded this luxury. The Corsair affair consisted of a rather public interaction
between Kierkegaard and a weekly satirical publication named The Corsair. Kierkegaard
wrote some articles attacking the Corsair and inviting them to attack him in response.
Instead of engaging him on an intellectual or witty level, as he seemingly had hoped, the
Corsair published a number of caricatures of Kierkegaard. These comics significantly
altered Kierkegaard’s public life, making him a constant object of ridicule. He eventually
refused to spend much time in public and took trips out into the countryside just so that
he could leave his house without being harassed.123 All of this leaves us with a
predicament: Kierkegaard can no longer be a nobody. Poole argues that the Corsair affair
thrust Kierkegaard into the public spotlight in such a way that he could no longer play the
games that created distance between himself and his pseudonyms. If indirect
communication requires, as he claims in Practice in Christianity, the authors
nonexistence in relationship to the text, then Kierkegaard’s indirect approach becomes
problematized by the Corsair affair. Indeed, much of Kierkegaard scholarship currently
focuses on the connection between Kierkegaard’s personal life and his writings. Thus,
Kierkegaard seemingly cannot indirectly communicate with us, for he is not a nobody
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with relationship to his writings.
All of this leads Poole to conclude that Kierkegaard’s works cannot be interpreted
in any meaningful manner. Given these multiple problems, Poole claims that Kierkegaard
merely wants to invite us to participate, to interpret. Poole continues this line of thought,
claiming that these interpretations are entirely subjective, as Kierkegaard has structured
his writings so that no definitive interpretation can come forward. Thus, Poole thinks that
we can only engage the text and can move no further. Poole argues that this is intentional
on the part of Kierkegaard and that thus we cannot even look to Kierkegaard’s journals or
personal writings for clues as to how we should interpret his pseudonymous works.
Instead, we are left only in an interpretive haze, unable to produce a workable
interpretation of the works but simultaneously invited to continually interpret. Poole
claims, “Kierkegaard writes text after text whose aim is not to state a truth, not to clarify
an issue, not to propose a definite doctrine, not to offer some ‘meaning’ that could be
directly appropriated.”124
Poole’s work is useful for us in that it takes very seriously Kierkegaard’s claim
that we should not mix up Kierkegaard with his pseudonyms. Poole’s approach helps us
recognize the distance between the different pseudonyms and between the pseudonyms
and Kierkegaard. Poole does a good job demonstrating the multitude of ways that a
straightforward reading of Kierkegaard’s works is problematic and why we have to take
the doctrine of indirect communication into account at all times when we are trying to
interpret Kierkegaard. That said, Poole also takes things too far on a number of
occasions. His conclusion is that no good interpretations of Kierkegaard are possible, but
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this seems far too extreme given his evidence. Certainly there will be doubt in our
interpretations, and it is unlikely that we can ever truly know what Kierkegaard thought,
but that does not prevent us, as scholars, from coming up with better or worse
interpretations of Kierkegaard’s various concepts and works, pseudonymous or
otherwise. The absence of a perfectly definitive reading of an author does not imply that
our readings and interpretations will be entirely subjective. Interestingly enough, while
Poole consistently claims that we do not have access to the real Kierkegaard, he claims
multiple times to have just that. Poole argues, on a number of occasions, that Kierkegaard
is intending to write works that defy interpretation and thus cannot be meaningfully
mined for philosophical content. So, Poole is claiming that we cannot know the mind of
Kierkegaard, and he circularly builds his argument on his own ideas about the mind of
Kierkegaard. It is against this overarching approach to Kierkegaard’s works that we see
Tietjen respond. In his approach, we see Tietjen raise a number of these criticisms,
working to establish that the doctrine of indirect communication does not prevent us from
meaningfully interpreting Kierkegaard.
Tietjen works against Poole’s reading of Kierkegaard, and specifically against his
claim that we cannot interpret Kierkegaard. Tietjen claims that much of Poole’s work is
based on faulty reasoning. Looking at Poole’s overall project Tietjen writes,
“[Poole’s] reasoning rests largely on a false dilemma: either take seriously
Kierkegaard’s use of indirect communication, commonly taken to include devices
such as irony and pseudonymity, or read him ‘on religious grounds,’ as edifying
or as having a serious message to convey through the pseudonyms. Poole claims
that those who look for edifying purpose in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous
literature read him bluntly; though in the end I contend that it is Poole’s reading
that is blunt given its narrow understanding of what constitutes an indirect
communication.”125
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Tietjen thinks that Poole takes an overly narrow view of the ways in which we can read
Kierkegaard. Much of Poole’s attack on definitive interpretations was based on
Kierkegaard’s use of indirect communication in his writings, but Tietjen argues that
Poole doesn’t fully understand the doctrine of indirect communication. As Poole claims
that other philosophers have read Kierkegaard bluntly, as if he is any other regular
philosopher, Tietjen seems to attack Poole claiming that he is reading Kierkegaard
bluntly by treating him in the way that a literary critic would and deconstructing the
authorship. Tietjen claims that this reading runs contrary to much of what Kierkegaard is
doing. We see Kierkegaard clarifying what an authentic Christian is while he
simultaneously tries to motivate that authenticity in his readers.126 But this would mean
that Kierkegaard has at least some specific goals and clear doctrines, something that
Poole argues against. Thus, Tietjen’s task is twofold: first to break apart Poole’s reading
of Kierkegaard and demonstrate that it is problematic, and second to build up an
interpretive methodology that allows us to understand Kierkegaard’s works.
Poole, in an essay, argues that examining a few stories written by William James
can help us understand how we should read Kierkegaard.127 In one story a novelist claims
that a secret message is hidden throughout his works. Poole takes this as inspiration for
how we should read Kierkegaard’s works, Fear and Trembling, to be specific. Tietjen
examines two different ideas that Poole derives from this situation. First, the hidden
message could not be revealed by the novelist, and second, no message can ever be
legitimately derived from a work of literature. However, Tietjen points out that Poole
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does not examine Fear and Trembling in order to discover if there exists a hidden
message. Instead he assumes that one is already there.128 This assumption is something
that ends up being somewhat endemic to Poole’s work, in Tietjen’s opinion. As Tietjen
later notes, “it is questionable whether one may appropriately collect a smattering of
quotations from a text, assemble them, and draw inferences from them.”129 Poole
provides no evidence that a secret message exists in Fear and Trembling and instead
gives us an interpretive lens first. Once we have the lens he them examines the text to see
how certain quotes and sections might lend towards some kind of hidden message.
Tietjen recognizes the possibility of a more charitable reading of Poole that might
come from the phrase written by Climacus, “subjectivity is truth.” Thus, the charitable
reading of Poole is that he is pointing out how there is probably an idea that Kierkegaard
is trying to indirectly communicate to us and referring to such a thing as a hidden
message. However, Tietjen rejects this charitable reading noting that Poole never even
hints that his reading of Kierkegaard might be this more charitable version. However, I
think that Tietjen is reading Poole a little too uncharitably. Even if we recognize that
Poole shouldn’t be given the charitable reading that Tietjen puts forward, we don’t have
to agree with the uncharitable reading of Poole that Tietjen takes. Instead, it seems like
Poole is trying to build an interpretive framework that begins with Kierkegaard’s own
admonitions not to confuse the opinions of the pseudonyms with his own opinions. Thus,
we could read Poole as not building up a definitive interpretive framework as much as
offering an alternative possibility to the standard reading of Kierkegaard. Nonetheless,
Tietjen does offer a useful criticism of Poole for lacking evidence and for seemingly just
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taking snippets and quotes of Kierkegaard and assembling them.
Tietjen also critiques Poole’s approach to Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms. Poole
argues that the pseudonyms present a serious problem for interpretation in that we are
never able to consider anything pseudonymous as representing Kierkegaard’s own views.
Tietjen thinks that Poole takes this too far, writing,
“Poole’s cautioning against conflating concepts across thought-worlds and
pseudonyms is sound, but he presses the point too strongly. Per Kierkegaard’s
request, one should keep the pseudonyms (and their concepts) apart as well as
keep them apart from him. That is to say, the pseudonyms, their respective
thought-worlds, and the concepts that belong to them should be understood as
distinct. But one can acknowledge such distinctions and still affirm the possibility
of conversation between them.”130
Tietjen argues that Poole pushes things too far. Even if we keep the pseudonyms distinct
in their positions, concepts, and worlds, we can still compare them and put them into
conversation with one another. Though the pseudonymous authors of Fear and
Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death are different, they both refer to the demonic and
thus we can examine the differing conceptions that they have and whether or not anything
can be put together from them. Doing so doesn’t commit us to conflating the two
concepts, nor does it commit us to assuming that the concepts are ones Kierkegaard
supports. It does, however, allow us to form some kind of interpretation with respect to
the pseudonyms and to the concepts themselves. Maybe by examining Climacus versus
Anti-Climacus and their respective works, we come to understand tensions that exist
between certain concepts. This overall practice can at least guide us towards some overall
view of what Kierkegaard is doing and what he’s communicating.
Having criticized Poole for going too far in his recognition of the roles of the
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pseudonyms and of indirect communication, Tietjen puts forward his positive claims,
specifically examining what indirect communication is and how it works. This project
helps him develop his own interpretive apparatus, though I will not be examining that
apparatus in this project, as my central goals lie with the concept of indirect
communication and how it functions in Kierkegaard’s works. He writes, “Therefore,
according to the lectures, indirect communication does not in the first-place concern
literary devices like pseudonymity or irony. Rather, the salient factor of indirect
communication involves what Kierkegaard calls a ‘communication of capability,’ as
opposed to a ‘communication of knowledge.’”131 Tietjen looks at indirect communication
as the same kind of communication of capability that was mentioned above but in doing
so works to undermine Poole’s position. If indirect communication is primarily the
communication of capability, then focusing on things like pseudonymity and irony is
problematic, for it is not the form of the communication that is significant, but rather the
ends of the communication. Things like pseudonymity and irony might help us reach
these ends, and seemingly Kierkegaard employs them for that reason, but they alone are
not the focus, rather it is the bringing forth of the capability. Indeed, most of the problems
that cause Poole to advocate for his position stem from his misunderstanding of the
doctrine of indirect communication, claims Tietjen. So, for Tietjen, neither the use of
irony, pseudonymity, Kierkegaard’s personal life, nor the inability to determine authorial
intent impede our ability to interpret, for none of these are necessary for Kierkegaard’s
goals as a religious author seeking to indirectly communicate with his audience. Instead
they only function as some of the tools that Kierkegaard employs to bring about
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capabilities, but they do not in and of themselves have any inherent value. While they
might make interpretation more difficult on occasion, and they certainly do, they do not
create a system under which we are unable to interpret Kierkegaard.
Tietjen also attacks Poole for arguing that Kierkegaard is intentionally leading us
into a place where interpretation is impossible. Quoting Poole, Tietjen writes,
“The first pertains to a desire on the part of Kierkegaard to lure his reader
alongside himself into an inescapable labyrinth. ‘The reader has to be gathered in
as a potential ally, seduced and intrigued by the typographical and rhetorical
waylayings of the text, and then involved in a kind of detective work, up to that
point where (under ideal conditions) there is no unadorned instruction of doctrine
or objective fact to be had, but only the mutually shared experience of
perplexity.”132
Tietjen is critical of this approach, thinking it unnecessary to believe that Kierkegaard’s
works cannot be interpreted and thus that they exist only to leave us in an interpretive
haze. However, while Poole takes the issue too far, there is something to be said for
Kierkegaard intending to leave his audience in the labyrinth. Tietjen seems right with
respect to interpretation, in that his previous criticisms of Poole have demonstrated that
there are meaningful ways that we can interpret Kierkegaard. This pushes us away from
the idea that all that we are left with is some experience of perplexity when it comes to
interpretation.
Despite this, there does seem to be some value in an experience of perplexity, in
being lost in the labyrinth. As has been explained earlier in this chapter, Kierkegaard
again and again stresses how subjectivity is truth in reference to Christianity and thus
how subjectivity was his goal and the goal of indirect communication. What is
subjectivity? Inwardness and appropriation. If I am lost in the labyrinth, what am I to do?
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I must search; I must struggle to escape. This process will necessarily involve some level
of appropriation. Either I abandon the text, and thus the labyrinth altogether, or I
appropriate the text as I fight to bring forth meaning from it. So, in this sense, the
labyrinth serves a purpose. Kierkegaard is not setting us in a labyrinth as a practical joke,
but rather because he is trying to engender inwardness in his audience. Thus, forcing his
audience to actively engage with the text, he is able to put us into a situation where we
either adopt subjectivity or disengage entirely. To the extent that he is successful, he
needs us to engage, an issue that I will be addressing next chapter, but minimally the
labyrinth is the perfect setup for indirect communication. If Kierkegaard wishes to bring
forth a capability of mine, what better way than to make me active as a reader? If I must,
on a personal level, participate with the text, then I am already being subjective in the
way that Kierkegaard desires and the only thing that is left for him to do is to bring forth
the capabilities that he thinks are necessary for authentic Christianity, or even just to reorient those capabilities that might already be active.
So, we see that a good middle ground exists between Tietjen’s and Poole’s
approaches to Kierkegaard. Poole oversteps himself when he claims that nothing can be
interpreted, but he does help us understand that there are interpretive limits when it
comes to Kierkegaard. We need to very seriously consider the use of irony, misdirection,
pseudonymity, and literary elements when we examine and interpret Kierkegaard’s
works. At the same time, Kierkegaard’s doctrine of indirect communication is aimed at
bringing forth a capability in the receiver and doing so might require some misdirection
or deception. To that end, we cannot always trust Kierkegaard or his pseudonyms. Thus,
our goal is to understand the use of indirect communication in Kierkegaard’s works by
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examining clear instances of indirect communication. Up until this point, I’ve developed
a line of reasoning that points to the goal of this type of communication: bringing forth
authentic Christianity in individuals. Moving forward I’m going to look at the parts of
Kierkegaard’s works that seem to function as a kind of motivation for the individual by
looking at sections that aim to elicit something from the reader. Many of the pseudonyms
often refer to themselves as poets, and Kierkegaard referred to himself in such a way as
well. These poetic sections, I will argue, fulfill the goals that Kierkegaard has laid out in
his doctrine of indirect communication. Thus, we need to examine the poetic side of
Kierkegaard to both recognize how this style of writing functions as a tool of indirect
communication and to get closer to our examination of parables and the way in which
they function in Kierkegaard’s authorship.
Conclusion

This chapter accomplished two primary goals. First, I argued for the necessity of
indirect communication in Kierkegaard’s works. Given the argument that I make in
chapter one about Kierkegaard’s goals, I here demonstrate that Kierkegaard needs to use
indirect communication if he is indeed going to bring the religious forward. While there
is something of a dearth of scholarship on Kierkegaard’s parables, there is a fair amount
of scholarship concerning his doctrine of indirect communication, and thus the second
accomplishment of this chapter was to provide something of a literature review of the
available scholarship on this issue. Thus, overall we have so far moved from an
understanding of what Kierkegaard intends for his works to accomplish to an
understanding of the tools that he finds necessary to achieve that goal. This all leads us
towards an analysis of parables themselves, as I will present in the next chapter. If we
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know that Kierkegaard wants to bring the religious forward, and we recognize that
indirect communication is an important part of that, we can now turn to the real topic at
hand: parables. How exactly do parables function as pieces of indirect communication
towards Kierkegaard’s stated goals?
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Chapter 3: Kierkegaard the Poet
“If the story-tellers could ha’ got decency and good morals from true stories,
who’d have troubled to invent parables?” – Thomas Hardy

A, the pseudonymous author of part one of Either/Or, begins the book by
examining the existence of a poet. He writes, “What is a poet? An unhappy person who
conceals profound anguish in his heart but whose lips are so formed that as sighs and
cries pass over them they sound like beautiful music.”133 A is referring, as he notes, to a
torture instrument that would convert the screams of the tortured into music that sounded
like the bellows of bulls. Poetry here is portrayed as something that transforms anguish
into what is then perceived as beauty. He also claims that he would rather be a pig farmer
only understood by pigs than a poet who is misunderstood by others. This image of the
poet is certainly not a romantic one, yet we see both Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms
refer to themselves as poets on a number of occasions. Something about the poetic mode
of writing seems to transfix these authors such that they keep returning to it and
transmuting their suffering into works of art. While Kierkegaard certainly had a number
of personal sufferings in his life, I ultimately want to disagree with A’s claim, and I think
that Kierkegaard does as well, that all poetry stems from suffering. Instead, I will argue
that Kierkegaard uses the poetic mode, specifically parables, as rhetorical tools that will
ideally cause his readers to make a choice that will lead to self-knowledge.
This chapter is going to explore the poetic side of Kierkegaard’s writings. I will
begin with an examination of the poetic in Kierkegaard and the connections that the
poetic mode has to indirect communication and the religious goal that Kierkegaard has in
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mind for his works. Though the aesthetic mode of existence, typified by A’s views, often
engages in poetic discourse, we will see that Kierkegaard has a much larger view of the
poetic than the view that A puts forward. Indeed, Kierkegaard comes to view the poetic
as a necessity for the religious, drawing connections to both appropriation and the
distinction between actuality and possibility. As the poetic moves between these realms
and concepts, I will argue that a poetic mode of communication is both dangerous in a
way similar to what Plato saw, in that poetry may simply lead us to a world of
imagination that separates us from our concrete existence and understanding of truth, as
well as helpful in that it can cause us to recognize other possibilities that we can
actualize.
Having examined the poetic in Kierkegaard I will then move to a discussion of
metaphor as a mode of poetic discourse. I will examine some hermeneutic approaches to
metaphor that help us understand Kierkegaard’s use of metaphor and parable.
Specifically, I will argue that we can best understand Kierkegaard’s metaphors as
producing a kind of tension between two possible interpretations that gives way to a
synthesis provided by the reader.
Moving from an understanding of what a parable is, I will then explore the unique
effects that a parable has and the ways in which these relate to Kierkegaard’s stated goals.
Specifically, I will be examining the ways in which parables can bring about a change in
the reader by bringing about a kind of sameness of vision in the parable and the reader. I
will end this chapter with a classic example from literature, and one that Kierkegaard
mentions both in published works and in his journals, the Biblical story of Nathan and
David. The prophet Nathan uses a parable to reveal truth to David and it causes a drastic
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change in David’s understanding of his own actions. I will explore this story as a kind of
paradigmatic example of how parable can function and use it to set up the next stage of
this project which will inspect a number of Kierkegaard’s parables and consider the
specific uses that they have in his works.
This chapter builds off what was argued in my previous two chapters.
Kierkegaard has a specific goal in mind as an author, and that goal is to bring forward the
religious in his audience. In order to accomplish this goal, Kierkegaard claims that he
must use indirect communication, and as was explained in chapter two, part of that
involves presenting his readers with existence-possibilities. This chapter works with that
idea, examining what form these possibilities might take, and working to develop a
general Kierkegaardian approach to metaphor and parable. This chapter will thus move
us from an understanding of the poetic in Kierkegaard to an understanding of metaphor
and parable in general, setting us up for chapter four where we will examine
Kierkegaard’s use of parables.
Section 1: Soothesaying Through Poetry

Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms often viewed themselves as poets with poetic
goals. While Kierkegaard, later in his career, outlines precisely what his goals were all
along, when we examine his diaries and the thoughts of some of his pseudonyms from
earlier in his career there is already the inclusion of the poetic. On one hand, Kierkegaard
identifies his goal as bringing people to authentic Christianity, that is, as a religious goal.
At the same time, Walsh notes that “A survey of journal references to himself as poet
reveals that he identifies himself with this role far more frequently in the period of the
later religious writings than in earlier years. Again and again he declares in the later
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journals that he is essentially a poet. In several entries he describes himself more
specifically as a ‘poet of the religious’ and even more narrowly as a ‘Christian poet and
thinker’.”134 So in addition to A identifying himself as a poet, Climacus implying that he
is a poet, and numerous other occasions in the pseudonymous works, we also have
Kierkegaard himself identifying as a religious poet.135 In an appendix to The Point of
View for my Work as an Author entitled “Armed Neutrality” Kierkegaard writes,
“The one who presents this picture [of Christendom] must himself first and
foremost humble himself under it, confess that he, even though he himself is
struggling within himself to approach this picture, is very far from being that. He
must confess that he actually relates himself only poetically or qua poet to the
presentation of this picture, while he (which is his difference from the ordinary
conception of a poet) in his own person relates himself Christianly to the
presented picture, and that only as a poet is he ahead in presenting the picture.”136
Kierkegaard recognizes the necessity of the poetic approach as a tool in order to bring
about his religious end. As discussed in Chapter 1, presenting an image of Christianity
from a standpoint of superiority will cause many to reject the image.137 This rejection
isn’t due to a problem in the image, but rather a problem in positioning the standpoint of
the author. Thus, Kierkegaard thinks that we need to position ourselves religiously below
the image. I must humble myself beneath the picture of Christianity that I put forward,
recognizing and readily admitting that I fall short of it. When considered by someone
viewing the image, I will not appear to be arguing for or stating my religious superiority,
I will be either an equal to the other person or someone lesser. I will not be declaring
myself better than others, instead I just happen to be filled with poetic inspiration. I have
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been gifted with a talent for words that has allowed me to communicate the truth. If I
were claiming to be religiously superior, then those who are turned away from my claims
would specifically reject my religious claims. But if I merely claim to be a poet writing
out of inspiration, then the rejection that I might face won’t necessarily be of my religious
ideas, but rather of my poetic mode. By taking the poetic approach and identifying
himself primarily as a poet, even a religious poet, and thus someone lacking both
religious and moral superiority, Kierkegaard is trying to put forward an image of
Christianity that will not be easily rejected. Therefore, the poetic approach is very much a
part of Kierkegaard’s religious goal.
Part of the reason for this also stems from Kierkegaard’s ideas about the kinds of
creatures that we are. As was discussed previously, Kierkegaard views us as essentially
subjective thinking things,138 and he thus must employ the indirect approach when trying
to communicate certain things to us. He writes,
“And just as it is a mediocre existence when the adult cuts away all
communication with childhood and is a fragmentary adult, so is it a poor
existence when a thinker, who is indeed also an existing person, has given up on
imagination and feeling, which is just as lunatic as giving up on the
understanding. And yet this is what people seem to want. They oust and dismiss
poetry as a surmounted element because poetry corresponds most closely to
imagination. In a scientific-scholarly process, it may be all right to classify it as a
surmounted element, but in existence it holds true that as long as there is a human
being who wants to claim a human existence, he must preserve poetry, and all his
thinking must not disturb for him the enchantment of poetry but rather enhance
it… The true is not superior to the good and the beautiful, but the true and the
good and the beautiful belong essentially to every human existence and are united
for an existing person not in thinking them but in existing.”139
We see Climacus here describe two different approaches to life. First, we have the
thinking person who employs a scientific process and second, we have an existing person
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who wants to preserve poetry. We must engage with the poetic approach because we are
existing creatures and not merely thinking creatures. For us, the beautiful and the true
need to coalesce into one. Mackey refers to this idea when he writes, “in Kierkegaard
philosophy becomes poetry.”140 Our existence can never be surmounted and thus we must
always take the state of human existence into account when we examine our style of
communication. In Chapter 2 I examined how the religious message often requires
indirect communication due to its content. Here, we have Kierkegaard looking at the
problem from the other end, not of the message or the communicator, but of the receiver.
The receiver puts limitations on the modes of communication that will be successful due
to the very nature of the receiver’s existence. This is again a push away from the thinking
approach, something that Kierkegaard refers to here as a “scientific-scholarly process.”
The goal is not merely to find the truth or to think something that is true, but rather to
exist in what is true. Thus, with our goal being a certain kind of existence, we must
employ the types of communication that are connected to the kinds of existing creatures
that we are. For Kierkegaard, this is the transformation of philosophy into poetry. It is not
merely that we are using poetry as an effective tool, though Kierkegaard certainly seems
to indicate that on occasion, as noted above. Instead, philosophical thought becomes
united with the poetic mode and with poetry itself.
Before fully endorsing the poetic mode of communication as fulfilling
Kierkegaard’s goals, I want to turn to some work done by Sylvia Walsh. Walsh finds a
number of concerns that Kierkegaard has about the poetic, and thus we must examine
these potential problems before we can move forward with an argument about the value
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of parable in Kierkegaard’s works. Walsh notes that we are faced with a limitation when
we argue for ethical or religious principles, that of our own life experience. She writes,
“From an ethical-religious standpoint, one may not communicate more than what one’s
own life conforms to. If one seeks to communicate something higher, therefore, it must
be made clear that the presentation is a poetic one.”141 Walsh’s contention here is that the
presentation of something in the poetic mode is only an imaginative one, a presentation
of a possibility. To that extent, the poetic mode allows us to explore ideas of which we
have no personal experience. Thus, the poetic mode lets someone who claims to have no
unique religious or moral experience make claims about what a certain religion should
look like. This can occur when we don’t make such claims as scholars but rather as poets.
We see this at work in Kierkegaard’s earlier pseudonymous works where the pseudonym
is very clearly lower than the ideal that is being presented. In some later works, like those
by Anti-Climacus, we see the pseudonyms explicitly mention that they are poets so as to
avoid confusion.142 In both situations, the religious ideas must be presented poetically, for
the author cannot claim, for practical reasons already mentioned as well as in truth, that
their life conforms with the stringent religious principles that are being put forward. The
poetic mode can explore ideas as possibilities, and thus even if I am not religious, I can
think about what the religious should be like as a poet. However, a scholar can only
approach the religious with the necessary authority to define exactly what Christianity is
and how it functions. Thus, the religious communication should be poetic if it is to propel
the reader and not merely exist as an argument about what authentic Christianity looks
like.
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Walsh also notes a number of smaller problems that Kierkegaard has with the
poetic. One of the reasons that Plato disliked poetry and did not want it in his ideal state
was because poetry was false. It was distanced by an order of magnitude from reality and
would thus represent a kind of deception. Walsh argues that Kierkegaard, in his quest for
the religious, must contend with this possibility of deception. If Kierkegaard is using
poetry as a kind of deception, then poetry starts to look like sophistry, and this is a
problem that Kierkegaard considers. “Have I, after all (however much I should like to
have someone share my point of view), the right to use my art in order to win over a
person?”143 Kierkegaard here struggles with the ethical question as to whether deception
is acceptable. His ultimate goal is the religious, but he has to take into account the reason
for which his readers choose the religious.144 Seemingly his audience must choose the
religious for the right reasons and not, for instance, because Kierkegaard’s beautiful
language has made them think that the religious will be full of pleasure and thus appeal to
the pleasure seeker in them. A true turn to the religious requires a recognition of certain
religious concepts like that of sin, that one is bringing to bear on oneself. Beyond concern
over the ethics of his methods, Kierkegaard also harbors further concerns about the
efficacy of them.
Walsh gives a full explanation of multiple dangers that Kierkegaard or some of
his pseudonyms think that poetry holds, which I will here represent very briefly. 145,146
One of the first problems is that poetry is ideal, it lives in the realm of possibility.
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Because of this poetry is oftentimes indifferent to actuality. The poetic does not need a
world (as A would put it) of nisses and trolls to actually exist, it only needs such a world
to be imaginable in order to bring the reader into that possibility. Because of this
detachment from actuality poetry carries the danger of driving the reader away from the
concrete and losing them in the possible. This carries a real danger for the religious goal
of Kierkegaard, for he wants to bring Christianity to bear on the concrete individual, and
not on the individual lost in possibility. To that individual, a world of sin can be
imagined, and we can think through the possible outcomes, and why such a world might
need a savior, but in the end, none of it matters for it is all a thought experiment. Thus,
poetry carries the danger of drawing us away from the actual world. In a similar vein,
since poetry can lead us away from actuality, it can also pull us out of the ethical, for it is
only immediate. Therefore, Walsh claims that poetry offers us immediacy in the form of
fantasy or imagination and in doing so can remove us from the realm of the ethical and
the relationships that are a part of that realm. We cannot be dialectical with something
that is only immediate, nor can we make meaningful choice in such a world of
immediacy.
In examining the problems that might lie with the poetic approach, Walsh also
outlines what exactly she thinks is needed for the good version of the poetic that
Kierkegaard is working towards. By examining some of Kierkegaard’s criticisms of Hans
Christian Andersen, Walsh claims that something Andersen lacks, and that Kierkegaard
thus desires out of poetry, is a positive life view.147 The poet must be able to reach
beyond a fragmentary view of life or of a single experience and instead present a
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substantial view of existence such that anyone reading the work of the poet can orient
their life towards what the poet is presenting. Kierkegaard wants poetry to serve a
specific function, that of bringing individuals closer to the religious, and thus poetry
needs to be instructive towards the religious goals that Kierkegaard has in mind. Walsh
also contends that the poetic requires reflection as a necessary ingredient in order for it to
be of use. Poetry cannot be immediate, which the pleasure-seeking life is composed of
according to A, for if it is then the reader can never move beyond the aesthetic realm.
Thus, for Walsh, in order for poetry to be ethically or religiously instructive, it must be
imbued with, and thus inspire, reflection. In this way poetry and the poetic can overcome
the danger of pulling the reader into immediacy and thus away from the ethical. With
reflection as an ingredient of the poetic, Walsh argues that we no longer have to worry
about poetry driving the reader into immediacy.
Lastly, Walsh makes a distinction between the imagination and the fantastic for
Kierkegaard.148 Most poetry drives us towards the fantastic, which isn’t rooted in
actuality and which leads away from the self. “In fantasy, the self does not become itself
but rather loses itself in infinitude, gradually becoming volatilized in an inhuman state of
abstraction… When the imagination or a capacity dependent upon it becomes fantastic in
this manner, the self can be said to be in despair, the despair of infinitude.”149 The
imagination, by contrast, is centered around oneself as an existing creature and thus
always returns to the concrete. We can think of the imagination as the faculty which
allows us to entertain possibilities, and the fantastic, as Walsh describes, as the
imagination run wild. Imagination, though it is entertaining possibilities, is remaining
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grounded in our concrete existence, whereas the fantastic loses this connection with our
concreteness and instead runs wild, intoxicated with possibility. Thus, our poetry needs to
engage the imagination but avoid the fantastic.150 As we move back to Kierkegaard, I
think it is good for us to keep in mind what I’ve outlined from Walsh above. Walsh’s
work helps us recognize categories like imagination when we examine Kierkegaard’s
parables and his poetic style overall.
One of the reasons that Kierkegaard wants to engage the imagination is that he
wants to put possibilities before us such that we can then actualize them. Here are two
sections where Climacus addresses this issue directly, and I am quoting them at length.
“But existence-actuality cannot be communicated, and the subjective thinker has
his own actuality in his own ethical existence. If actuality is to be understood by a
third party, it must be understood as possibility, and a communicator who is
conscious of this will therefore see to it, precisely in order to be oriented towards
existence, that his existence-communication is in the form of possibility. A
production in the form of possibility places existing in it as close to the recipient
as it is possible between one human being and another. Let me elucidate this once
again. One would think that, by telling a reader that this person and that person
actually have done this and that (something great and remarkable), one would
place the reader closer to wanting to do the same, to wanting to exist in the same,
than by merely presenting it as possible. Apart from what was pointed out in its
proper place, that the reader can understand the communication only by
dissolving the esse of actuality into posse, since otherwise he only imagines that
he understands, apart from this, the fact that this person and that person actually
have done this and that can just as well have a delaying as a motivating effect.
The reader merely transforms the person who is being discussed (aided by his
being an actual person) into the rare exceptions; he admires him and says: But I
am too insignificant to do anything like that.”151
What is great with regard to the universal must therefore not be presented as an
object for admiration, but as a requirement. In the form of possibility, the
presentation becomes a requirement. Instead of presenting the good in the form of
actuality, as is ordinarily done, that this person and that person have actually lived
I have here only provided a very brief overview of what Walsh puts together regarding the poetic, and
while there is certainly a rich conversation to be had about the differences between imagination and
fantasy, for instance, such a conversation will have to be bracketed in this project both for the sake of
brevity and in order that I might progress to the core concepts that this project seeks to address.
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and have actually done this, and thus transforming the reader into an observer, an
admirer, an appraiser, it should be presented in the form of possibility. Then
whether or not the reader wants to exist in it is placed as close as possible to
him.152
The problem with presenting something as actually existing is that it too easily turns the
reader into a mere observer. I can watch a professional athlete perform an incredible feat
and think to myself, “Wow, I could never be that good.” The presentation as actuality can
turn us into admirers, but Kierkegaard doesn’t want admirers of Christianity, he wants
authentic Christians. Thus, Kierkegaard must present possibilities to his readers. When an
actuality is presented, I am immediately made aware that it is possible for a human being
to achieve such a thing, but I am also made aware very explicitly of the differences
between myself and the person who just achieved what was made actual. I can look at the
athlete and recognize that I am not strong or fast enough to do what they did. But when
something is presented only as a possibility, I can tap into my imagination and then place
myself within the possibility to see if it can be actualized. There is nothing for me to
admire in a possibility, nor is there any way for me to excuse myself from action when I
examine a possibility, for I do not yet know if I possess the ability to actualize what is
being presented as possible. So, I am left with only two choices, to test myself against the
possibility and try to actualize it, or to reject the possibility altogether as being unworthy
of my time.
When looking at this question of possibility, I think it’s useful to turn to Mackey’s
thoughts considering Kierkegaard’s poetic approach. Mackey, making a similar claim to
the one that I made in chapter one about how Kierkegaard’s goal is to engender
awareness, writes, “That in a way is the purpose of every poet: not to tell the truth, nor
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yet to insinuate fabulous lies, but to make men aware of the options so that the emergence
of truth within the individual is not hindered by the conceit of knowledge or the tangle of
error.”153 The poet, and therefore Kierkegaard, to the extent that he considers himself a
religious poet, is trying not to present a truth to the reader, but instead to present
possibilities to the reader such that the reader can freely pursue the truth subjectively.
Yet, Kierkegaard seems to want to take things a step further than Mackey implies. As we
will come to see, Kierkegaard’s goal is not to merely to present possibilities, but to do so
in such a way that the reader is prompted to choose for herself. This too ties back into
Kierkegaard’s claims concerning indirect communication and appropriation. Climacus
writes,
“Inwardness cannot be communicated directly, because expressing it directly is
externality (oriented outwardly, not inwardly), and expressing inwardness directly
is no proof at all that it is there… but there is inwardness when what is said
belongs to the recipient as if it were his own – and now it is indeed his own. To
communicate in that way is the most beautiful triumph of resigned
inwardness.”154
Inwardness and appropriation are achieved via the use of possibilities that the poetic
carries. When something is presented as a possibility the reader must turn inward and
appropriate the idea if they want to engage it at all. Because of this, if Kierkegaard
ultimately wants to engender inwardness, as Climacus seems to desire, then he must take
a poetic approach so that he can present possibility to the reader. Having recognized the
necessity of the poetic approach to Kierkegaard’s overall goals as an author, let us next
examine the most common and striking forms of the poetic that Kierkegaard employs in
his writings: metaphor and parable.
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Section 2: Construct Additional Metaphors

One of the common ways that we see Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms bring
forward these kinds of possibilities is through their use of metaphor and parable. To
examine this, I first want to return to a quotation from Anti-Climacus that I brought up in
chapter 2. “For example, it is indirect communication to place jest and earnestness
together in such a way that the composite is a dialectical knot – and then to be a nobody
oneself. If anyone wants to have anything to do with this kind of communication, he will
have to untie the knot himself.”155 I had used this to help explain the concept of indirect
communication, something that I think this quote does well. But, given that metaphor and
parable qualify as forms of indirect communication, I’d like to bring it in here as well.
This dialectical knot of jest and earnestness causes the receiver to have to untie the knot
for themself. It is unclear to the receiver if the communication is a matter of jest, if it is
earnest, or if it is some combination of the two that is producing an entirely new third
option. Thus, the receiver of the communication is faced with this challenge. They need
to uncover the meaning of the communication, but the communication is offering them a
number of different possibilities.
Given that Kierkegaard wants to bring forward possibility such that it might
provoke inwardness, we see a connection between this dialectical knot and his poetic
concerns. So, when we ask why Kierkegaard often broke into metaphor and parable
throughout his writings, I think we can trace a clear connection back to his concept of
indirect communication, and therefore back to his religious goal. Metaphors and parables
produce the same kind of effect that we see Kierkegaard describe with his dialectical
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knot. The dialectical knot presents us with competing possibilities. The receiver, upon
recognizing the possibilities must, if she is to seek any level of understanding, resolve the
competition in some manner. So, we can see this dialectical knot as producing a kind of
tension between multiple possibilities. When I run into a metaphor, I am faced with
multiple possibilities of meaning, and it is up to me to decide on one of them as an
avenue forward. If I encounter a passage that claims, “Man is a puppet” as I am reading
through a text, I encounter the tension caused by possibility. Man is very clearly not a
literal puppet, for I am made of flesh and bone instead of fabric. So, must I interpret
things metaphorically? Metaphorically, this might be referring to my lack of free will, or
maybe a hyperbolic statement about my quality of life. Regardless of the interpretation
that I decide on, the metaphor presents me with this kind of tension. Lorentzen, one of the
few scholars who has worked on Kierkegaard’s use of metaphor, makes a similar claim.
He writes, “Metaphor provides Kierkegaard with the dialectical tension and the middle
ground – as a kind of no-man’s land – that his indirect communication requires of the
reader to struggle with existence itself, to examine not only life but ideas in life that
ethically instruct and prompt the reader to choose.”156
Given this concern with tension as a central concept in Kierkegaard’s use of
metaphor, I want to bring in another theorist who also examines the use of tension in
metaphor: Ricoeur. Ricoeur focuses on the way that the reader interacts with and comes
to understand metaphor. Ricoeur claims that we come to identify metaphors by finding a
kind of confusion in the language being used. “So metaphor appears as an answer to a
certain inconsistency of the statement interpreted literally.”157 When taking a literal
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reading of “Man is a puppet,” confusion would ensue for human beings are not inanimate
dolls with strings attached. This inconsistency is what makes us aware that the statement
is probably metaphorical. In this vein, Ricoeur also argues that we must approach whole
statements as metaphorical and not merely single words. It’s not that “puppet” is a term
being used metaphorically, but instead that the entire proposition “Man is a puppet” is
metaphorical. Giving us this ability to identify metaphors, Ricoeur presents his overall
approach, for which he uses the term “tension.” Ricoeur writes,
“Now substitution is a sterile operation, but in metaphor, on the contrary, the
tension between the words and especially the tension between two interpretations,
one literal and one metaphorical, in the whole sentence, gives rise to a veritable
creation of meaning of which rhetoric perceived only the end result. In a theory of
tension… a new signification emerges which deals with the whole statement. In
this respect, metaphor is an instantaneous creation.”158
Tension theory approaches metaphorical statements as statements that create new
meaning. The tension between the possible interpretations of the text gives rise to a new
understanding, a “creation” as Ricoeur calls it.
For Ricoeur, this tension stems from the existence of two possible interpretations,
a literal interpretation and a metaphorical interpretation. These two interpretations aren’t
at odds with one another, but instead they complement one another. The literal and the
metaphorical mutually inform each other, the literal helping me understand the
metaphorical and vice versa. Thus, when we take both interpretations as a totality, a new
meaning is created. This new meaning is neither the metaphorical or the literal, but rather
is the tension of the two. For Ricoeur, this breaks from a history in which the literal
interpretation is often ignored in favor of the metaphorical. Instead, Ricoeur claims that
the literal is an important part of what the metaphor does.
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I think that Ricoeur’s understanding of tension is helpful for us when we turn
back to Kierkegaard’s use of metaphor. As I will explain in the next chapter, Kierkegaard
also wants to take into account the literal. The structure of his metaphors and parables,
the characters that he uses, their places and locations and words, are all valuable in
helping us understand what Kierkegaard is trying to do as an author. Yet, Ricoeur wants
tension to derive from two possible but complimentary interpretation, literal and
metaphorical. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, seems to want some kind of competition
between interpretations. I think that this is a minor point, but one worth considering.
Where for Ricoeur the literal and the metaphorical work together to produce a new
creation of meaning, for Kierkegaard the possibilities that the metaphor presents are in
conflict with one another, though this conflict might have the same kind of resolution that
we find in Ricoeur. The dialectical knot presents us with two competing possibilities, jest
or earnestness. The earnest interpretation does not help me understand the jesting
interpretation, nor vice versa. They are not analogues of each other in the way that the
metaphorical and the literal are for Ricoeur. Yet, in the end, they might have the same
kind of dialectical synthesis that Ricoeur sees in the literal and the metaphorical. For
Kierkegaard, the goal of the poetic is to cause inwardness through the introduction of
possibilities. Thus, when I am presented with the competing possibilities that a metaphor
introduces, I must consider their likelihood. Does this metaphor lend more towards jest or
towards earnestness? Does it lend more towards literal or metaphorical? But, if the
metaphor doesn’t clearly lend itself to one interpretation over the other, then I am forced
to make something out of it. I must figure out how to maintain both jest and earnestness
in a meaningful way such that the metaphor still makes sense. This occurrence brings

109
about inwardness and appropriation. Where for Ricoeur the metaphor creates new
meaning, for Kierkegaard the creation stems from the individual.
Given this understanding of how metaphor works for Kierkegaard, I’d like to
briefly cover how this also extends to parables. Kierkegaard often gives us colorful
metaphors, but we also find a large number of longer form parables. But how do we
distinguish a parable from a metaphor or from a short story? There doesn’t seem to be
any single demarcating feature that we can use to pinpoint something as a parable.
Ricoeur notes this difficulty, writing, “To call a certain narrative a parable is to say that
the story refers to something other than what it told… how does the narrative itself start
the interpretive process which makes it into a parable?”159 Parables have the same
metaphorical aspect to interpretation that metaphors do, which for Ricoeur brings about
the same kind of tension between literal and metaphorical. But a parable is a narrative of
some sort. Thus, Ricoeur concludes that, “The parable has been tentatively defined as the
mode of discourse which applies to a narrative form a metaphoric process.”160 A parable
does the same thing that a metaphor does, it just does it in a narrative form. For Ricoeur,
just as we posit meaning of the entire metaphor and not just one phrase of the metaphor,
so too do we posit meaning of the entire parable, and not just one character or action.
Yet, there might also be a number of structural signifiers that can at least clue us
in to the possibility of a parable. Donahue, in his work on Biblical parables, finds that
parables are often marked by some traits, though the list that he comes up with, adapted
from Rudolf Bultmann, present neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for a parable.
Instead, they are more like markers that indicate the possibility of a parable. Donahue
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finds that we usually have a concise narrative in which large groups of people are treated
as a single individual and in which you rarely have more than two individuals interacting
at the same time. He also claims that parables rarely give the reader access into the minds
of the characters, and instead that all motivations and thoughts are portrayed through
characters’ actions or speeches. He notes that parables are also often characterized by
repetition of actions and situations, as well as a lack of a full conclusion, and thus with
issues left unresolved.161
So, we see that parables and metaphors fit very well both into the description of
the poetic that Kierkegaard gives us as well as with his desire for indirect
communication. Parables and metaphors present a kind of choice to the reader by giving
them the dialectical knot that must be untied. The parable possesses a kind of tension that
prompts the reader to unravel the knot, and in doing so, the parable causes inwardness
and appropriation. As we move forward, I will endeavor to explain exactly how parables
are able to not only provide this tension to the reader, but how they go further and prompt
us to choose.
Section 3: The Power Level of Parables

Parables present to us an interesting literary tool mostly because of the effect that
they have on the reader. Parables are able not only to provide a creative imagining of a
certain person or place, but also to present real choices to the reader. When working
through a parable the reader is invited to participate in the parable. Reading through the
parable of the workers in the vineyard, we are invited to wonder as to why the lord pays
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all of his laborers the same amount regardless of the work that they have done.162
TeSelle, a theologian who primarily works with metaphor, uses this idea to claim, “A
parable of Jesus is not, then, only an interesting story; it is a call to decision.”163 The
parable calls to the reader and invites them to seek understanding. We must understand
how or why the lord acts as he does when his actions seem unfair. This understanding of
ours then prompts a further decision, for the parable is trying to describe to us the
Kingdom of God. So, we must decide whether to revise our understanding of the
Kingdom of God or not. In this sense, the parable will often present some kind of conflict
between our understanding of the world and the world that the parable presents, with the
resolution of this conflict driving us to revise our understanding of the world. TeSelle
writes, “The secure, familiar everydayness of the story of their own lives has been torn
apart; they have seen another story – the story of a mundane life like their own moving
by a different ‘logic,’ and they begin to understand (not just with their heads) that another
way of believing and living – another frame or context for their lives – might be a
possibility for them.”164 The parable presents a possibility to us, that God is like such and
such, that the Kingdom of God is like such and such, that I need to live a life like such
and such. Yet the parable does not present them as intellectual possibilities, things that
we might need to merely assent to. Instead, they are presented as real possibilities for us
that can impact our lives.
Interacting with and engaging the metaphor empowers its ability to make us
choose, and thus we realize that the possibilities in the parable are real possibilities for us.
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Lorentzen’s examination of metaphor turns his attention to Kierkegaard’s The Book on
Adler, in which he finds support for a similar hypothesis. “The intent is to push the
primitive existential moment of choice to its crisis by compelling ‘one either to be
offended or to believe,’ for, ‘contemporaneity is the tension that does not permit a person
to leave it undecided.’”165, 166 The parable is contemporaneous for it offers us a choice
that is always relevant to our lived experience, and thus is eternally contemporaneous. No
matter my situation in life, recognizing my sin in the face of Christ, or understanding
what the Kingdom of God is like, will always relate to me. The religious parable, in this
sense, offers up offense or belief as the options that we must choose from. The parable is
asking us to reorder our understanding of the world and to that extent, there is a chance of
offense. In the act of asking me to reorder things, the parable is claiming that my
understanding is incorrect and therefore I can respond with offense, which disallows the
parable to be successful. Thus we can either ignore the parable and fail to engage it, or
we are forced to choose between offense and belief. When faced with an understanding
of our fallen state in the face of God we are either offended or we choose to believe, and
it is parables that bring us to this tipping point.
Seemingly what I have just described amounts to a kind of persuasion. The
parable will often either persuade me to believe or to be offended. Yet, Lane argues that
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous and philosophical works are not meant to be persuasive to
the reader.167 Instead, he argues, the philosophical works are meant to clear up confusion
and give an explanation of what true Christianity is. To that extent, they cannot be
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persuasive, for their goal is knowledge. Thus, he argues, the religious works are the ones
that are trying to be persuasive. However, this approach seems to me to neglect the
literary side of Kierkegaard’s philosophical works. Parables, metaphors, analogies,
allegories, all of these invite our participation and prompt us to decide. In order to
understand how these tools fit into the context in which they are placed, we must
endeavor to interpret them in a way that is meaningful to the text in which they appear.
Thus they invite us to participate with them, and to the extent that they are designed to be
persuasive, they prompt us to decide. This process is inherently persuasive to the extent
that we go through with it. Thus, if the reader engages the parables in Kierkegaard’s
philosophical works, we see the possibility of persuasion beyond just the religious
writings.
But how exactly do parables persuade us? When considering their persuasive
power, we have to take into account that it is the reader who is interpreting and thus
constructing them. The author puts together a parable, in Kierkegaard’s case, with a
specific goal in mind. But all that the author can do is write the parable and then give it to
the reader. The reader, having now been invited to participate with the parable, has to
figure out what the parable means. Given, as I have described, that the parable is going to
offer an alternative account of the Kingdom of God for instance, one that the reader must
then measure up against his or her own account, the reader must endeavor to uncover this
alternative account. However, the parable does not outright describe this account. Instead,
the reader must build it for themself. Yet, in order to understand what that account is, or
if it even differs from your own, you must construct the account from the parable. It’s
possible that you are unable to do so, maybe you just can’t make sense of the parable. But
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if you can, then the account that you have created is at least somewhat coherent. So now
you must measure this coherent, alternative account versus the one that you already hold
yourself. This alternative account now has a good chance at being persuasive for two
reasons. First, since it was a creation of yours, you feel like this is self-discovered
knowledge, and thus the parable bypasses many of your defense mechanisms. You do not
feel like your views are being attacked externally, for you were the one who constructed
this account. Secondly, since the account is your construction, and you constructed it in
order to make sense of the parable, you put together something that is at least somewhat
coherent and rational. To that extent, you are unlikely to dismiss it immediately or
offhandedly. You will instead give it some consideration and truly measure it against the
account that you currently hold. Thus, the parable will possess a much greater possibility
to persuade than say, a diatribe that attacks the account of the Kingdom of God that you
currently hold.
Another ability that the parable has is what Arnold Isenberg refers to as “critical
communication.” Isenberg’s work is primarily centered on aesthetics. One of his most
famous pieces presents an argument about the duty of the art critic. Some take the job of
the art critic to be evaluative. That is, the art critic is supposed to evaluate the value of
certain works of art based on criteria that are more or less accepted. Isenberg claims that
this usually goes about via a three-step process. The critic renders a verdict, gives a
reason for the verdict, and backs up the reason by some norm. So, a critic might say that a
painting is good (verdict) because it matches form to content very well (reason), and any
painting that matches form to content is a good painting (norm).168 Taking issue with this
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approach, Isenberg says that it leaves out something meaningful that comes along with
criticism. He argues that it is not merely the critic’s job to evaluate art, but also to bring
about a shared vision of a work of art. He writes,
“And if communication is a process by which a mental content is transmitted by
symbols from one person to another, then we can say that it is a function of
criticism to bring about communication at the level of the senses, that is, to induce
a sameness of vision, of experienced content. If this is accomplished, it may or
may not be followed by agreement, or what is called "communion" - a community
of feeling which expresses itself in identical value judgments.”169
The job of the critic is to make you see what she sees. For example, the film critic does
not exist so that I can know which movies I should see and which I should avoid. Instead,
the film critic exists so that when I go see a certain film, I can see all of the depth,
mystery, and symbolism that I would have missed without the help of the critic. She
allows me to see what she sees, and assumedly what she sees is a fuller vision of the
work of art.
How exactly does the critic do this? An evaluation is something that is easy
enough to communicate, but how does one bring about a shared vision? The critic can tell
me how she sees the work of art, but that won’t make me see it that way. Something
beyond a communication of her vision must occur. Isenberg refers to this special kind of
communication as “critical communication”. According to Isenberg, “In ordinary
communication, symbols tend to acquire a footing relatively independent of senseperception.”170 When we communicate ordinarily, the words or symbols that we use to
communicate have established their meanings independent of our individual senseperceptions. Thus, if we are trying to bring about a sameness of vision, ordinary
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communication will be no good. Isenberg uses the following example to illustrate critical
communication, and the difference between it and ordinary communication.
““The expression on her face was delightful.”
“What was delightful about it?”
“Didn’t you see that smile?””171
The final line here is important. Were the speaker to simply say, “The smile” there would
be no special communication. Instead, we would merely have information being
communicated. The speaker would be communicating that a specific smile was
delightful. Instead, by asking the question, the speaker is prompting something very
different to happen. The interlocutor must consider the question. Assumedly he did see
the smile, but yet he didn’t notice that her expression was delightful. So, he has missed
something about her expression. What he has missed is something interpretive. He hasn’t
missed out on any content; he saw her face. So the “critic” in this situation is trying to
share her vision of a woman’s expression. She asks if her interlocutor saw the woman’s
face. What effect does this have? The interlocutor must now reconsider what he has seen.
He saw her expression, and he saw her smile. But he somehow missed connecting her
smile to a delightful expression. The smile is the key here. He must reinterpret what he
has seen and center his reinterpretation around the smile. Once this happens, he should
hopefully see the delightful face that the critic has seen.
This kind of critical communication is not something that can be objectively
stated. Instead it is intuited from one to another, in Isenberg’s example through the form
of a question. The critic is not informing their audience about qualities found in a work of
art. Instead, they are trying to affect a change in their audience. They want their audience
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to pick up on the same subtleties that they are picking up on. But telling you about these
subtleties won’t make you see them. Instead, I have to get you to reorient your vision
such that you then see the same things that I am seeing. Critical communication is what
causes us to reorient ourselves in this way.
Section 4: Come Now David, Where Has Uriah Gone?

Given this scaffolding that I have put together describing how parables function,
let’s now look at a classic example of this in action, one that a number of scholars, and
Kierkegaard himself, all consider: that of David and Bathsheba. I want to turn to this
example primarily for two reasons. First, it is a parable that both Kierkegaard and a
number of parable scholars examine. Thus, by looking at David and Bathsheba, we can
gain at least a small understanding of how Kierkegaard’s analysis of parables fits in with
that of modern scholars. Second, I want to examine this parable because it presents to us
a perfect example of what I’m arguing a parable should accomplish for Kierkegaard. It is
a story about a successful parable and thus gives us a good image for the process that I’m
claiming we find in Kierkegaard’s works. In order to examine this parable, I’m first going
to start by turning to Ted Cohen, a philosopher who primarily worked in aesthetics.
Cohen uses the story of David and Bathsheba from the Bible to illustrate critical
communication in action.
One day, David sees Bathsheba bathing and invites her to his palace and has sex
with her. She becomes pregnant soon after though her husband is away at war. King
David thus calls her husband back from the front lines and tells him to go and be with his
wife, hoping that Uriah would then be the assumed father of the unborn child. However,
Uriah, the husband, refuses. He claims that it is not right for him to be with his wife while
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his comrades in arms are fighting. So King David sends Uriah back to the front lines and
arranges for him to die in battle. Upon his death, David summons the widowed Bathsheba
to live in his palace. This course of action angers the Lord and he sends the prophet
Nathan to speak to King David. David feels no remorse at his actions and thus Nathan
tells him a story.
““There were two men in one city, the one rich and the other poor. The rich man
had a great many flocks and herds. But the poor man had nothing except one little
ewe lamb which he bought and nourished; and it grew up together with him and
his children. It would eat of his bread and drink of his cup and lie in his bosom,
and was like a daughter to him. Now a traveler came to the rich man, and he was
unwilling to take from his own flock or his own herd, to prepare for the wayfarer
who had come to him; rather he took the poor man’s ewe lamb and prepared it for
the man who had come to him”
Then David’s anger burned greatly against the man, and he said to Nathan, “As
the Lord lives, surely the man who has done this deserves to die. He must make
restitution for the lamb fourfold, because he did this thing and had no
compassion.”
Nathan then said to David, “You are the man!””172
The context of what Nathan says to David informs us that this is clearly something in
need of interpretation. Nathan is not telling David that David stole someone else’s lamb
and must have forgotten about it. He is telling David that David is the rich man from the
story, but obviously not in a literal sense. This context demonstrates the need for
interpretation, but where does this interpretation lead us?
Cohen brings up two points that are very important to keep in mind. “(1) Nathan
has not told David anything David did not already know, (2) When Nathan has finished
speaking, David has new feelings and thoughts about something he has already
known.”173 If David did not know that he had done something wrong, he would never

172
173

From 2 Samuel Chapter 12 in the NASB translation
Cohen 235

119
make the connection that Nathan wants him to make between himself and the rich man.
He must already know that he is guilty of taking something from someone less fortunate,
when he had no need to take anything. So Nathan is not informing David that David has
done something wrong, for David already know this. Instead, Nathan is making David
feel something new about things that he already knew. He wants David to feel the guilt,
shame, and anger towards himself that he feels towards the rich man. Also, it is important
to note that the truth of the story is irrelevant here because we only need David to
entertain the story seriously in order to bring about the emotive effect.174 When Nathan
tells David that he is the rich man, Nathan has artificially closed interpretation. From the
standpoint of David there is now only one meaningful way to interpret the story.
But what happens is more than just an issue of interpretation. The story of David
and Nathan isn’t interesting because David is able to properly interpret what happens.
Instead, the interest lies in the effect that the interpretation has on David; the critical
communication that passes from Nathan to David. “David’s anger and moral outrage at
the rich man have been transferred to himself.”175 How exactly does this happen? We
should be very careful and precise in describing this, for in doing so we are hopefully
elucidating one of the central powers of parable. Cohen writes,
“No doubt David ‘is like’ the rich man in the story. But that itself leads to
nothing. What matters is that some specific feeling attached to David’s sense of
the rich man is provoked in David’s sense of himself, to which it had not
previously been attached. This is not achieved simply by drawing David’s
attention to the fact that he and the rich man share membership in some similarity
class. Nathan needs the absolute particularity of the rich man. This is what
arouses David’s feelings. Nathan does not effect the transfer of feelings by saying,
“You resemble people whom you dislike.” David might accept the proposition
that he is like these disagreeable people and yet not be moved to anger at himself.
After all, any group can be judged similar in some respect or other, and the
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question will remain, why should David identify himself as such a person with
respect to his feelings? Nathan does not permit this way out. Instead of telling
David that he resembles people who make him angry, Nathan says, with absolute
specificity and particularity, that David is the rich man, exactly the man at whom
he is angry. And David responds at once.”176
It is the particular specificity of the instance that brings about the change in David. As
was argued, David must have already known that what he had done was wrong. Yet, he
did not have an emotive response to his moral wrongdoing. Thus, Nathan must do two
things: he must evoke the emotive response from David, and he must make sure that the
response is aimed at David himself. Nathan could have tried to do both at once, by telling
David that he should feel bad for what he’s done. But that leaves David with an escape.
He can verbally assent to Nathan without making the emotive connection. Nathan takes a
different route. He evokes the specific emotion that David needs to feel, and then he
redirects that emotion. By doing this Nathan is able to achieve a sameness of vision with
David, he is able to critically communicate. He makes David feel what he feels, and then
he redirects that feeling in an inescapable way. Thus, David feels guilt and anger towards
himself, and the lesson is complete.
This example is demonstrative of the idea that this kind of change is only able to
take place because of the specificity that the parable possesses. As individuals, we do not
respond in a significant manner to general stories. Our empathetic response, for instance,
is closely tied to individual, specific stories and actions. If critical communication is the
bringing about of a shared vision, then we are referring to some kind of perceptive state
and not merely a state of knowledge. I am not trying to get you to agree with me, I am
trying to get you to see what I see. In order to see what I see, you need to adopt the
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viewing stance that I have. This adoption, or as I referred to it earlier, reorientation, is
brought about by the specificity that we gain from the parable. If they are viewing the
situation in the same gestalt view that I am viewing it, their interpretation should be the
same as mine and thus it will apply to them as it does to me.
When Nathan tells the story of the rich man, he is setting up David to see the
situation in the same way that Nathan sees it. When Nathan tells David that he is the rich
man, there is no escape. David could deny that he is the rich man, but there will be no
logical way in which to do so. David can either be completely delusional, or he can
accept the critical communication that Nathan is giving him. The option of delusion is
one that is certainly available, but it is hard to take. David first is given the correct
emotional orientation by the story about the rich man. Given this orientation, he interprets
the story, and his interpretation reorganizes his view of himself. So, the parable allows
for critical communication in those steps. First it reorients the reader to the orientation of
the storyteller.177 By telling such a specific parable, we are able to prompt the reader to
read the story in a specific way. The reader, having been reoriented, interprets the story.
This interpretation should bring about a reorganization on the part of the reader, for
something has been critically communicated to them and thus they are adopting a new
point of view of themselves or of others. In this way, the parable effects a change in the
reader, though this change is not merely one of knowledge. The reader has not just been
taught a moral lesson. Instead, they now see the world in the same way that the author
does, if the author has been successful in their endeavor.
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Kierkegaard himself addresses the parable that Nathan tells David in For SelfExamination. He writes,
“But do you not believe that David himself was well aware beforehand how
abominable it is to have a woman’s husband killed in order to marry her? Do you
not believe that David, the great poet, could himself easily describe this
(eloquently, terrifyingly, shockingly)? Then, too, do you not believe that David
was well aware that he was guilty and what he was guilty of? And yet, yet, yet
someone from the outside was needed, someone who said to him: You.”178
David was well aware that the law had been broken, and he was not so foolish so as to
imagine himself as having acted righteously. However, what was missing was his
personal connection to the truth. What he needed was an outside source that connected
David’s own person to the truth. What Nathan was able to do was indirectly
communicate the truth to David such that David appropriated the truth that Nathan
presented and was able to immediately change. I think it is all too easy to imagine
Kierkegaard considering himself to be like Nathan, bringing the truth to Denmark, his
David.179 Kierkegaard is weaving the parable such that his audience becomes as enrapt as
David was. They are caught up in the story, emotionally connected to it, full of
inwardness. At that moment, Kierkegaard wants to turn to them and say: “You.”
Seeing this connection between parable and indirect communication by
examining the way in which parable functions leads us towards an examination of
Kierkegaard’s parables themselves. This chapter sets up the framework required to
connect parables with Kierkegaard’s goals as an author, specifically that of his religious
goal and his use of indirect communication. Understanding that parables can persuade,
instructing the readers about themselves and offering up a sameness of vision with the
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Of course, he can only do this towards those individuals who already possess the condition, as was
discussed in chapter one.
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author, we see how a close look at Kierkegaard’s parables can help us better understand
his works individually and collectively.
Conclusion

In chapters one and two, I worked to establish the goals that Kierkegaard had for
his authorship as well as the conceptual tools that he saw necessary to use in order to
accomplish that goal. Kierkegaard wants to bring us to Christianity, to make us aware of
the true requirements of Christianity and of how much we lack in respect to them. He
does this by using indirect communication to present possibilities to us. This chapter
examined how parables fit into that schema and work towards advancing and fulfilling
Kierkegaard’s goals. Having now established a Kierkegaardian approach to parables, our
next task is to turn to some of the parables themselves and examine them in order to give
demonstrations of how they function both towards his overall goals and towards the goals
of each individual work. Thus, we will next look at a number of parables taken from
different times of the authorship and analyze them with the Kierkegaardian approach to
parables that I’ve just established. Having done that, in chapter four, our last chapter will
finally put forward the argument that ties all of these pieces together by showing
precisely how the Kierkegaardian parable functions on the reader.
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Chapter 4: Kierkegaard the Storyteller

Quantum theory provides us with a striking illustration of the fact that we
can fully understand a connection though we can only speak of it in images
and parables.
– Werner Heisenberg

Having examined the parable that Nathan tells David, we are now going to turn to
a few of Kierkegaard’s own parables. In that spirit, I will begin with one such parable.
“It is supposed to have happened in England that a man was assaulted on the
highway by a robber disguised with a large wig. He rushes at the traveler, grabs
him by the throat, and shouts: Your wallet. He takes the wallet, which he keeps,
but he throws away the wig. A poor man comes down the same road, finds the
wig, puts it on, and arrives in the next town, where the traveler has already given
the alarm. He is recognized, arrested, and identified by the traveler, who swears
that he is the man. By chance, the robber is present in the courtroom, sees the
mistake, turns to the judge and says, “It seems to me that the traveler is looking
more at the wig than at the man” and asks permission to make an experiment. He
puts on the wig, grabs the traveler by the throat, and says: Your wallet – and the
traveler recognizes the robber and offers to swear to it – but the trouble is that he
already has sworn an oath. So it goes with everyone who in one way or another
has a “what” and pays no attention to “how”; he swears, he takes an oath, he runs
errands, he risks his life and blood, he is executed – all for the wig.”180
As I have stressed a number of times in this project, we must pay attention to the “how”
just as much as we pay attention to the “what.” So far I’ve argued that parables are an
important part of Kierkegaard’s “how” because they have a specific function that lends
itself towards Kierkegaard’s self-professed goals.181 We’ve examined the ways that
parables function and thus work towards these goals. This chapter is going to examine a
number of parables individually and demonstrate the way that each specific parable
functions both in the work in which it is found, and in the overarching schema that
Kierkegaard has in mind: bringing people inwards so as to turn them into authentic
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Kierkegaard’s goals were discussed primarily in chapter one where I argued that Kierkegaard is working
to bring his audience closer to authentic Christianity.
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Christians.
In my previous chapters I have outlined why we should pay attention to
Kierkegaard’s parables. Kierkegaard wants to push individuals towards Christianity and
given that Christianity has a specific subjective nature, Kierkegaard must employ the
kind of communication that is tied to subjective truth: indirect communication. Taking
into account his doctrine of indirect communication and examining his poetic side, we
have been brought to his parables as the next object of examination. But before we dive
into Kierkegaard’s specific parables, I want to consider a short defense that one of the
pseudonyms, Johannes Climacus, gives concerning the use of parables and fairy tales.
“Suppose there was a king who loved a maiden of lowly station in life – but the
reader may already have lost patience when he hears that our analogy begins like
a fairy tale and is not at all systematic. Well, presumably the erudite Polos found
it boring that Socrates continually talked about food and drink and physicians and
all such silly things that Polos never talked about. But did not Socrates still have
one advantage that he himself and everyone else had the prerequisite knowledge
from childhood on?”182
Climacus here makes reference to the metaphors and parables that Socrates would often
use. He finds that Socrates benefits from referring to concepts that everyone involved is
familiar with. Everyone had the same ideas about the foods and drinks and physicians
that Socrates mentioned. Thus, he is using a shared language of referents and concepts in
his explanations and questions. The value here is that nothing needs to be introduced.
Socrates does not have to teach his audience some new concept by referring to abstract
ideas. Instead, he talks about food and drink metaphorically, and everyone knows the
things of which he speaks. This is the defense that Climacus gives of his breaking into a
parable in the middle of his philosophical discourse. Parables present a kind of shared
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language that all, or at least most, individuals can partake in. I might not understand what
you mean when you say “objective truth” or “sin” or “faith”, but I do understand a king
and a maiden. I’ve read many stories about such individuals and I know many maidens
and am familiar with kings. So while I struggle to even begin to understand your writings
on sin, I can immediately begin to understand the story of the king and the maiden, for I
already possess the prerequisite knowledge.
This chapter will provide a close reading of a few of Kierkegaard’s parables.
Given the frequency with which Kierkegaard employs parables, it would be an unruly
task to try to examine each of them, so instead I’ve selected a small number that I think
provide good examples of well-crafted parables that serve Kierkegaard’s overarching
goals. I’ve organized them chronologically so that we can see how they directly relate to
different stages that Kierkegaard is hoping to usher his readers through. The first of these
that I will examine is the parable of Agnes and the Merman that is found in Fear and
Trembling. I’ve chosen this parable for a number of reasons. First of all, it contains the
very first mention of sin in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works. I find this especially
valuable for Kierkegaard’s audience consists of people who are sinners. Thus, Agnes and
the Merman represents the very first communication that directly examines this important
spiritual side of his audience. Agnes and the Merman also functions in Fear and
Trembling as a bit of a foil to the Abraham and Isaac narrative, for Abraham is without
sin in his actions towards Isaac. Therefore, as I will argue, the parable of Agnes and the
Merman presents to us, the readers, something that the story of Abraham and Isaac
cannot: a shared language and experience. Given that Kierkegaard’s own defense of the
use of parables is built on this idea of a shared language, I think it especially valuable to
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examine the parable that first speaks to sin as a factor in life.
The next two parables that I will look at both come from Philosophical
Fragments. The first is the parable of the King and the Maiden, which begins with the
excerpt just above. The second is the parable of the Tyrant Historian. I’m choosing two
parables from Philosophical Fragments because both of these parables serve to illustrate
some of the central themes in Fragments, as well as function towards Kierkegaard’s
overarching goals in important ways. Fragments was written after Fear and Trembling
and serves to continue the shift from the ethical to the religious that began in Fear and
Trembling. Thus, in Fragments we see a lot of discussion about how we can be religious,
how we can transition to faith. Fear and Trembling laid out the struggle between the
ethical and the religious, and in Fragments we get the exploration of some of the basic
questions that someone might have as they move into faith. Both of the parables that I’ve
selected from Fragments help to serve this goal. The parable of the King and the Maiden
addresses how humans can enter into a relationship with God when, due to sin, they
know that they do not deserve one. Similarly, the parable of the Tyrant Historian
examines the age-old question about the historicity and rationality of faith. How can I
believe something written in a book thousands of years ago? Maybe I could believe if I
had been there, or if I had known the disciples of Christ. The parable of the Tyrant
Historian addresses this sentiment, trying to convince readers that it wouldn’t have made
a difference, that the question of faith remains the same if we were best friends with
Simon Peter or if we are reading about the actions of Simon Peter two thousand years
later. So where in Fear and Trembling we see the introduction of some religious
elements, for instance of sin instead of just unethical action, in Fragments we find the
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transition to the religious.
After looking at Fragments, I want to turn to a much later work, For SelfExamination. This work takes place long after Kierkegaard has hoped to reintroduce
Christianity to his audience, an action that was initially planned to be completed in the
Postscript. In For Self-Examination, we instead see a message aimed at those who
seemingly consider themselves Christian. A lot of For Self-Examination consists of
lessons and messages to Christians. I will be looking at two different parables from this
work. The parable of the royal decree and the parable of the Beloved’s Letter appear a
few pages apart and both address the same problem. Something that we see Kierkegaard
referring to throughout a number of his works is how the truth of Christianity is
essentially a subjective truth. It is a truth that should transform and change us. In these
parables we see Kierkegaard trying to impart this to his audience, again using the shared
language that parables bring. Both of these parables present situations in which direct
action instead of careful study is the prescribed approach. Kierkegaard is pushing us to be
doers of the Word and not merely scholars of the Word.
One of the reasons that this chapter is dedicated, almost entirely, to the
examination of a few parables is that Kierkegaard scholarship generally ignores them.
With very few exceptions outside of the errant reference here and there, the parables are
never discussed. As you may note reading through this chapter, some of the
interpretations that I provide are not complex, while others are. Kierkegaard’s parables
are not all convoluted. Indeed, some of them are very straightforward. Nonetheless, it is
worthwhile for us to examine them, for otherwise we neglect and dismiss significant
portions of Kierkegaard’s work. The parables serve a function both in helping to explain
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the concepts that Kierkegaard describes in standard philosophical prose, as well as to
motivate the reader to enact the kind of individual change that Kierkegaard desires. This
chapter will explain the former of these, primarily focusing on an understanding of what
the parables are, how they explain ideas, and how they are related to the works in which
they are present. My next chapter will focus on the latter, presenting an argument for the
ways in which parables function to motivate us as individuals to change.
Overall with these parables I hope to present both a number of examples of how
parables fit into the schema that I have outlined thus far, as well as to suggest a new way
to read Kierkegaard. My goal with this chapter will be to demonstrate how we could
focus on the parables found in Kierkegaard’s works to try to gain an understanding of the
main concepts at work, and specifically to recognize how they apply to us as individuals
struggling with our movement through Kierkegaard’s spheres of existence. A suggestion
that I offer up for consideration: we may be able to construct a roadmap of Kierkegaard’s
main ideas by putting together a chronological collection of his parables. Such a
collection would serve the individual searching to subjectively, and not just objectively,
interact with and appropriate Kierkegaard’s ideas.
Section 1: Merman. MERMAN!

The parable of Agnes and the merman appears in Problema III of Fear and
Trembling. In this section, Silentio questions whether or not it was ethically defensible
for Abraham to remain silent, that is, for Abraham to have concealed his intentions from
Isaac, among others. In delving into this problem, Silentio turns our attention to four
different stories. The story of Agnes and the merman is the second of these stories, and
one that most Danes would be familiar with, as it was well known in Danish tradition. In
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the fairy tale, a merman seduces a woman named Agnes. She desires to go to the bottom
of the sea, and he takes her there. She has a number of children with the merman and one
day wishes to return to the surface and go to church. The merman knows that if she
leaves the sea she will never return, but Agnes does not relent. Eventually she does return
to the surface and ends up staying there, leaving her children and the merman all alone in
the ocean. This is the most common version of the story known by the Danes, although
there are a number of slight variations depending on who is telling it. Hans Christian
Andersen, for instance, wrote an unsuccessful musical about Agnes and the merman.183
Kierkegaard, as Silentio, created his own version of Agnes and the merman that broke
both with the regular tradition of the fairy tale and with Andersen’s retelling of it. The
version of the story that appears in Fear and Trembling has a number of unique
characteristics.
In Silentio’s version of the story, the merman is unable to take Agnes. He begins
to seduce her, and she willingly submits herself to him, but just as he is about to whisk
her away into the sea, she looks at him one last time, “not fearfully, not despairingly, not
proud of her good luck, not intoxicated with desire, but in absolute faith and in absolute
humility.”184 With this last look, the merman stops; he cannot continue his seduction. The
sea is calmed as the wildness within the merman is calmed. Her absolute innocence wins
the merman over and defeats him. The merman takes Agnes home and tells her that he
just wanted to show her how beautiful the sea can be when it is calm. Silentio begins with
this story, and he adds to it to create his particular treatment of repentance and thus of sin,
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for one can only repent if one has transgressed.185
When looking at this initial version, we already get a taste of the central
problem—the clash between the faithful and innocent Agnes versus the unethical
merman. Agnes’s faith is able to overcome the merman specifically because her faith is
complete. She looks at the merman in “absolute faith and absolute humility.” Agnes is
unlike any of the other women that the merman tries to seduce, and in this we recognize
the merman’s problem. Agnes wants the merman faithfully, but he only wants her as a
captured prize. Part of a successful seduction, for the merman, is winning a woman over
despite her reservations. But Agnes has no reservations, and to that extent the merman
has not seduced her. So Silentio envisions Agnes as being absolutely innocent, and it is
that innocence that the merman cannot overcome. Indeed, the opposite occurs: Agnes
overcomes the merman.
The innocence that Agnes possesses is not a quality or trait that any real human
being could have, and Silentio himself acknowledges that Agnes is an impossible human
being. He claims that it would be an “insult” to envision a seduction in which the woman
is as innocent as he portrays Agnes to be.186 We must keep this in mind as we work
through the story. Agnes represents an ideal of innocence, faithfulness, and humility. In
order to overcome the merman’s sin, we need something drastically non-human.
Silentio then elaborates on some possible outcomes of the parable. If the merman
is overcome by Agnes’s innocence, then the merman can do one of two things. His first
option is that of mere repentance by turning away from his initial plan to seduce Agnes.
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He recognizes the wrongness of his actions and he experiences the unhappiness that is
tied to that recognition. If he merely repents he does not communicate to her what his
true intentions are, nor does he reveal the depths of his depravity. Instead, he lies to her.
He tells her that he only wanted to show her how beautiful the sea looks when it is calm.
Given this approach, the merman remains closed, for repentance does not in and of itself
include disclosure to Agnes. This leaves Agnes upset, for she loved the merman and was
ready to spend the rest of her life with him. The merman too is unhappy, for he loved
Agnes but was unable to disclose himself to her and this now carries a new guilt.
Therefore, repentance alone leaves both of them unhappy, for repentance alone leaves the
merman without Agnes.
The second option that Silentio offers is repentance accompanied by disclosure to
Agnes. In this scenario, like the first, the merman goes through the motion of repentance.
However, in this case, he does not remain burdened by this guilt. Instead, he discloses
himself to Agnes. He tells her of himself, of his treachery, of his indiscretion. But he also
tells her of his love, and in this he pledges himself to her. He decides to marry her. He
overcomes his guilt and does more than repent in the sense of merely turning away from
his initial wrongness; he goes further, takes the step of faith, and gains Agnes. This is the
expanded story that Silentio gives to us. But, the question remains, why should we
examine the story of Agnes and the merman?
Fear and Trembling is primarily concerned with the account of Abraham’s near
sacrifice of Isaac and attempts to understand how Abraham could have acted as he did.187
Abraham is righteous both in the eyes of God and of men. Though Abraham is not
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perfect, he is nonetheless chosen by God. Abraham can choose sinfully, but he is not
currently possessed by sin.188 With Agnes and the merman, Kierkegaard offers the reader
a story that bears some resemblance to that of Abraham and Isaac, but one with a number
of differences, primary among them the presence of actual sin. The merman is a seducer,
very clearly in sin. He wants to seduce Agnes, take her away to the bottom of the sea, and
make her his own, but Agnes defeats him through her perfect innocence.
While there is a sense in which the merman overcomes his own sinful urges, he is
not the source of this change, Agnes is. Hall claims that it is through the accident of
Agnes’s virtue that the merman is saved, and not through his own virtue.189 I agree with
Hall’s assertion, though I want to carve out room for an additional claim. It is not the
merman’s virtuous self that impedes the seduction, but rather is it Agnes’s. Nevertheless,
it would be a mistake to think that the merman has no part in his repentance. Agnes’s
innocence makes the merman aware of his need for repentance, but it cannot make him
repent. He must make that choice for himself.190,191 Agnes’s innocent nature brings about
a change in the merman that moves him to choose repentance.192 This is in contrast with
Abraham’s faith: Abraham is a man who hears the voice of God and acts; Abraham’s
nature does not change when he responds to God. The merman, on the other hand,
relinquishes his seductive ways in the face of Agnes’s innocence. He changes himself in
order to respond to the purity he sees in Agnes.
Thus, the merman repents. He is unable to seduce Agnes and this failure causes
This is to say that Abraham can choose to disobey God, and in doing so would be sinning, but prior to
that choice, he is not a sinful individual. He is righteous in the eyes of God and is God’s chosen one.
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him to realize the error of his ways. When the merman recognizes his evil intent and must
decide whether to disclose that intent to Agnes, the merman seems to hold a position
similar to that of Abraham: after the real sacrifice was made, Abraham has to come to
terms with his seemingly evil decision to kill his son and he must decide whether or not
to disclose this information to Isaac or Sarah. However, the merman and Abraham are not
identically placed. Abraham was chosen by God for his faith; the merman is not even a
candidate for faith until after his encounter with Agnes.
Silentio claims that if the merman decides to remain quiet then he is in the realm
of the demonic. This category is something that Abraham did not experience, as it relates
specifically to the fact that the merman is in a sinful state. The merman is in the realm of
the demonic when he recognizes his sin, but in such a way that he rejects the possibility
of salvation. The merman, in this scenario, does not accept forgiveness, and he sees this
refusal as the only clear sign of his virtue: “Now the demonic in repentance probably will
explain that this is indeed his punishment, and the more it torments him the better.”193
The demonic individual bears his sin alone, refusing to share it with anyone, refusing to
burden anyone with it. Bearing it alone isolates him from others and it estranges him
from himself. Rather than accept the possibility of forgiveness and salvation, the demonic
turns away from them out of warped respect for his unworthiness of them.194
Silentio goes on to describe what one who succumbs to the demonic might do in
this situation. Agnes is sad because she loves the merman and now the merman is leaving
her. Thus, he will try to save her from her sadness, and will endeavor to remove the love

193
194

FT 96
This is only a sketch of the state of the demonic. Given the constraints of my topic and the thesis that
this project aims to argue, a full explanation of the demonic state is outside my parameters.

135
that Agnes feels towards him. He might “belittle her, ridicule her, make her love
ludicrous, and if possible, arouse her pride.”195 So if the merman remains closed, he
enters into this demonic state via a kind of self-imposed suffering.
In this we find Kierkegaard’s first discussion of both sin and the demonic.
Interestingly, Silentio sees the demonic as being higher than the ethical. The merman
must come to terms with the universal and then turn away from it in order to enter into
the demonic.196 Silentio writes, “With the assistance of the demonic, therefore, the
merman would be the single individual who as the single individual was higher than the
universal. The demonic has the same quality as the divine, namely, that the single
individual is able to enter into an absolute relation to it.”197 Speaking of the merman’s
demonic approach, Lippitt writes, “Such an orientation does not just fail to express the
universal, in the manner of shooting at a target and missing. Rather, the merman
demonstrates a self-absorbed embrace of his (demonic) hiddenness.”198
While Abraham embraces the divine directive, the merman instead embraces his
desire to remain closed to Agnes. Thus, the merman must recognize the universal and
intentionally move beyond it. The merman in the demonic stage recognizes the ethical
category of existence and purposefully denies it. In this sense he too experiences a
teleological suspension of the ethical, quite like Abraham. It is in this respect that the
demonic resembles the divine, but the merman’s teleology is quite different from that of
Abraham. Abraham’s telos is based on the word of God, whereas the merman’s telos is
not. However, were we, as readers, not privy to their innermost experiences, these two
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men might seem the same. They both recognize the ethical and purposefully choose to
move beyond it, for reasons unknown. Only if they disclose themselves can we judge
them to be demonic or divine.199
Having considered the demonic approach in which the merman remains closed to
Agnes, Silentio turns his attention to the possibility of the merman repenting like before,
but this time opening himself to Agnes. In such a case, the merman explains that he was
intending to seduce Agnes, but that her innocence has won him over. Silentio writes that
in this situation, the merman goes on to marry her. However, this is no simple choice.
The merman cannot merely decide on a whim that disclosing himself to Agnes is a good
idea. In order to come to the dialectical apex, the merman must first realize his own sin.
That is, he must realize that his sin makes him unworthy of Agnes, for she is perfectly
innocent. Given this realization, what is the merman to do? How can he disclose himself
and marry Agnes?
For the merman, repentance is what brings about the possibility of faith. He must
repent in order to move past his sin. Given his repentance, the merman must then decide
whether to disclose himself or to remain hidden. If he remains hidden then he enters into
the demonic, but if he chooses to disclose himself to Agnes then he has the opportunity to
enter into a relationship with her. As Keeley puts it, “Resignation is the last stage prior to
faith, and repentance is a first possible sequel to sin.”200 So when we look at the actions
of the merman, we first see him in sin. After sin, he enters a stage of repentance and that
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repentance can lead him into faith, but it can also lead him into the demonic if he does
not disclose himself.
Silentio describes this act of disclosure by the merman similarly to the way that he
describes the movement of faith. Speaking of the merman he writes, “Then he marries
Agnes. He must, however, take refuge in the paradox. In other words, when the single
individual by his guilt has come outside the universal, he can return only by virtue of
having come as the single individual into an absolute relation to the absolute.”201 The
merman’s sin takes him outside of the ethical, and he chooses either to remain closed to
Agnes, or to open up to her. The only way that the merman can re-enter into the ethical is
by overcoming the ethical. Silentio describes this process as “entering into an absolute
relation to the absolute.”
This should sound familiar to the descriptions that Silentio gives of the movement
made by the knight of faith.202,203 Indeed, Silentio even describes it as such when he says,
“The merman, therefore, cannot belong to Agnes without, after having made the infinite
movement of repentance, making one movement more: the movement by virtue of the
absurd.”204 So, the merman becomes the knight of faith when he discloses himself to
Agnes. Keeley writes, “But when repentance and Agnes both gain possession of his soul,
the merman expressed the more difficult movement. It is this latter movement that is
comparable to the movement of faith.”205 He becomes the knight of faith because he has
no reason to think that disclosure will bring about a positive outcome. Instead, he has
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faith by virtue of the absurd. It is certainly beyond the bounds of reason to think that the
merman would gain the love of Agnes, one who is perfectly innocent, by disclosing to
her his sinful past and the perverse desire that he had to seduce her. He believes, for
reasons that surpass the understanding, that by disclosing himself he will gain Agnes, just
as Abraham believes that he will gain Isaac through obeying God’s order to sacrifice him.
So the merman is able to make the same movement of faith that we see in Abraham,
though they both are acting under very different circumstances.
Silentio’s descriptions of the merman after he has disclosed himself are strikingly
similar to those that he gives of the knight of faith. In the act of disclosing himself to
Agnes, the merman makes the movement of the absurd, which is precisely what Silentio
targets as being the unique identifier of the knight of faith, for it is what separates the
knight of faith from the knight of resignation. Describing the merman who discloses
himself Silentio claims, “then he is the greatest human being I can imagine.” He goes on
to say, “The merman, therefore, cannot belong to Agnes without, after having made the
infinite movement of repentance, making one movement more: the movement by virtue
of the absurd.”206 Silentio describes the knight of faith in much the same way. The knight
of faith makes the infinite movement and then continues on to make the movement of the
absurd.
The parable of Agnes and the merman presents to the reader an image of the
knight of faith that is graspable in a way that the story of Abraham is not. Abraham was
chosen by God and, in the confines of the Binding of Isaac narrative, was blameless.207
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This is not to say that Abraham was supra-human or entirely sin-less, but merely that in the confines of
the story, he heard the voice of God and acted correctly without hesitation.
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But I, and I assume all of Kierkegaard’s other readers, am neither of those things. I have
not heard the voice of God, and I am very much steeped in sin. Thus, if Abraham is the
only vision of a knight of faith, then such a thing is beyond me. But when we view the
merman, and see him as a knight of faith, the readership gains back the possibility of the
knight of faith. I struggle to imagine being called by God to sacrifice my son, but I can
easily imagine being a sinful person in the face of a pure creature. The parable of Agnes
and the merman allows the reader to connect to a salvation narrative that we cannot find
in Abraham. I share the experience of the merman, and thus I can consider his narrative
from my own perspective, as an insider. I am the merman and I need Agnes. This is the
critical communication, to return to a concept I explained last chapter, that this parable
drives towards. Just as David needed to realize that he was the rich man who stole from
his neighbor, I need to realize that I am the sinner in need of salvation.
Having presented a reading of this parable, we might next ask: Why examine
Agnes and the merman? Fear and Trembling has a number of parables in it, and the
Agnes parable is itself nestled in a series of four parables late in the book. Yet, the
parable of Agnes and the merman has something unique in it: the very first mention of
sin. Prior to this parable, readers of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms have not seen the concept
of sin anywhere. We do not see sin discussed with relationship to Abraham, for he was
sinless in his actions towards Isaac. The reader has therefore not yet had any existence
possibility presented that is part of the reader’s shared experience. As was noted in the
introduction to this paragraph, parables bring to the table a shared language and
experience that the audience can understand and connect with. Up until the parable of
Agnes and the merman, such a shared experience did not exist in Fear and Trembling.
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Thus this parable holds special significance. For if, as I have contended, parables function
as a part of Kierkegaard’s plan to bring his readers into authentic Christianity, the parable
of Agnes and merman is where we must start, in sin and in need of salvation.208 The
possibility of salvation and of becoming a knight of faith exists for the merman, as long
as he chooses well. So too does Kierkegaard want us to recognize that we also can choose
well. We therefore see how this parable, if successful, begins to move Kierkegaard’s
audience towards faith for it provides a reminder of the initial realization of the need for
salvation.
What I’ve presented here is primarily an understanding of the content of the
parable. I haven’t yet dug into the form itself. In order for us to examine how the form
functions, we need to first understand the kinds of content that we find in Kierkegaard’s
parables and the ways in which they work within their individual texts. In chapter five I
will be presenting my argument for their specific function, referencing the parables that
are found here, like that of Agnes and the merman.
Section 2: A Cinderella Story

The next parable that I will examine comes from the next pseudonymous work
after Fear and Trembling, Philosophical Fragments. Early on in the work we come
across the parable of the king and the maiden. Climacus writes that there once lived a
king who was very powerful and wise. He was well respected and feared by all the other
nearby kingdoms. And on top of this good fortune, he was also in love. He loved a lowly
maiden. His heart overflowed with love for her. And yet, as he was full of love, he slowly

208

Again, this is all premised on the possession of the condition, for without the condition, this entire
discussion is fruitless.

141
began to feel sorrow as he realized something. “Alone he grappled with the sorrow in his
heart: whether the girl would be made happy by this, whether she would acquire the bold
confidence never to remember what the kind only wished to forget – that he was the king
and she had been a lowly maiden.”209 The king realizes that the maiden might recognize
that she could never repay the king for the love that he’s showing. She could never
deserve to be so uplifted, for she is only a lowly maiden. So the king hopes that she can
forget her upbringing and status. Climacus claims that the maiden would be happier to
live a lowly and obscure life rather than to be uplifted by the King and to realize, every
minute of every day, that she did nothing to deserve her treatment and that she can never
repay it.
So, what is the king to do? The first option that Climacus presents is for the king
to leave her where she is, living the life of a lowly maiden. The maiden is pleased by this,
for she is content with her life before she knows of the king and his love. So inaction on
the king’s part does not interrupt or damage the maiden’s life at all. From her perspective,
she does not need to be uplifted, even though she might indeed be happier if her life were
to be magically improved. Yet, though the maiden would be satisfied with the king’s
inaction, the king would be left in sorrow. The king deeply loves the maiden and her
contentedness does not calm his sorrow. The king wants the maiden selfishly and
erotically, but he also wants to make her happy. Thus the king is saddened because even
though the maiden is content with her current situation, she is unaware of the possibilities
that she’s missing out on and the king also fails to have her as an object of love.
The next option that Climacus gives the king is the option to uplift the maiden.
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Climacus writes, “the king could have appeared before the lowly maiden in all his
splendor, could have let the sun of his glory rise over her hut, shine on the spot where he
appeared to her, and let her forget herself in adoring admiration.”210 This is able to
overcome the situation where the maiden recognizes how much she owes to the king for
the change in her circumstance. By revealing himself in all of his splendor the king is
overwhelming the maiden such that she forgets her worry. In view of all the king’s
splendor, her memory of her lowly state disappears. She can think only of the king’s
glory and his magnificence. Yet, the king is still unhappy for he considers this to be a
deception. If the maiden only sees the king’s glory and can only think about his glory,
then she cannot see him for who he truly is and she cannot see his love for what it is.
“This perhaps would have satisfied the girl, but it could not satisfy the king, for he did
not want his own glorification but the girl’s, and his sorrow would be very grievous
because she would not understand him; but for him it would still be more grievous to
deceive her.”211 By revealing his glory to her he glorified himself and made it so that she
only saw his glory. Thus the maiden does not understand the king, for she does not know
why he would uplift her as he did. She does not understand what he feels for her.
Taking all of this into account, Climacus provides a third option that the king may
pursue so that he may resolve his situation. Uplifting the maiden will be unsuccessful and
thus Climacus brings up the possibility of the king’s descending. The king will become
low, as low as the maiden, so that he can express his love in earnest. However, Climacus
notes that this descent cannot be one of mere attire. The king cannot dress like a servant
and hope that his descent is complete. “But this form of a servant is not something put on
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like the king’s plebian cloak, which just by flapping open would betray the king.”212 The
king cannot just dress like a peasant, for to only mask one’s clothing will eventually lead
to the truth of the king’s identity being revealed one way or another. He might
accidentally order the palace guards around or require niceties foreign to the average
peasant. At the first sign of trouble he will claim that he is the king and must be treated as
such. Instead, the king must wholly become a servant. In word, deed, appearance, and
thought he must be as low as the maiden. Once he has descended, he can love her in truth
and she can receive his love in truth. For Climacus, this is the only outcome where they
can both be happy in their love.
The analogues to this parable are quite obvious, and Climacus even points them
out. The king acts as god, the maiden as humanity. Humanity is low and though content
in ignorance, could be made immensely happier by receiving the god’s love. So how
must the god love us? As was demonstrated with the king and the maiden the god must
lower himself. The god must descend into humanity and truly become one of us. The
obvious metaphor here being a reference to Christ. So, we have a parable that seems to
have a rather obvious metaphorical meaning, God sending his son Jesus to us as an act of
love, so that we might be happy. Climacus notes most of this, for he tells the parable and
then moves back and forth between the narrative and the metaphorical in his analysis. He
writes about God in one sentence and then the king in the next, switching from maidens
to humans when he sees fit. So the intended metaphorical meaning is made clear to the
audience by the author as he analyzes his own parable. This is something that
Kierkegaard rarely does so completely. Oftentimes he will have a few lines of analysis of
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his parables, but the analysis is usually quite vague, noting only the general themes that
the parable has in common with whatever his current subject is. Yet here we have a
parable that is quite well analyzed by the author and broken down for the audience. Given
this analysis, what use is there in my inclusion of this parable in this project?
When we take into account the goals and structure of Kierkegaard’s works as well
as the approach to parable that I’ve laid out, I think that the parable of the king and the
maiden provides us with a good example of how Kierkegaard’s parables are supposed to
cause personal and individual change in the readers and not merely to impart knowledge
to them. The parable doesn’t inform us of anything new. Climacus flat out describes why
the god has to descend and how this relates to the overall problem of the teacher and the
learner in Fragments. Yet, despite this, we are given the parable of the king and the
maiden. At the end of the previous chapter I analyzed the story of Nathan and David,
remarking that Nathan did not communicate any new information to David. David knew
that he had done something wrong, he just didn’t seem to care very much. What Nathan
was able to do was to transmute David’s knowledge about his wrongful act into a
transformative experience for him. When we look at the parable of the king and the
maiden, I think that we have Climacus attempting to do something similar. In the parable
of Agnes and the merman, we were introduced to the concept of sin, we identified as
mermen who needed an Agnes to save them. Moving from Fear and Trembling to
Philosophical Fragments, we are now dealing with the possibility of salvation; how
exactly can we be saved? How does Agnes save the merman? How can God save us?
Well, let’s forget God and sin and all of these difficult concepts, instead let’s think about
a king and a maiden. What can the king do? He can relinquish everything, leave his old
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life behind, and become a servant. Only in this action is he able to love the maiden in
truth and for their love to be happy. The king needs to descend if he wants to express his
love. As an audience, this connects us to our blind ignorance for we see the same
ignorance in the maiden. She would have been perfectly happy to remain where she was,
and she would have been happy if the king uplifted her by a show of glory. But both
would have left the king in sorrow and would have been deceptions. So, the king must
become a peasant, a servant. As readers, we realize what the servant does not: how much
the king is sacrificing and how little the maiden is aware of her situation. All that remains
is for Nathan to point his finger at us like he did at David and say, “You are that maiden.”
But David trusted Nathan, they were like brothers. I do not trust Johannes Climacus and
thus he cannot do as Nathan did. Instead he can only hope that we take the parable to
heart, recognizing it as a parable, as something additional that was added to the text. By
investigating and unraveling the oddity of a story tossed into the middle of a serious
philosophical inquiry, we might come to understand the content of the parable and also to
realize that we are the maiden just as we came to realize that we were mermen.
As we move from the parable of Agnes and the merman to the parable of the king
and the maiden we also move forward in Kierkegaard’s overall goal for his writing. If he
is trying to engender inwardness such that authentic Christianity can come forward and
blossom, both of these parables serve his needs. We have been made aware of our own
sin, of our lowly state by the merman, and now the king and the maiden helps us
recognize the vast difference between us and God. What could possibly bridge this
difference? Only God descending to our level, God becoming human, the Christ. So we
see these parables functioning not only to teach us these objective truths, but also, and

146
more importantly, to bring about a subjective relationship to these truths such that they
might change who we are and how we think of ourselves.
As we move through Philosophical Fragments we eventually come to another
parable that I wish to examine, the parable of the tyrant historian. At this point in
Fragments, Climacus has become concerned with the issue of faith and its relation to the
historicity of Christ. I might struggle to believe in Christ now, being two thousand years
separated from him, but maybe I could believe if I had been there, or if I could speak to
his disciples. It is this problem that the parable is in dialogue with.
“Suppose there lived in the generation closest to the contemporary generation a
person who combined a tyrant’s power with a tyrant’s passion, and he had the
notion of concerning himself with nothing but the establishment of the truth in
this matter – would he thereby be a follower? Suppose he seized all the
contemporary witnesses who were still alive and those who were closest to them,
had them sharply interrogated one by one, had them locked up like those seventy
translators and starved them in order to force them to speak the truth. Suppose he
most cunningly contrived to have them confront one another, simply in order to
use every device to secure for himself a reliable report – would he, with the aid of
this report, be a follower?”213
Climacus notes that such information would not help the tyrant for he would have
deceived himself. While he indeed may be able to attain the best possible history of the
situation, even something that all eye witnesses were to agree on, that would not help him
believe for faith is not a matter of history. If the parable of the king and the maiden made
us realize why God descended to our level and became human, then we might next ask
how we can know, with objective validity, that Christ is that human. The parable of the
tyrant historian drives us to answer that we can’t, regardless of how strong our historicity
claims are. The tyrant does not become a follower when he receives the perfect account
that all agree upon because that account only gives him objective claims about when a

213

Ibid 92

147
certain person went to certain places and said certain things. It gives an account of
numerous people who all saw this certain person perform miracles. But even this does not
demonstrate the godhood of a human being. Instead, it merely shows that a large number
of people all saw what appeared to be a miracle.
This helps to demonstrate the difference between the objective approach and faith,
which Kierkegaard has argued elsewhere to be primarily subjective. The objective gives
us the facts, in this case the historical facts. But the historical facts do not give us faith.
Knowing that Jesus was from Nazareth or that many people saw him change water into
wine does not help me believe that he is God made flesh. Instead this belief is one that I
have only through faith, through a subjective relationship with it. So, establishing the
historical situatedness of the story of Jesus might help us as scholars, but it does not help
us as followers, and for this reason the tyrant is not a follower. Fragments thus has
advanced from introducing the necessity of Christ to demonstrating what is required in
order to believe. We shouldn’t try to become scholars; establishing the history will not
help us believe. We can imagine ourselves as the tyrant historian working to put together
an exact account of what transpired. We can imagine interviewing each witness, testing
their testimony against that of other witnesses. We might amass a huge amount of work
all aimed at helping us paint the perfect picture of who Jesus was, what he was like, and
exactly what he said and did. And despite all of this, my skepticism might remain. Maybe
it was a mass delusion. Maybe Jesus was merely a very persuasive sleight of hand
trickster. Maybe all of these stories are a false memory shared by many people. No
amount of accounting for the story helps me believe that a god had become human. Thus,
Climacus not only tells the reader that a history is not enough, he uses the parable of the
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tyrant historian so that we can realize it for ourselves, as I will argue in chapter five. I
could become a tyrant historian, but it will do me no good, so instead I must seek to be a
follower by taking a subjective approach to faith.
Section 3: I Obey the Letter of the Law, if Not the Spirit

Next, I want turn to a few parables from For Self-Examination, a book published
much later in Kierkegaard’s career, and one published under his own name. For SelfExamination has a general assumption that the reader is a Christian and is seeking selfimprovement or that the reader is earnestly seeking to become a Christian, and much of
the book addresses issues related to becoming a more authentic Christian. Early on in the
book, we run into two parables only a few pages apart, the parable of the royal decree and
the parable of the beloved’s letter. They both touch on the same issues, so I’m going to
describe both of the parables before we examine them more deeply.
In the parable of the beloved’s letter, Kierkegaard begins by making quite clear
what the parable is about. He writes, “Imagine that a lover who has received a letter from
his beloved – I assume that God’s Word is just as precious to you as this letter is to the
lover. I assume that you read and think you ought to read God’s Word in the same way as
the lover reads this letter.”214 So we have a parable about a letter from someone’s beloved
and this letter signifies, in some sense, the Word of God. We are the lover and God is the
beloved. Kierkegaard goes on to consider a rebuttal that his audience might make: but the
Word of God is written in a foreign language, and we must decipher it. Thus Kierkegaard
adds to his parable the claim that the beloved’s letter is written in a language that the
lover does not understand. So what is the lover to do? He obviously cannot just read the
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letter, for he cannot understand the language in which it is written, and so he must instead
begin to translate it. The lover finds a dictionary so that he might translate the foreign
tongue into his own and begins the arduous task of translating. Kierkegaard describes
what might happen were an acquaintance of the lover to enter and take notice of the
labors of the lover. The acquaintance might say,
“‘Well, so you are reading a letter from your beloved’- what do you think the
other will say? He answers, ‘Have you gone mad? Do you think this is reading a
letter from my beloved! No, my friend, I am sitting here toiling and moiling with
a dictionary to get it translated. At times I am ready to explode with impatience;
the blood rushes to my head and I would just as soon hurl the dictionary on the
floor – and you call that reading – you must be joking!’”215
Kierkegaard goes on after this to note a distinction here between two different forms of
reading. There is reading to translate and reading to understand. The lover is currently
focused on the former so that he might eventually be able to accomplish the latter.
Having finally completed the translation the lover can transition from one kind of reading
to the other and can finally read the letter from his beloved.
After this initial setting, Kierkegaard goes on to offer another stipulation: what if
the letter not only contained the standard professions of love that we would expect, but
also expressed a directive aimed at the beloved? This directive would “require very
much” of the lover, and thus there seems ample reason, Kierkegaard thinks, for anyone to
pause and give thought to the directive. Yet Kierkegaard imagines that the lover, upon
reading the directive, immediately jumps to action and runs off to accomplish what was
asked of him. But what would happen if, when the lover accomplished the task and
returned to his beloved, she were to tell him that he must have mistranslated her letter or
misunderstood her, for what he accomplished was not the directive that she gave him?
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Would she be happy or upset with him? Would he be pleased with himself or full of
regret? In order to answer this, Kierkegaard takes a quick detour into another short
parable. He has us think of two students, both instructed to learn their homework lessons
very well. One student goes home, and in his attempt to learn his lesson well, reads twice
as far and learns twice as much as he needs to, but he learns it well. The other student,
curious about what it means to learn a lesson very well, goes around asking his friends
from school what they are studying or how they were learning. Soon he got sidetracked
enjoying a discussion with a friend and the night was over before he had learned any of
the lesson.
Kierkegaard uses this second parable to explain part of the problem in the first.
He claims that the beloved would not be upset with the lover who acted instantaneously,
wanting to immediately fulfill the directive he’d been given. Similarly, the schoolboy
who studied twice as much did more than was necessary, but his teacher will not be angry
with him. However, the boy who spent all of his time trying to figure out exactly how he
should learn has wasted his time and accomplished nothing. Kierkegaard finds this
analogous to the lover who spends all his time working on a translation such that if he
comes across a directive he redoubles his efforts to make sure that he gets the perfect
translation of the directive so that he can be sure that he will act in the correct way.
Kierkegaard finishes these parables by returning to the topic at hand, the Word of God.
He claims that we need to treat the Word of God like the lover who acts on the beloved’s
directive and like the schoolboy who learns twice as much as is necessary. As fits in with
many of his claims that we’ve already discussed, Kierkegaard wants to make sure that we
do not become overly concerned with the scholarly approach to Christianity if doing so
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impedes our ability to act as God wants us to act. We see this theme quite clearly in the
parable of beloved’s letter and the short parable of the schoolboy’s homework contained
within it.
A few pages later we find another parable, the parable of the royal decree.
Kierkegaard writes,
“Imagine a country. A royal decree is issued to all public officials, subordinates –
in short, to the whole population. What happens? A remarkable change takes
place in everyone. Everybody turns into an interpreter, public officials become
authors, and every blessed day an interpretation is published, one more learned,
more penetrating, more elegant, more profound, more ingenious, more wonderful,
more beautiful, more wonderfully beautiful than the other. Criticism, which is
supposed to maintain an overview, can scarcely maintain an overview of this
enormous literature; indeed, criticism itself becomes such a prolix literature that it
is impossible to maintain an overview of the criticism: everything is interpretation
– but no one read the decree in such a way that he complied with it. And not only
this, that everything interpretation – no, they also shifted the view of what
earnestness is and made busyness with interpretations into real earnestness.”216
The contemporary reader will likely immediately recognize how applicable this parable is
to current academic philosophy. Despite this clear similarity, let us instead think of the
context in which Kierkegaard was writing this. This parable goes on to lament this type
of response. As we saw in earlier chapters, Kierkegaard very much saw Christianity as
something that required action. Here we see the popular response not being action, but
instead study. Everyone is to become a scholar and a critic. It is this approach that
Kierkegaard finds so problematic.
Both of these parables deal with similar themes. In the parable of the beloved’s
letter, we have a character who can seemingly choose between making sure he gets the
exact perfect translation of a call to action or acting on an imperfect translation. In the
parable of the royal decree, we have an entire country who so strongly desire to
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understand a royal decree that they all become scholars and critics, though no one follows
the decree. Prior to these two parables, in between them, and after them in the text,
Kierkegaard writes about the Word of God and the proper orientation that we should have
towards it. It seems quite clear that we need to be doers of the Word and not scholars of
the Word. The Word of God does not ask for us to be scholars, it demands action on our
part. So again, given that Kierkegaard seems to describe his intended meaning and theme
with the parables, what use do the actual stories hold? Why tell these two parables instead
of just instructing us to be doers of the Word?
Both of these parables seem poised to instruct the reader to act on the commands
of God rather than to spend time making sure that one is interpreting them correctly. Yet,
this is a rather straightforward message and one that Kierkegaard laid out in plain words.
The form of the parable allows the individual to access that common experience and
language that they share with Kierkegaard and to activate their ability to imagine
different possibilities. I do not know what it is like to, with authority, give commands to
all humans. I have no experience relating to what is expected in such a situation. But I am
familiar with a couple in love, either through experience or through popular literature and
storytelling. If I had sent a letter to my beloved that directed her to act in some way, but I
had done it in a foreign language or had coded it in some other way, what I want most is
for her to do the thing that I’m asking her to do. If I sent a coded message to my wife
asking her to pick up some butter on her way home from work and she mistranslated my
message and instead brought home olive oil, or bread, or coffee, I would likely find the
whole situation amusing. I’d be glad that she had tried her hardest to do what I had asked
and I would recognize that coded messages are not easy to understand. If I think of
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myself being put in the parabolic situation that Kierkegaard describes, I would very much
want action and not study. If my wife came home empty handed but assuring me that she
had spent hours poring over my message, working with different cyphers and translators,
I would be quite annoyed. The purpose of the message wasn’t to obtain a good
translation, but to cause an action on the part of my beloved.
Similarly, when we examine the parable of the royal decree, I’m sure that many of
us find the situation already frustrating. The royal decree orders us to act in a certain way,
to follow certain rules. For everyone to become scholars and critics concerning the decree
is to obviously miss the point of the decree. What makes the situation even worse is that
the general populace becomes so warped that they begin to think that this critical and
scholarly attitude toward the decree is true earnestness! Everyone can imagine the
frustration that the ruler must have at this outcome. Even if you’ve never ruled a country,
you could think about this in terms of your own children, for instance. If you gave your
child a command and your child spent all of her time analyzing and studying the
command instead of completing it, you would rightfully be quite angry with her. The
parable of the royal command describes a situation where a command is received from a
place of power and authority, and so every individual only needs to recognize and
understand those concepts in order to be able to individually connect and personally
imagine themself in that type of situation. These parables tap into shared individual
experiences and the emotional responses that those experiences elicit in order to bring
about the kind of critical communication that Kierkegaard wants to take place.
Something interesting that is worth considering is that in both of the parables that
I just described, that of the beloved’s letter and of the royal decree, I have interpreted
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them from the standpoint of the God character. In both parables, I have imagined myself
as the ruler who made the decree or as the letter writer who was amused at the response
of the lover. If we look at the parable of the beloved’s letter, the lover is the main
character of the narrative. We see the entire situation through his eyes as he struggles to
translate the letter and has to decide whether or not to act on it. So naturally, we might try
to interpret the parable from his point of view. However, we are unable to judge the
actions of the lover unless we take the beloved’s position. From purely the lover’s
perspective, studying the letter to get a perfect translation or acting on the first translation
that is made are both quite sensible actions. In order to judge which action is correct, we
must ask ourselves what the beloved must have wanted. Why would she include a
directive in her letter? Thus, we must adopt her perspective, and indeed Kierkegaard
makes her perspective easy to adopt, for it is only that of a beloved writing a letter to her
lover. So, we see that we can identify with both characters here. This is a bit different
from the situation of Agnes and the merman where I cannot imagine what it is like to be
Agnes, for I have never been pure and innocent. Therefore, when we examine the parable
of the beloved’s letter, we have to think through the situation from both perspectives in
order to recognize the proper response and thus in order to recognize how we should act.
We have a similar situation with the parable of the royal decree. We need to think
through the situation from the perspective of the public as well as the perspective of the
ruler in order to make a judgment call about the actions of the public.
This does lead to some interesting conclusions when we look at the place of
parables in Kierkegaard’s works that I want to briefly mention here, though these will be
heavily expanded upon in chapter five. First, I want to note that I think that Kierkegaard

155
intends for these parables to be interpreted this way. They are written such that we have
to take the “God” position in the parable in order to glean the intended meaning from it.
One might contend that I am instead interpreting these parables incorrectly and taking the
wrong meaning from them, but they are heavily contextualized by the works in which
they are found and, at least in the case of these two parables, the context leads us to a
very clear meaning. So Kierkegaard wants us to take the “God” position as we read
through these parables.217 Recognizing that forces us into another conclusion, namely that
we cannot always interpret parables from the standpoint of the character that is most like
us. In the parable of Agnes and the merman, I cannot be Agnes so I must think it through
from the perspective of the merman. But this is not the case in the parable of the
beloved’s letter. So it seems unnecessary for the reader to be able to identify as a single
character and to thus derive their subjective relationship to the parable from that
character. In the parable of the beloved’s letter, I will think through the situation from the
standpoint of both characters, even if one of them is an analogical representation of God.
When we examine all of these different parables from different works of
Kierkegaard, we find a few primary things of interest. First, all of these parables try to
use images, experiences, or stories that the majority of Kierkegaard’s Danish audience
would be familiar with. The Danes knew the story of Agnes and the merman, so
Kierkegaard retold it, changing some things to make it fit his purpose. Everyone was
familiar with the concepts of kings and maidens for such things were, directly or
indirectly, a part of everyday life. So too can they imagine tyrants and lovers and royal
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orders. All of these topics and concepts were a part of the shared experience and language
that Kierkegaard’s audience possessed. Thus, because both of the specificity of these
stories, as well as with their commonality, readers are able to imaginatively project
themselves into these stories in order to understand them. I imagine myself as merman, or
as king or, as a lover, and am able to work through the consequences of the parable from
those positions. Given the various arguments that I’ve presented up to this point, I think
we can conclude that Kierkegaard is trying to indirectly communicate to us with these
parables and bring about a kind of shared vision of ourselves. As I will argue next
chapter, the parable of the royal decree doesn’t exist so that I can agree with Kierkegaard
about Christianity requiring us to be doers of the Word and not scholars of the Word. It
exists so that I become a doer of the Word!
Second, many of these parables deal with love as a central concept. I picked the
parables that I did for this chapter not based on this shared theme, but rather because I
thought that they were all excellent examples of Kierkegaard’s use of parables, and that
they all served to seriously prod the reader. However, what I’ve ended up with are a
bunch of parables about love. The parables of Agnes and the merman, the king and the
maiden, and the beloved’s letter are all focused around an individual struggling to love
another or to successfully express their love for the other. The parable of the tyrant
historian doesn’t deal with love in any obvious way. The parable of the royal decree
doesn’t appear to deal with love, though one could argue that underneath all of it, we
have a king’s love for his people and the people’s love for the king. Nonetheless, love
ends up appearing not only in the parables that I selected, but in a great many of
Kierkegaard’s. In recognizing this, I want us to remember Kierkegaard’s ultimate goal for
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his authorship: to bring the religious forward. As I noted in chapter one, Religiousness C,
as Westphal calls it, carries with it the requirement of agape. We must love others in a
self-emptying way as we try to imitate Christ, who did the same. If Kierkegaard wants to
bring the religious forward, the ability to love others in a self-emptying way is a
necessary part of that. Thus, we can directly connect the concept of love to Kierkegaard’s
intended goals for his writings.
Yet, despite this connection, Religiousness C demands agape of us, and most of
the parables deal with some variant of romantic love. In Works of Love, Kierkegaard
separates love into different kinds: neighborly and preferential. Neighborly love is the
kind of love that Religiousness C demands of us. It is a self-emptying, other-focused type
of agape love. Neighborly love requires that we love all others as neighbors, and that we
want what is best for them in a fashion that neglects or denies our own selfish desires.
Preferential love, on the other hand, would refer to the more common types of love that
most people experience like romantic love, the love of friends, or familial love. So the
parables mostly present versions of preferential love even though neighborly love is the
goal that we need to strive for. The parable of Agnes and the merman has a bit of both, in
that the merman certainly feels romantic love towards Agnes, but he also seems to
experience self-emptying love, as evidenced by his refusal to seduce her and his desire to
disclose himself to her. In order to respond to the prevalence of preferential love in the
parables, I want to very briefly refer to some of Sharon Krishek’s work.
Krishek examines the place that love holds in the writings of Kierkegaard in a few
of her works. One of her interests is in the parallel structure of Fear and Trembling and
Works of Love. Referring to this she writes, “In this central text Kierkegaard presents,
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side by side with stories of romantic love, an account of the double structure of faith,
which includes two seemingly contradicting movements: the movement of resignation
and the movement of faith. There is an important connection, I claim, between these two
movements and a possible understanding, and fulfilment, of love.”218 Krishek argues that
we must understand preferential and neighborly love like we understand the dual
movement of faith, for Kierkegaard. Just as faith requires two contradictory motions,
resignation and groundedness, so too love requires two contradictory motions, selfemptying (neighborly) and self-fulfulling (preferential) love. Thus, while the parables
might be focused quite heavily on preferential love, this type of love, on Krishek’s
account, still very much holds value for us in fulfilling Kierkegaard’s goal of becoming
Christ-like. The parables are modeling different types of love for us, showing us
variations of romantic love, familial love, self-emptying love, among others.219
Last, these parables, as we might expect, mirror some of the main themes that
Kierkegaard is working through in the texts in which the parables are found. However,
the parables sometimes take a different approach to these themes than the rest of the work
does. If we look at Agnes and the merman, for instance, we find a parable about how
someone in sin might work towards becoming a knight of faith. The rest of Fear and
Trembling, though, doesn’t deal with sin at all. Instead it is mostly concerned with
Abraham. So the parable provides us with an individual connection to the overarching
concepts and themes that the main work does not. Abraham’s story was not one of sin
and thus one that we ultimately cannot understand from an insider perspective for none of
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us are without sin. When we add the parable of Agnes and the merman we are able to
examine a narrative about becoming a knight of faith that we can make sense of, for we
who are in sin must deal with sin and repentance in ways that Abraham didn’t. We can
thus see this parable, and others, as walking us through, on an individual level aimed at
our inwardness and appropriation. His works also function to lay out a kind of road map
on becoming a Christian. We start in the aesthetic stage, move to the ethical, and finally
to the religious. Once we have become authentic Christians the writings then turn towards
our steady improvement as Christians. So while we might view Kierkegaard’s sections
that are closer to standard philosophical prose as sections that explain important concepts
to us in this path towards Christianity, I will argue in chapter five that we see his parables
as actually doing the work of prompting the individual to move closer to Christianity.
Conclusion
The examination of these parables sets us up for the argument that I’m going to
put forward in the next, and final chapter, which is that Kierkegaard’s parables function
as a mirror for us. Once we recognize that these parables guide us through the stages
towards the religious by critically communicating to us through this common experience
and language of kings and lovers and maidens, we can begin to see how in order for the
parable to truly succeed, I must see the possibilities that it is offering as real possibilities
for myself. Since Kierkegaard never points out, as Nathan does with David, that “You are
that man,” we must be able to recognize this for ourselves within the parables themselves.
Otherwise we are only left angry when we consider the parable of the royal decree, much
as David was angry when he heard of the rich man who stole his neighbor’s lamb. We
must be able to transform that anger into action by recognizing the truth that the parable
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reveals is a truth about us, regardless of if we come to that conclusion by taking the
stance of the God character or the stance of the human character.
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Chapter 5: Kierkegaard the Metaphorical Mirror

You use a glass mirror to see your face; you use works of art to see your soul.
- George Bernard Shaw

In my heart of hearts, I wish that chapter four was the final chapter of this work.
I’d like to end things with a few parables, and I still might, instead of with a lengthy
philosophical discussion. Some of the power of the parable is lost when we demystify it,
it seems to me. Nonetheless, a demystifying is now in order and this chapter will seek to
provide an argument for the overall value that we find in Kierkegaard’s parables. In order
to properly frame this argument, I’d like to briefly sketch out a number of the concepts
and conclusions that have been covered in the previous chapters.
As has been noted constantly throughout this work, Kierkegaard’s goal for his
writings seems to be to turn his countrymen and women towards an authentic version of
Christianity.220 A number of times in his later works he claims this as his purpose.
Though it may merely be a tired writer in hindsight making sense of what he’s done, I
think that the structure of his works backs up this claim. Kierkegaard finds that many in
his society claim to be Christian, but they lack what he thinks is of central importance to
what is truly Christian, and that is a passionate subjective relationship to the truth. Thus,
his goal seems to be to bring this about. Yet, at the same time, he claims that he cannot
make people Christian, for that is something that only God can do. Early on in
Fragments, Climacus considers the learner’s paradox as it relates to Christianity. How
can someone come to know that they are in sin? It cannot be taught to them, for being in

220

I give a brief overview of what Kierkegaard’s authentic Christianity looks like in section one of chapter
one.

162
sin, in untruth, specifically implies an ignorance of your own untruth. So Kierkegaard
cannot speak to those in untruth; doing so would be, to quote Epictetus, “fighting against
a God, opposing Zeus.”221 Making the individual aware of their untruth is something only
God can do, and it occurs via a transformation of the individual. Kierkegaard, being
unable to effect this transformation, seemingly cannot bring the individual to Christianity.
Instead, what he can do is remind them of a truth that has already been revealed to them.
An individual, having been transformed by God such that they can now see the truth, can
go on to ignore or forget what they’ve seen. It is this individual whom Kierkegaard is
targeting with many of his pseudonymous works. He cannot make us become Christians,
for he cannot reveal to us our untruth; instead he can speak to those that have what he
calls the “condition.” The condition is the ability to recognize your own untruth, and the
condition can only be granted by God. Once someone has the condition, Kierkegaard can
then speak to them and remind them of the truth, remind them of their sin. This is what
we see occurring throughout his works. Kierkegaard is trying to remind us of something
that has already been revealed to us, yet something that we have consciously or
unconsciously forgotten. The argument that this chapter will present very specifically
works within this framework, trying to show how the parables help to bring about this
goal. Kierkegaard is not speaking to heathens who have never heard the Gospel, but
rather to individuals who already consider themselves Christians but who seem to have
forgotten what that means. They are thus in need of a reminder, and I will demonstrate
that Kierkegaard’s parables do an exceptional job at offering this.
In order to remind us, Kierkegaard writes that his goal is to turn us inward. He
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notes inwardness and appropriation as being central to his project and as being central to
Christianity in Fragments, Postscript, For Self-Examination, and Point of View. If we
have the condition, and thus Kierkegaard wants to remind us of what we’ve forgotten
(our own untruth), he doesn’t need to present any new information to us. Rather, he needs
to reorient us towards information that we already possess. If asked, I would admit that
I’m a sinner in need of salvation. Yet Kierkegaard imagines that when faced with this
question, I would likely follow it up with some claim about how I attend church, tithe,
and properly believe the correct doctrines, and thus am on my way to salvation. He thinks
that I have forgotten that Christianity requires something very specific of me. It is not
enough to believe the correct things; instead I must have a certain type of relationship
with the things that I believe. This relationship is what Kierkegaard is working to
engender. He wants to turn us inward, to see the things that we already know, but to see
them in new ways that changes how they affect us and the kinds of people that we are.
Part of the reason that Kierkegaard wants to turn us inward is because he claims
that Christianity is essentially subjectivity. That is to say, true Christianity is not a set of
beliefs, but a special orientation towards those beliefs. In Postscript he imagines two
different individuals. The first individual prays to the correct God, but does so in untruth.
The second prays to an idol, but does so with the “passion of infinity.” Climacus then
asks, which of the two is truly worshipping God? His answer is that the second individual
is, despite praying to an idol, specifically because he is correctly oriented towards the
divine, even if it is an idol.222 He is full of passionate subjectivity and so though he might
have the wrong name for God, and though he is looking at an idol, his subjectivity is
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what matters. Thus, Kierkegaard is trying to bring about a certain kind of subjectivity
when he turns us inwards. He’s not merely trying to communicate a set of correct
doctrines, though he does seem to do this as well. Instead, his primary goal is to cause his
readers to subjectively relate to the truth that has already been revealed to them by God.
In order to do this, he must examine his style of communication. Kierkegaard
considers two different forms of communication, direct and indirect. Direct
communication is the communication of facts. Direct communication relates to objective
knowledge and thus is concerned with things that can be demonstrated. The vast majority
of formal education is direct communication. When you take a physics class, you are
trying to learn about the rules that govern the natural world and how they interact.
Similarly, when you take a religious studies class, you are likely to learn about the belief
systems that a number of different religions have and how they have changed over time.
Both of these would be the direct communication of objective knowledge. But
Christianity is not as concerned with the objective as it is with the subjective. Thus,
Kierkegaard cannot employ direct communication to bring about his desired end. If he
did so, we would end up with something that would likely give us a list of rules to follow
and doctrines to believe, with rational defenses for each rule and doctrine. But this is not
Kierkegaard’s goal. Instead, since Christianity is essentially subjectivity, Kierkegaard
employs indirect communication. Indirect communication works not to inform me of
certain bits of information, but to bring about inwardness, appropriation, and subjectivity.
Using indirect communication, Kierkegaard specifically wants to communicate
existence-possibilities.223 To communicate an existence-possibility is to communicate an
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entire life possibility that one can inhabit. The communicator is trying to give to the
receiver a view of a possible life that could be theirs. This is precisely the type of thing
that cannot be directly communicated, for if I were to hand you a list of what your life
would be like if you were a true Christian, there would be something missing from that
list. No list could properly communicate what it is like to be a Christian, to exist in a
certain way. So Kierkegaard has to use indirect communication to bring us existencepossibilities. As has been noted, Kierkegaard is trying to change us in a specific way, so
you might ask, “Why use an existence possibility instead of an existence actuality?
Would it not be more effective to actually demonstrate these things instead of offering up
possibilities?” Climacus responds,
But existence-actuality cannot be communicated, and the subjective thinker has
his own actuality in his own ethical existence. If actuality is to be understood by a
third party, it must be understood as possibility, and a communicator who is
conscious of this will therefore see to it, precisely in order to be oriented to
existence, that his existence-communication is in the form of possibility. A
production in the form of possibility places existing in it as close to the recipient
as it is possible between one human being and another. Let me elucidate this once
again. One would think that, by telling a reader that this person and that person
actually have done this and that (something great and remarkable), one would
place the reader closer then by merely presenting it as possible. Apart from what
was pointed out in its proper place, that the reader can understand the
communication only by dissolving the esse of actuality into posse, since otherwise
he only imagines that he understands, apart from this, the fact that this person and
that person actually have done this and that can just as well have a delaying as a
motivating effect. The reader merely transforms the person who is being
discussed (aided by his being an actual person) into the rare exception; he
admires him and says: But I am too insignificant to do anything like that.”224
Climacus’ reasoning for using existence-possibilities stems from a fear, shall we say, that
the reader, upon hearing that our moral exemplar is an actual person who has done such
and such, will think of the communicated existence as something impossible for themself.
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When the communication is of an actuality it is all too easy to compare oneself to that
actuality. When I am told that a friend of mine spends all her free time volunteering, I can
find a number of ways to dismiss her actions and describe why those would be
impossible for me. Her job is less demanding, or she’s not married and thus doesn’t have
duties at home, or any other reason. The actuality of the existence allows me to compare
it to my own in concrete terms and come up with concrete reasons as to how I cannot
inhabit that existence. But possibility does not run into this problem. If something is
presented as a possibility to me, then I am comparing myself not to a concrete individual,
but to an imagined fictional character. The existence-possibility is presented as an option
to the reader in a way that ends up being different than the presentation of an existenceactuality. I compare myself to the concrete person in order to determine if the actuality is
something that I can fulfill. However, with the possibility I don’t compare myself to the
fictional character, for I recognize their fictional nature. Instead, the comparison becomes
one of self-examination. I compare myself to another possible myself. I imagine me as
moral exemplar versus me as I currently am and wonder if I can bridge the divide
between the two, actualizing what has been presented to me as a possibility.
Engaging in this action requires an imaginative effort on my part. I have to
imagine myself as the possibility being presented. Stokes examines this issue of moral
imagination and existence-possibilities, eventually noting an issue that we have to
contend with. Stokes, referring to a section from Sickness Unto Death, writes, “Here
Anti-Climacus makes it clear that any actualization of the self is dependent upon the
subject’s ability to posit another, ideal self which it is to become.”225 Stokes goes on to
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claim, “What is posited in imagination has the specific quality of becoming possibility,
and this already adds something to the content of imaginative thought. What we imagine
is not simply an inert piece of representational imagery or conceptual construct, but
instead something that bears a distinct modal relationship to the world and the imagining
subject.”226 Stokes looks at this question of possibilities and sees that imagination plays a
significant role. In order for the existence-possibility to become a real possibility for me,
I must imagine it. As Stokes notes, this imagination is not merely a considering of the
thing in some abstract manner, the way that one might imagine a triangle when doing
geometry. Instead, this imaginative process has a close relationship to the imagining
subject. Thus, as I imagine the existence-possibility, I imagine it as a possibility for
myself. There is no absolute reason why I connect it to myself, I could instead imagine it
as a possibility for someone else. Yet, I know myself more intimately than I know anyone
else, and I can much more easily imagine myself in various scenarios than I can imagine
others. My default, my instinct, is to imagine myself in the existence-possibility that’s
been presented to me.
Stokes examines this process of imagination and, noting that other scholars have a
similar approach such as Ferreira and Gouwens, proposes imagination occurring in a kind
of two-step process. Our first step is to imagine the possibilities that are being presented
to us. Yet Kierkegaard’s goal here is not merely for imagination to occur. Instead, he
wants us to somehow relate this imagination back to our concrete selves.227 So, we need
to transcend imagination and actualize the possibilities that are being presented to us.
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This is the second step. We might think of this in a very simple way. You are going to
meet someone for the first time so you imagine a few different ways that you might do
so. You imagine yourself shaking their hand or waving and introducing yourself, or
waiting for someone else to introduce you, etc. There are a number of possibilities that
you imagine. When you meet the person, you select one of the possibilities that you
imagined, and you actualize it. So, we have a two-step process of, first, imagination, and
second, action.
Stokes, however, claims that while this two-step process is sensible folkpsychology, it runs aground of some of Anti-Climacus’ claims about how imagination
works. Stokes writes,
“[Anti-Climacus] takes it that feeling, willing, and knowing are all, at base,
dependent upon imagination. Imagination pervades all psychic activity; and if this
is so, we cannot say that imagination comes first. Fidelity to Anti-Climacus’
insistence that imagination is inseparable from reflection and active at the same
moment as resolution, will compel us to avoid a picture of the reflective self
which first imagines possibility and then chooses deliberately from the options it
has imagined.228
Stokes thinks that in order to remain true to Anti-Climacus we cannot think of
imagination as occurring first and acting as second, as the folk-psychology approach
would claim. Thus, when we examine the question of existence-possibilities, the idea
would be that these possibilities are not presented to us and considered at one point in
time, and then a change occurs within us and we choose one at a different time when we
are no longer imagining them. Rather, imagination is constant. We are imagining the
possibility as we actualize it. It both remains possibility and becomes actuality
simultaneously, somehow. Yet, Stokes’ claim here only ends up being problematic for us
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if we think of imagination as an action of pure thought. As I’ve argued, when we are
asked to imagine an existence-possibility, we are not merely thinking of a possible thing
for an unknown person. We are imagining it for ourselves. I am, for instance, imagining
myself as a merman. To that end, I am already mixing my concrete existence with an
imaginary possibility, and thus am doing more than just involving the faculty of thought
or imagination, I am also employing my will. Bringing my concrete existence to bear on
an existence-possibility requires me to will, for I am not an abstract creature. I struggle to
imagine myself as an abstract thing in an abstract situation. I already bring my
concreteness to my imagination of the existence-possibility. I am willing myself to
consider the possibility that I could be other than as I am, or as I think I am. So we can
grant to Stokes that we don’t imagine first and act without imagination second. The
possibility is always a live possibility in our minds. Even the initial act of imagining
requires an act of will, such that we are always engaging in willing and imagining to the
extent that we are bringing our concrete selves to bear on the imagination.
Thus, Kierkegaard is looking to turn us inwards by offering us existencepossibilities that he hopes we will actualize. These existence-possibilities come to us
through indirect communication and they work to activate our imagination so that we will
be prompted to remember, and therefore, choose to see, the truth about ourselves that has
already been revealed to us by God. These possibilities do not always present the truly
Christian. However, taken as an entirety, they demonstrate the movement into the truly
Christian. Keeping these concepts in mind, let us now turn to the topic at hand: parables
and the ways in which they act as a mirror for us so that we might see our true selves.
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Section 1: Nobody Expects the Merman Parable!

As has been argued, Kierkegaard is hoping that his readers appropriate what he is
writing, ideally bringing forth inwardness. But there is an open question here as to what
the reader is appropriating. Appropriation is a bit challenging because seemingly the
reader can appropriate Kierkegaard’s works however he or she wants and end up acting
or changing in a way that Kierkegaard doesn’t want. I can read the fairy tale about the
Tortoise and the Hare in Aesop’s fables and learn that I must never give up. I appropriate
the story, examining the situations in my life in which I lack perseverance and I work to
overcome that lack. I become a new person, someone who perseveres regardless of the
challenge ahead of me. But maybe Aesop wanted me to take from the story that overconfidence is a dangerous fault. Maybe instead of becoming more perseverant in the face
of extreme difficulty, I should lessen my pride and humble myself. In one retelling of the
story the forest animals elect the Tortoise to be their messenger as he must be the fastest
since he won the race. A forest fire soon threatens their habitat and so they send the
Tortoise to warn everyone, resulting in the deaths of most of the forest creatures. So
maybe what I need to change about myself is my reliance on specific outcomes as the
source of my everyday judgments. Maybe the best student isn’t the one who gets the best
grades. Maybe my wife should not be angry when I don’t do the dishes. The problem
with appropriation is that it is at the whim of interpretation. So if Kierkegaard is trying to
bring about inwardness and appropriation, we need some way to overcome this issue.
Lorentzen examines the preface to Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions and
notes that Kierkegaard seems to have a specific kind of appropriation in mind, at least
with that text. Referring to the book, Kierkegaard writes,
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“[this book] quietly waits for that right reader to come like a bridegroom and to
bring the occasions [for learning] along with him. Let each do a share – the reader
therefore more. The meaning lies in the appropriation. Hence the book’s joyous
giving of itself. Here there are no worldly “mine” or “thine” that separate and
prohibit appropriating what is the neighbor’s… The appropriation is the reader’s
even greater, is his triumphant giving of himself.”229
The book is giving itself to the reader, but Kierkegaard claims that the reader should do
more than receive the book. The reader must also give himself. But to whom? The book
is being given to the reader so that the reader can appropriate it. The reader can collapse
the distinction between “yours” and “mine” such that the book is both Kierkegaard’s and
the reader’s. So when it comes to the book giving itself, we have some kind of clarity of
what is happening. But when we think of the reader giving himself, things are much more
difficult. What is the reader giving and to whom is he giving it? The first question here
isn’t too challenging. When we talk of the book giving itself, we mean that it is giving its
content, its identity, its ownership to someone or something else. So to with the reader.
The reader is giving his person, his identity, everything that makes him, him. But to
whom is he giving it? I contend that the clearest answer to this question, both in the
context of this quote and in the larger context of Kierkegaard, is that the reader is giving
to himself. The reader is being appropriated by himself. Lorentzen remarks something
similar when he writes, “The ethical-religious poet’s indirect communication essentially
allows a reader to map out his own actions personally through the appropriation of
parables (or any metaphorical speech) onto the reader’s thoughts, thereby prompting
meaning into the reader’s deeds.”230 Lorentzen claims that our interactions with parables
and metaphors provide us with situations where we examine our own thoughts and
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actions. Let’s imagine that the three interpretations of the Tortoise and the Hare that I
outlined are the only possible interpretations. Lorentzen is arguing that I will end up
supplying the interpretation that most evenly matches onto myself and my own struggles,
thoughts, and desires. With that interpretation in hand, I will then appropriate what
appears to me to be the parable. Though, what I’m really appropriating is what I’ve
already supplied, my own concern that I am too prideful or that I lack perseverance, or
that I’m too quick to judgment. If that’s the case then really my appropriation is of
myself, for what I am gaining from the parable and thus changing about myself is
something that I’ve put into the parable. I think it’s somewhat telling that Kierkegaard,
especially in the Postscript, often lists appropriation and inwardness together as being
what make up subjectivity. On the surface, these seem like different things. Inwardness is
an examination of the self, but appropriation is taking something external and making it
part of yourself. Yet, if we think of appropriation here as taking part of yourself, maybe a
part that you’ve ignored or forgotten, then inwardness and appropriation seem quite
similar.231
In For Self-Examination, Kierkegaard claims that the Word of God acts like a
mirror for us, so that what we are really seeing and learning about is ourselves. “If you
are to read God’s Word in order to see yourself in the mirror, then during the reading you
must incessantly say to yourself: It is I to whom it is speaking, it is I about whom it is
speaking.”232 Kierkegaard goes on to describe the experience of reading the parable of the
good Samaritan. A man is robbed and left injured and half naked on the side of the road.
The first person to pass him is a priest. When we read about the priest passing him by,
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Kierkegaard thinks that we should think of ourselves as the priest. We are to think to
ourselves, “Alas, to think that I could be so callous, I who call myself a Christian.”233 He
claims that we shouldn’t avoid this thought by noting that we are not actually priests. We
should identify as the villain of the story, for in that we can see our faults and become
better. Here again, what we are appropriating is something about ourselves. As much as I
like to ignore it, I am sometimes very callous and unloving or uncaring towards others.
The parable of the good Samaritan should remind me of that fact. Thus the real subject of
the parable isn’t Samaritans or priests, the subject is me. It is a parable about me, and I
am to learn about myself from it.
When we ask about appropriation, and how we can be sure that the reader is
appropriating the right thing, to some extent we still can’t. We can’t be sure that the
reader identifies as the priest and not the Samaritan or the man who was beaten and
robbed. Nonetheless, if appropriation is of self, then at least we have narrowed the
possible ways in which someone could interpret and appropriate. The parable will appeal
to me in certain ways and I will fill it with my thoughts, fears, and desires. It will then
turn these around and show them to me, allowing me to appropriate parts of myself that I
had neglected or forgotten. And given that part of Kierkegaard’s goal here is to remind us
of the truth that God has already revealed to us, this seems to be an especially relevant
consideration.234
If what I am appropriating is myself, as I have argued, why not just
straightforwardly tell me the faults that I have? Why should we use the song and dance of
parables just to tell me that I’m sometimes callous like the priest? Part of the reason
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comes down to the issue of offense. If you were to outright tell me that I’m a callous
person, I will likely be somewhat offended, and that offense will strengthen my rejection
of your claim. You’ve upset me, so you must be wrong. Yet, if God does this we are not
offended.235 Seemingly the experience of recognizing your own sin does not cause
offense when this experience is caused by divine revelation, for the divine speaks with
authority. On the other hand, when a human attempts to inform me about my sin, I
become angry and upset. Because of this, Kierkegaard needs to devise a way to remind us
of our sin and of our untruth without tripping those psychological alarms that go off when
we are confronted by another human. Climacus writes, “but there is inwardness when
what is said belongs to the recipient as if it were his own – and now it is indeed his own.
To communicate in that way is the most beautiful triumph of resigned inwardness.”236
For Climacus, the goal of indirect communication is for the recipient to experience the
communication as if it were his own. To refer to the popular film, Kierkegaard wants to
practice inception. The ideal scenario occurs when I read something that Kierkegaard has
written, and as I think about it, interpret, and consider the ideas, I come to realize
something for myself. This realization has some relation to the text, but it is not what is
found in the text, and thus it appears to me to be an idea that originated with me. Since
the idea is mine, I am not offended and no psychological defense systems are tripped.
Thus, Kierkegaard needs to write and communicate such that the communication belongs
to the receiver so as to avoid the possibility of offense.

I am using the term “offense” here in the way it is normally used in English, and not in the way that
Kierkegaard uses it. Where Kierkegaard describes our offense to God, he is generally referring to the
faculty of reason rebelling against something that extends beyond reason. I am not describing this kind
of offense to reason, but instead I am merely describing the experience of becoming antagonistic
towards an individual who said something that upset us.
236
CUP 260
235

175
Stokes examines this approach in the context of the David and Nathan parable
that was first discussed in chapter three. David has sinned though he refuses to admit it,
so Nathan tells him a story which is a metaphorical version of David’s own actions.
David is enraged at one of the characters in the story and Nathan then informs him that he
is that man. Thinking about this, Stokes writes, “Once again, the meaning conferred by
the image is nowhere to be found in its direct content, but in the viewer’s engagement
therewith. That is not, however, to say that David simply imports a meaning into the story
that properly does not belong there; rather, he uncovers a meaning that is only accessible
if he engages with the story in an immediately self-referential attitude.”237 Nathan can’t
just tell David that David has done wrong. David either already knows this but is refusing
to acknowledge it or he is unaware entirely, though the latter seems unlikely. If he’s
already actively refusing to acknowledge his wrongdoing, pointing it out to him will be
fruitless. So instead Nathan tells David a story and David recognizes the wrongness of
the actions of the man in the story. Though he requires Nathan’s help to do so, David is
appropriating himself. He’s not putting meaning on the story that doesn’t belong there,
though he is putting meaning on the story. His interaction with the story is what provides
the meaning that is then appropriated by him, with Nathan’s help. Since Nathan’s help
was required, David does have the opportunity to reject Nathan’s assertion that he is that
man. He is a king, not a shepherd (anymore). He did not take an animal from his neighbor
to slaughter. He matches none of the literal analogues of the story. Yet, he does match
them metaphorically. Part of Nathan’s success stems from his ability to rouse David’s
anger. Being that he is somewhat in a fit of rage upon hearing the story, David is not in
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full possession of his rational faculties, and thus is not quite in the proper state of mind to
separate the literal from the metaphorical and argue that since he doesn’t fit the literal
that the story cannot be about him. Instead, when Nathan informs him that he is that man,
his heightened emotional state collapses the literal and metaphorical into one, and he
recognizes himself in the story.
It’s worth noting that Kierkegaard doesn’t think that scripture has need of a
Nathan who will tell us that we are that man. In Works of Love, Kierkegaard writes, “The
interpretation is that you, you who read the words of the gospel, you are the tree. What
the prophet Nathan added to the parable, “You are the man,” the gospel needs not add,
since it is already contained in the form of the statement and in its being a word of the
gospel.”238 The Word of God does not need a Nathan character, for it already speaks with
authority. Thus, one could dismiss Kierkegaard telling us that we are sinners, for who is
Kierkegaard? What does he know? But we cannot do so with the Bible, for it is the Word
of God. We can therefore see why the Bible does not need a Nathan character. The
assumed interpretation is that we are the sinners that the Bible is speaking of, for we have
all fallen short of the glory of God. No one needs to say, “you are that man,” as that is
already built into the fabric of the Word. Kierkegaard himself is another issue though. He
never says that we are that man. He never directly claims to be writing about his
audience, at least, unless you do the sort of thing that I am doing now and connect a
bunch of errant pieces of his works to put that together. He doesn’t tell the parable of
Agnes and the merman and right afterwards say, “Oh by the way, you’re all mermen.”
Nathan was able to make that transference by way of David’s anger, but Kierkegaard
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doesn’t often provoke that kind of intense emotional reaction in his readers, I assume.
Thus the task for Kierkegaard seems to be greater than that of Nathan. Nathan had to
merely tell the story and then point out that it was really about David. Kierkegaard has to
tell the story, but he needs to tell it so well and structure it so perfectly that the audience
realizes for themselves that it is about them. That is quite a difficult task, and I will argue
that Kierkegaard attempts to accomplish it by using his parables as mirrors for his
readers.
Section 2: The Man in the Mirror

In order to answer the question of how Kierkegaard attempts to get his audience
to realize that he is talking about them, and not some pagan, un-Christian, “other,” let us
turn to Anti-Climacus.
“And only the sign of contradiction can do this: it draws attention to itself and
then it presents a contradiction. There is a something that makes it impossible not
to look – and look, as one is looking one sees as in a mirror, one comes to see
oneself, or he who is the sign of contradiction looks straight into the
contradiction. A contradiction placed squarely in front of a person – if one can get
him to look at it – is a mirror; as he is forming a judgment, what dwells within
him must be disclosed. It is a riddle, but as he is guessing the riddle, what dwells
within him is disclosed by the way he guesses. The contradiction confronts him
with a choice, and as he is choosing, together with what he chooses, he himself is
disclosed.”239
There seem to be at least two distinct things going on here. First, we have a discussion of
the divine. Kierkegaard’s use of the term “contradiction” is, at least in part, referring to
the God-man, to Christ. Christ is a contradiction because he both God and man, he is God
in time and in flesh. So, on first pass, we have a selection that describes human’s
interaction with the divine. When the divine reveals itself to us, we must choose to
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believe or not and to follow or not, and in choosing we disclose ourselves. But I think
that there is also a second thing going on here. This passage is bookended with
discussions about direct communication and its efficacy, or lack thereof, to communicate
the truth of Christianity. Given that context, I think that it’s also important for us to read
this passage as Anti-Climacus offering us some considerations about Kierkegaard’s
overall method as a writer. As we have seen multiple times, Kierkegaard wants to bring
about inwardness and appropriation, for he cannot do much more in bringing true
Christianity to his audience.240 We have here a discussion about how a concept, a
contradiction, can cause a reader to disclose themself, even unintentionally. This
disclosure acts as a kind of self-revelation. The individual, in choosing and in their
choice, makes visible something about themself that was previously invisible. This
person becomes disclosed like the merman was, and his disclosure was his first step to
salvation.
Let us consider how this works with reference to parables. There seem to be a few
key ingredients to the situation that Kierkegaard is describing. First, we need a
contradiction. As I mentioned, Christ acts as his own contradiction, but Kierkegaard does
not have this luxury. So instead Kierkegaard must provide one. As was argued in chapter
three, Kierkegaard’s parables are implemented so that they present a contradiction to the
reader and force the reader to choose for themself. Metaphors and parables carry with
them a tension in that they present the reader with a dialectical knot that the reader must
untie. In untying the knot, the reader has to choose and thus disclose themself. The
tension that was described in chapter three was a result of a dialectic in which the
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metaphorical and the literal are superimposed on each other. The reader must make
something out of this tension, and I argued that in doing so the reader is creating
meaning, though that creation is directly tied to the metaphor or parable. We see how this
fits into what Anti-Climacus is describing. Anti-Climacus shows us a contradiction that
forces us to choose and that when we choose we are disclosing ourselves. The tension in
the parable is the contradiction that forces us to choose, and that when we choose and
disclose ourself, we are thus creating something. We are combining what is found in the
parable with what is found in ourselves. This is appropriation and inwardness just as
Kierkegaard wants.
Another ingredient that we see in Anti-Climacus’ description is that the reader or
viewer must look at the contradiction. The contradiction must draw attention to itself so
that the reader investigates it. This investigation can then lead to the untying of the
dialectical knot and thus the disclosure of the reader. So Kierkegaard not only needs to
craft a contradiction, a dialectical knot, but must also bring it to our attention. As a
reminder, this must all occur indirectly. Kierkegaard cannot tell us that we all need to pay
close attention to the contradiction that he’s about to present to us, for doing so makes the
communication direct and then instead of subjectivity we find objectivity. Instead of
bringing the reader closer to Christianity it teaches the reader some aspect of soteriology
(or any other such academic, doctrinal pursuit of Kierkegaard’s writings). He would be
taking something that was intended to be transformative to the reader and instead making
it educative to the reader. So Kierkegaard has to draw our attention to a crafted
contradiction without actually telling us any of the above. Parables and metaphors are
wonderful vehicles for accomplishing this. Specifically, most of Kierkegaard’s parables
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appear tossed in the middle of his normal philosophical, though poetic, prose. He
generally does not explain his parables, giving only a few brief remarks about them
before moving on. The experience of reading through them is an interesting one. You are
reading about some philosophical concept, like that of objectivity. Climacus is explaining
his criticisms of objectivity and some of the strengths of subjectivity as a route to truth.
Then, all of the sudden, we have a story about an escaped mental patient from an insane
asylum. Climacus finishes this story and moves back to his discussion of the objective
subjective distinction, without explaining the story. We are left wondering about the
nature of the story. Why was it included? Is it just to lighten the mood and keep our
attention like a professor telling a joke in the middle of a lecture? It certainly does lighten
the mood, for the story is amusing. In this, we see that the story is inviting. Its placement
and its pleasure serve to invite the reader to inspect it. What purpose does such a story
serve? In this way Kierkegaard is able to present contradictions that draw attention to
themselves without Kierkegaard having to explicitly call our attention to anything. The
parable wants to be read, and we want to read it.
We read the parable, are invited to explore it, and in doing so come into contact
with the contradiction. We are then prompted to choose, and in choosing we disclose
ourselves. But to what end? My contention is that parables are to act as mirrors for us,
disclosing ourselves to ourselves. The parable reveals something about me, but the
revelation is for myself and not for anyone else. Stages on Life’s Way begins with an
epigraph that is a quote from one of Georg Lichtenburg’s notebooks, “Such works are
mirrors: when an ape looks in, no apostle can look out.” Kierkegaard is tasking himself
with reminding a populace who are complacent and confident in their Christianity that
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they are not apostles, but indeed are closer to apes when it comes to their religion. I think
that this epigraph is a fitting claim about what Kierkegaard is trying to do overall with his
parables. He presents to us the dialectical knot that wants to be untied. As we untie it and
interpret it, we create something and thus disclose ourself, for the creation was ours. We
are then faced with what we have disclosed, and we must recognize that it is ours. In this
way we come to see ourself, or at least, some facet of ourself, in the way that Kierkegaard
sees it. He sees us as being in untruth, as having forgotten the radical requirements of
Christianity. He sees me as thinking that I am already saved and thus need to only make
sure that I act in accordance with what I am told to do at church. I must make sure not to
murder anyone, for instance. But I am no murderer, and thus I sit confident in my
salvation and my faith. Kierkegaard then shows me Agnes and the merman. I find the
story very intriguing, for somehow it’s supposed to help me understand Abraham, which
I’d like to do. The more I dig into the parable of Agnes and the merman, though, the
more I can’t understand any of Agnes’ actions. As I try to resolve the dialectical tension,
I try to think things through from the stance of the merman. This helps me make some
progress, as I can at least understand some of the merman’s actions. As I do so I also
recognize that this is likely metaphorical and I start to think through what Agnes and the
merman stand for. Ideally, Kierkegaard wants this thought process to end with the
recognition that I am the merman, and that Agnes is Christ. Kierkegaard wants me to see
that I am sinful, like the merman. This is a facet of myself that is already there, but it’s
one that I’m ignoring. So the parable works to get me to see part of myself. This mirror
image is difficult to alter once it’s been made. Just as David could not dispute Nathan’s
claim that he was that man once he had already become full of anger and judgment, so
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too, we struggle to deny the image in the mirror when we’re the ones who have made it.
When an ape looks in, no apostle can look out.
But what about the possibility in which I do not see myself in the mirror? What
happens if I am disclosed through the process just described, but I do not recognize the
disclosure as myself? Stokes, in his work on moral imagination and moral vision
considers this possibility. Stokes’ overall project is to map out Kierkegaard’s thoughts on
moral vision and his attempts to get us to see things a certain way. This work ends up
being relevant to my argument here, and Stokes also considers some of the mirror
metaphors that Kierkegaard uses. Stokes writes,
“Looking at oneself is therefore not the same as seeing oneself. One can look at
oneself (literally, as in the Peasant example, or imaginatively, as in the case of
positing possibilities for action) and yet not see oneself. This brings us back to the
“mirror of possibility”, into which one must look in such a way as to see
‘‘oneself’’ rather than ‘‘a human being merely’’. This mirror metaphor thus
brings into focus the conditions necessary for cognition to maintain an essential
connection to the subject’s concrete reality. Central to this is a mode of vision in
which we see ourselves such that there is an immediate experience of co-identity
with the imaginatively posited self. This is apparently necessary even where the
“objective” content of my imaginings contains me. I may imagine a possibility
that contains me (say, my responding to a present situation by undertaking some
action) but I can still fail to “recognise myself”, that is, experience my co-identity
with the “me” in this possibility. In such a case, I fail to maintain the connection
between my lived reality and what I imagine. Such a self’s will has, according to
Anti-Climacus, become “fantastic.”241

We have to seriously contend with the problem of the individual who does not recognize
their reflection. Stokes introduces a terminological distinction to help clarify things: the
difference between “looking” and “seeing.” To look at yourself in the mirror is to focus
your attention on the image. To look at the mirror of metaphor or parable is to read it
closely and to imagine the situation and examine the contents of that imagining. In doing
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so, I might run into an image of myself as a character in the story or even as the topic of
the story. The disclosure that comes with interpretation might render myself for myself.
Yet, I am only looking, and thus lack self-recognition. As Stokes puts it, I might fail to
experience co-identity with the “me” that I am looking at.
Seeing, on the other hand, is to experience that co-identity. I look at the image and
I recognize it as being me. I identify with what I am looking at, and thus gain a new
perspective on myself. This seems to be precisely what Kierkegaard desires out of his
parables, so we must figure out how to move from looking to seeing. We see this occur in
the King David narrative when Nathan tells King David that he is that man. Prior to
hearing this, David looks, but he does not see. He recognizes the wrong-ness of the
actions and might even be imagining someone very like himself committing them, but he
does not identify with the person doing so. Only when Nathan informs him does he
change over into seeing himself and thus seeing his faults. One of the key ingredients that
we see in the David story that is missing from the straightforward mirror approach is
emotional attachment. David looked, felt, and then saw. He heard Nathan’s story and was
overcome with anger. The anger was targeted at the man in the story and so Nathan
turned that anger on David, and once that attachment was made, David saw himself truly.
Stokes refers to this as moving from an objective mindset to a subjective one. Referring
to Nathan telling David that he is that man, Stokes writes,
“This statement is needed to take David from his objective approach from the
story, an objectivity which he uses to keep awareness of his own moral culpability
at arm’s length. Had David been more concerned for his own moral condition, the
implication seems to be, he would have seen himself in the story without needing
to be told that it was a story about himself (even though the story itself concerned
the slaughtering of sheep). In the same way, Kierkegaard re-tells the Good
Samaritan parable and claims we are to understand that the Priest who passes the
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injured man by is us.”242
For Kierkegaard, holding up mirrors won’t be enough as it will leave us hoping that the
reader changes from looking to seeing. We do not want to rely on hope when it comes to
readers who are self-assured in their Christianity. In the retelling of the Good Samaritan
parable, Kierkegaard takes on the mantle of Nathan and tells us that we are the Priest.
Yet, this is a rather uncommon occurrence, and this happens in For Self-Examination,
which was one of his later works, and which was not written pseudonymously. Here he
directly communicates, telling us how to interpret. It’s interesting to note that somehow
Nathan is able to use direct communication to bring about inwardness, something
Kierkegaard doesn’t seem to consider. Nathan telling David that he is that man is a
moment of direct communication, but it is directly communicating about an indirect
communication, and thus the subjective approach is still preserved. Nathan has also been
established as a prophet, and thus as someone with authority, something that Kierkegaard
lacks, as he stresses multiple times. This direct communication was able to move David
out of his objective approach and appropriated his anger, changing its target from a
fictional person to himself. The direct approach is not something that Kierkegaard will
take in his pseudonymous works, for doing so would ruin his entire indirect approach.
Just as Nathan waited until the story was over to directly communicate, Kierkegaard
waits for pseudonymity to be over before he directly communicates with us. Thus
Kierkegaard still needs some way to get his audience to move from looking in the mirror
to seeing themselves truly in the mirror. He needs for us to be emotionally invested and
focused with interest on what he is doing in order that he has the best chance for the
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change to occur.
Parables again provide an ideal opportunity for this. In reading through the
parable (if it is well written, at least), we should come to find ourselves identifying with
characters, or cheering for heroes, or trying to predict the outcomes. Though the parables
may be short, they engage us and focus our interest. We likely do not end up as overcome
with emotion as David was, but parables serve to do more than just invite us to look, as I
discussed above. They actively engage us in a way that has already bypassed our
psychological defense systems. We read the parables almost naively. We think that we
are just trying to understand Kierkegaard and his odd writings, but we are not worried
about ourselves. We do not think that an attack is coming. So, we investigate recklessly.
That investigative spirit leads us to engage with these stories and to become invested in
them and their meanings. That investment is then turned around on us. We begin by
looking, but Kierkegaard is able to make some kind of emotional attachment with us
through his parables, and this leads to us seeing. Yet, there is no guarantee of this. I might
not be moved by the parable. I might not find it interesting or engaging. Seemingly this
happens all the time as regards Kierkegaard. I find it unlikely that all readers of
Kierkegaard have had transformative experiences when they work through his parables.
Minimally, the scholarship seems to treat the parables as unimportant, so even among
Kierkegaard experts, the parables do not seem to always have the desired effect.
Nonetheless we see how Kierkegaard’s parables are put in place to move us from
looking to seeing. Kierkegaard wants to hold up a mirror in front of us. He makes the
image in the mirror interesting and attractive, so we really look closely and engage with
it. He has not developed the rapport with us that Nathan developed with David and so he
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cannot point out to us that in the mirror is an image of us. Instead he uses repetition. He
creates many mirrors, all with slightly different images drawn on their surface. As we
investigate these over and over, he hopes that we slowly come to realize that we are not
looking at paintings of some other person, but at images of ourselves deceptively
shrouded in imaginative drawings. In doing so we move from looking to seeing, as we
begin to identify with the image placed in front of us. We slowly come to realize that not
only is the merman in need of Agnes, but that I, too, am in need of an Agnes.
Section 3: Through a Mirror, Darkly

The ultimate goal of these mirrors is not only that we see ourselves, but that we
see ourselves truly (not darkly). If we look into the mirror and are able to see ourselves
and identify with the thing that we are seeing, then in order for the Christian to come
forward, we also need to see something that is true. It’s not enough for me to identify
with the image in the mirror that I see if that image presents some falsehood about me.
This occurs plenty in literary works. The reader thinks themselves like the protagonist, a
hero or heroine who really would stand and fight and save the world. In reality, none of
this might be true, we may all be cowards. But when we read the Iliad, we imagine
ourselves as Hector, tamer of horses, fighting to protect his homeland (or, at least, I do).
Thus, the image that Kierkegaard wants us to identify with is markedly not heroic, or
even positive. Instead, he’s trying to get us to identify with a rather negative image of
ourselves. I am not being presented as the hero, but the sinner, the morally corrupt, or the
ignorant. Yet, upon seeing myself portrayed this way, I am likely to dismiss the portrayal,
or to never identify with it. Kierkegaard remarks in Christian Discourses, concerning
why this shouldn’t even be a problem, writing, “One tells him a story. This now puts him
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completely at ease, because he understands well enough that since it is a story the
discourse is not about him. A few words are introduced into this story that perhaps do not
immediately have their effect but sometime later are suddenly transformed into a question
of conscience.”243 If Kierkegaard were to plainly present these unflattering mirror
images, we would ignore him. But the parable doesn’t appear to be a mirror to us, at first.
So we engage it, we examine it, for the parable is just a story about some imaginative
occurrence. But, in doing so, we run into the image and only after considering it do we
slowly realize that it is a mirror, an image of us.
But this image is not supposed to just be Kierkegaard’s thoughts of what we are
like. Instead, he is trying to make true claims reveal themselves to us. King David, on
some level, knew that he was guilty. Were this not the case, he would struggle to
understand how he could be the man that Nathan was accusing him of being. Unless he
knows, but is suppressing the knowledge, that he is guilty of terrible things, he would be
unable to make the connection that he did when Nathan spoke. Nathan was thus not
revealing anything new to David, he was showing David something that was already
known, however much ignored or suppressed. Kierkegaard envisions himself as having a
similar task. As has been discussed, he cannot make us Christians, for only God can do
that. Instead, his task is to remind us of what has already been revealed to us by God, that
we are sinners and that Christianity requires our passionate, subjective investment in our
beliefs. Thus, Kierkegaard is not only trying to convince us of something that he thinks is
problematic, though that too is clearly the case. He is also trying to show us something
true.
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Part of his project here is to remind us of what God revealed to us, and thus to
somewhat try to re-do what God has already done. God revealed to us what was true
about us from the standpoint of absolute knowledge. Because of this, the content of what
Kierkegaard wants us to realize is something akin to divine knowledge, though not in any
problematic way. There is a sense in which Kierkegaard wants to give us a God’s-eyeview of ourselves. To that extent, some of the parables have us as the subject, but some of
them have God as the subject that we identify with. In the last chapter we looked at the
parables of the Beloved’s Letter and the Royal Decree. In both of these parables, the
natural interpretation leads us to think about things from the metaphorical standpoint of
God. This doesn’t help much if the goal of the parable is to present a mirror for us, for
then I would begin to see myself as if I were God. Instead, the goal here is for me to see
myself truly, and taking a divine standpoint is helpful in doing so. If I can see myself the
way that God sees me, I have gained much. So when I think through the parable from the
standpoint of the Beloved or the King, I learn to see myself the way that God might see
me. I recognize the frustration or annoyance that I would feel if I were in God’s position
watching my actions. Initially, I probably fail to realize that this parable is about how
God sees me, but as Kierkegaard noted in Christian Discourses, sometime later these
words will ideally be transformed into a question of conscience.
Thinking through this experience of anger, frustration, or annoyance that the King
in the parable of the Royal Decree would feel also provides part of what was mentioned
earlier as regards the need for an emotional response. David felt anger, and Nathan was
able to redirect that anger from a fictional character back onto David himself. This anger
is part of what motivates the efficacy of the parable. Kierkegaard, when he gets us to see
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ourselves the way that God might see us, is able to do something very similar to Nathan.
The emotional response is a powerful one, and one that will not easily go away. Had
Nathan informed David that his story was only a parable, David’s anger would not have
immediately dissipated. Our emotions stick with us, and so rousing an emotional
response is a good way to make sure that we do not turn around and deny the claim that is
then made upon us. If I, thinking of myself as the King in the parable of the royal decree,
feel anger and frustration at the inability of the general population to follow my
commands, then all that needs to happen is for me to realize that God must feel that way
with me, that God is the King. As soon as I realize that, my anger or frustration does not
disappear, for I am already in a heightened emotional state. Instead, my emotions are
transformed, for now I am angry and disappointed with myself and I feel sorrow and
regret. Thus we can see that Kierkegaard’s parables seek to present to us a true image of
ourselves. Yet this image might come from different perspectives. Maybe I identify as the
merman and remember that I am a sinner. But maybe I see myself as the king and give
consideration to God’s view of me. Both of these approaches work to elicit a specific
response from me such that I entertain the story, become engrossed by it and emotionally
invested in it, and then slowly come to realize that the story is really about me, revealing
truths that I knew, but had forgotten or was suppressing, about myself to myself.
Section 4: Objects in Mirror are Closer Than They Appear
I’ve argued that parables do a great job at providing us with a true image of
ourselves, but I also want to provide the inverse of this, that mirrors alone cannot provide
this and thus that parables are in a weak sense, necessary for Kierkegaard. As I’ve noted a
few times throughout this work, Kierkegaard cannot directly communicate our failings to
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us. This is for at least two reasons. First, Christianity is essentially subjective for
Kierkegaard, and thus while he could directly communicate that we are failing in that
subjectivity, it will not have the desired effect.244 Secondly, doing so would likely cause
our defense systems to kick into gear. Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous method wasn’t
implemented for the mere fun of it, rather he saw it as a necessity so that his readers
couldn’t dismiss what was being written by connecting it to his concrete person. Upon
hearing that Kierkegaard was criticizing them, the public might respond by thinking that
these are the errant thoughts of a lonely man who scorned his fiancée, or maybe the
thoughts of one angry at a system under which he struggled to flourish. Generally
speaking, his claims and criticisms would fall on deaf ears. We see a similar problem
when we consider the possibility of Kierkegaard adding straightforward mirrors to his
works. If Kierkegaard put together true images of us, but did not hide them within poetic,
metaphoric, or parabolic language, his audience would ignore them. I do not think myself
a terrible sinner who has forgotten his religion and been led astray, so if Kierkegaard
were to claim that I was, I would likely respond by rejecting his claim outright. For this
reason, mirrors by themselves will not accomplish enough, for as Anti-Climacus claims,
“Even in seeing oneself in a mirror it is necessary to recognize oneself, for if one does
not, one does not see oneself but only a human being.”245 Kierkegaard needs to not only
present mirrors to us, he needs to present mirrors that we do not reject. This mirror also
needs to stir us from merely looking, into feeling, and then finally into seeing ourselves.
That is to say, something subjective can be given an objective description, but the objective description
will always fail to accomplish anything, for the issue is subjective at heart. For instance, Kierkegaard
could tell me that I’m not a true Christian, and that would be an objective statement about something
that is essentially subjective (as I argued in Chapter One), however, in doing so he does not cause me to
become a true Christian or to understand what a true Christian is, for those things are essentially
subjective.
245
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The mirror does not hold truth within itself. Instead, it is through active use of the mirror
that truth comes forward. To that extent, a plain mirror does not suffice. The objective
description of his audience’s shortcomings will not assist Kierkegaard. Instead, he must
deceive us to some extent. He must get us to look at something that we do not suspect is a
mirror but that actually is.
In order to see how the mirror would work in an ideal situation, we can briefly
look at Kierkegaard’s words concerning the Word of God.
“What is Required in Order to Look at Oneself with True Blessing in the Mirror
of the Word? The first requirement is that you must not look at the mirror,
observe the mirror, but must see yourself in the mirror… The second requirement
is that in order to see yourself in the mirror when you read God’s Word you must
(so that you actually do come to see yourself in the mirror) remember to say to
yourself incessantly: It is I to whom it is speaking; it is I about whom it is
speaking… Finally, if you want to look at yourself in the mirror with true
blessing, you must not promptly forget how you looked.”246
The first two considerations that Kierkegaard has here are quite similar, both aimed at
pushing the reader to see themself in the mirror.247 Similarly, the third is aimed at making
sure that whatever is learned from looking at the Mirror of the Word is not forgotten.
Again, we have to note that Kierkegaard and God are in somewhat different positions
with respect to how appropriation and inwardness function. God can transform the
learner, Kierkegaard can only remind the learner. So the instructions given here are
aimed at making sure that the transformation takes place. One could, for instance, read
the Word as if it were a purely fictional tale and thus gain nothing from it. Kierkegaard’s
advice here is an attempt to correctly orient the reader of the Word so that they realize the
truth found within. Yet, despite the difference in positions between Kierkegaard and God,
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there is still a focus on being able to see oneself in the text. Whether you are reading the
Parable of the Prodigal Son or the Parable of Agnes and the Merman, you must see
yourself in the mirror in order for the desired outcome, of moving closer to authentic
Christianity, to occur.
Stokes analyzes the second aspect of Kierkegaard’s claim about how to read the
Word as an act of volition. He notes that Kierkegaard goes on to claim that when
someone sees themself in a mirror unexpectedly that they do not recognize themself.
While this is, at most, a rare occurrence, it does help us understand Kierkegaard’s point.
In order to see myself in a mirror I must, in some sense, be prepared to do so. Thus
Stokes argues that there is some amount of openness required in order for us to be able to
see ourselves in the mirror. “Self-recognition requires an attitude of receptivity, and
adopting such an attitude will be a willed act.”248 In order for the mirror to be successful,
I must be open to whatever it reveals. Had Kierkegaard approached me and claimed that
he would show me what I am truly like, I would not be open to whatever he revealed. I
would probably be quite guarded and dismissive if he painted me negatively. Yet, with a
parable, the reader’s default position, to the extent that the reader is engaging the parable,
is openness. The reader can pass over the parable or treat it as mere amusement, and to do
so is to remain closed. But if the reader engages, doing so requires willed openness.
Engaging with the parable is acknowledging that there is something that I don’t yet
understand that is hidden in the parable, and that I want to uncover. This, my first step is
to will to learn, willing a recognition that the parable possesses something that I currently
lack. The parable wants to be interpreted, it wants me to work with it. I might have some
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guesses as to how to interpret it or what it means, but since I don’t think that it is about
me, I am not guarded or dismissive. I am open to considering whatever the parable puts
forward. I still might dismiss it at the end, but my initial stance is one of openness. Thus,
parables assist in providing an impetus for the initial act of volition that needs to be in
place in order that we might see ourselves in the mirror.
Kierkegaard’s mirrors therefore require the activity of the reader in order to have
their desired effect. We see him claim as much in Upbuilding Discourses when he writes,
“The discourse does not address itself to you as a specific person, it does not even
know who you are; but if you think about the occasion very vividly, then it will
seem to you, whoever you are, as if it were speaking directly to you – this is not
the merit of the discourse, it is your self-activity’s doing, that you for your own
sake assist the discourse and of your own accord will be the one to whom it says:
you.”249,250
Kierkegaard is claiming that the eventual outcome of reading his discourses will require
both the discourse and the reader. It is not as if the discourse works on the reader, who
remains passive. Instead, the reader is an active component is making the discourses
meaningful. Stokes analyzes this passage in a similar manner, writing,
“Again, Kierkegaard is not suggesting that we project meaning onto discourses
such that we ‘find’ meanings in these discourses that are actually in ourselves.
Rather, it is only through a specifically self-reflexive mode of receptivity that the
moral meaning of the discourse can become evident. The capacity of a discourse
to prove morally upbuilding depends upon the ‘self-activity’ of the reader,
without which the moral communicator is helpless to communicate her
message.”251
So while we are playing an active part as readers, it’s not as if we are putting meaning
into something that lacks meaning. I’m not merely projecting something into a story that
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has nothing, and then “finding” that thing in the story. Kierkegaard’s goal was to bring
about appropriation and inwardness, not to convince the reader of some moral truth.
Stokes’ reference to “moral meaning” here would therefore best be interpreted to refer to
the moral change that I must undergo. Kierkegaard doesn’t want to tell me that stealing is
wrong, he wants me to react with disgust to the thought of stealing. The “meaning” in the
story cannot be some kind of objective claim. There is nothing to find, for the desired
outcome is a change in us. Thus, we have to be an active participant in the creation of
meaning, for we are part of the meaning. The parable is for me and it is about me. But
Kierkegaard does not know me, he lacks knowledge of any of my particulars. So, he must
craft something that applies generally, and I supply the particulars. His parable and I
work together to create meaning, that meaning specifically being my appropriation of my
true situation vis-à-vis my religion.
Putting this all together we see something akin to a list of requirements that is
placed before Kierkegaard if he is to complete his task of causing his audience to become
more authentic Christians. First, he must communicate something to his audience.252 This
initial requirement is rather straightforward. Kierkegaard is trying to speak to each person
individually and communicate something to them. Second, the thing that he is trying to
communicate is about the audience.253 Though parts of his works look to explicate
Christianity, he claims that his primary goal is to bring about Christianity in his audience.
Thus, the thing that he is communicating is not about the nature of religion, or truth, or
any other concept. Instead, he’s looking to reorient us towards something concerning
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ourselves: our sinful nature and our need for salvation. The third requirement is that he
cannot communicate this thing to us directly.254 He cannot straightforwardly tell us what
we’ve done wrong or how to fix our mistakes. Christianity is, at its root, subjectivity, and
thus he must use the style of communication that matches subjectivity, indirect
communication. The goal of this indirect communication is to bring us inwards, to cause
appropriation. It’s not that he needs to use indirect communication to clue us in to some
concept, rather the indirect communication should work to change us as individuals.
Fourth, in order for this change to occur, we need to engage the indirect
communication.255 We need to be active participants with the text in order to appropriate
any meaning from it. Kierkegaard does not want to merely hope that this occurs. Instead,
he has to craft his indirect communication such that it invites this kind of interaction and
engagement. And the last requirement, this communication needs to bypass our natural
psychological defenses since the content of the message has the strong possibility of
causing offense.256 Telling someone that they are not a real Christian when they consider
themselves otherwise will likely not elicit a positive reaction. Instead, you will be
dismissed, ignored, or attacked. Kierkegaard needs to find a way for his communication
to overcome this problem. He needs to craft something that we willingly engage with
despite the fact that it attacks us.
I’ve argued for all of these pieces in different parts of this work. Ideally, we now
see how parables perfectly fit as a solution to this requirement. Parables create the
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opportunity for Kierkegaard to tell us something about ourselves by using them as
mirrors. Parables function as indirect communications that invite us to engage with them
and require us to be active participants in the creation of meaning. Parables also bypass
our defense systems for we do not initially believe that they are about us. Through all of
this we see that Kierkegaard tries to accomplish something very significant with his
parables that cannot be accomplished with his philosophical prose. Taking into account
the discussion that I’ve put forward concerning some of Kierkegaard’s claims about his
goals as an author, we have to very seriously consider parables as being of paramount
importance to our study of Kierkegaard.
Section 5: “I Deceived Her by Pretending I was a Deceiver”257

I want to end with a parable and by offering up the possibility that we must thus
treat Kierkegaard as something of a trickster, a deceiver. To begin, a short parable of his
found in The Sickness Unto Death,
There is a story about a peasant who went barefooted to town with enough money
to buy himself a pair of stockings and shoes and to get drunk, and in trying to find
his way home in his drunken state, he fell asleep in the middle of the road. A
carriage came along, and the driver shouted to him to move or he would drive
over his legs. The drunken peasant woke up, looked at his legs and, not
recognizing them because of the shoes and stockings, said: “Go ahead, they are
not my legs.””258
Kierkegaard gives us a wonderfully humorous little tale about a failure in recognition. 259
To use some of our language from earlier, the man looks at his legs, but he does not see
his legs. He does not identify with the legs that are in front of him, and thus he tells the

This is a line of Kierkegaard’s taken from his journals, referring in part to his relationship with Regine
Olsen. JP VI 6762.
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carriage driver to run over them (with no care shown for whosever legs they might be).
However, he will likely soon realize his mistake when the carriage runs over his legs and
he experiences intense pain. He will move from looking to seeing upon feeling his legs
shatter. However, instead of deep-diving into this parable from the standpoint of the
reader who is being pushed towards authentic Christianity, I’d like for us to consider how
this might help us understand Kierkegaard’s actions as a writer.
When Kierkegaard presents to you a mirror as a parable, you do not initially think
it is a mirror, for you are entranced by the parable. You think you are looking at an image
of someone else. Someone terrible, or downtrodden, or ugly, and you are none of those
things. But as you examine it from different angles and look closely, you slowly start to
realize that it’s you in the image. And at that point, you’ve already condemned the image
as ugly, and so you’ve already passed judgment on yourself. You are like the drunken
man in Kierkegaard’s parable. We look at our legs and judge them, make comments
about how out of shape that person is, how lazy they must be, how ugly they are. But,
unbeknownst to us, Kierkegaard had slipped the stockings over our legs so that we
wouldn’t immediately recognize them. Yet, slowly, as we look closer, we realize that the
legs are ours.
Kierkegaard, in order to bypass our defenses, has to play a trick on us. He has to
slip stockings over our legs so that we don’t recognize them at first glance. We can
imagine him tiptoeing around, tying our shoelaces together, hiding our keys, or putting
food-coloring in our toothpaste. His parables are invitations, but we don’t quite fully
grasp to what we are being invited. We think that we are going to participate in a
pleasant, but abstract, philosophical exercise, but lo and behold, we are actively being
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self-critical. Kierkegaard gets us drunk on philosophy, and in that abstract philosophical
stupor, he slips stockings on our legs. We cast abstract judgments on those legs, for we
do not recognize them as our own. But as we judge and examine them, we slowly come
to realize the truth that was revealed to David by Nathan. Those are our legs, we are that
man. This realization places us in a precarious position, for we need the carriage to stop,
lest our legs get run over. Action is now required of us. David must atone, the drunken
man must tell the carriage driver to stop, and we must repent.
Conclusion

We return to the problem first sketched out by Climacus in Fragments, that of the
teacher and the learner. The teacher cannot demonstrate to the learner that the learner is
in untruth, for one of the properties of being in untruth is being ignorant about your own
state of untruth. Socrates repeatedly professed that he did not know what virtue was.
Meno responded by asking how Socrates would then know if Meno had not properly
answered the question. Meno could have given a perfect answer, but Socrates, being
ignorant of what virtue is, would not recognize it. Socrates responds by claiming that we
can remember it, for our soul has already gained all knowledge prior to us being born.
Kierkegaard refers to this as the Socratic version of the problem. His version of the
problem is much worse, however, for we cannot remember not being in sin. We have
been born into sin for Kierkegaard, and thus our memory cannot save us. Instead, only
God can save us by transforming us. This transformation both reveals the truth to us and
allows us to recognize it as true.
Only God can function as this kind of teacher, so what space can Kierkegaard
occupy? If he is trying to bring us closer to authentic Christianity, and he cannot
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transform us, what can he do? Seemingly, he can return to the Socratic, he can prompt us
to remember. Though we have forgotten the terrible truths about ourselves that have been
revealed to us, Kierkegaard can prompt us to remember. But to do so is no easy task.
Kierkegaard must engage with us indirectly, using pseudonyms and parables. He has to
trick us into engaging a text or story that we find interesting only to realize, potentially in
terror, that we are the subject. The use of parables throughout his works doesn’t function
to obfuscate his philosophy or to serve as humorous interludes. He is not telling stories
the way that many do in the classroom so that they might recapture the attention of their
audience. Kierkegaard’s parables work to serve a very specific function in his overall
goal as a philosopher. He needs to disarm us before he shows us how ugly we are, and he
needs for us not to reject the true image that he is presenting. Parables work to
accomplish both of these things, as I’ve demonstrated.
If my argument has been successful, I think that it requires us to read Kierkegaard
a little differently. We have to read his parables as philosophy, and not merely as
companion examples to his philosophical prose. Beyond that, though, I think that there is
still quite a lot to be gained from this study despite Kierkegaard having a relatively small
audience these days and despite Christianity being taken less and less seriously in the
West. If my argument has been successful, which I think it has, and if Kierkegaard is
correct in his approach, we might need to change the way that we try to spread
philosophy. We might want to take a page from C.S. Lewis and write stories. If our goal
is to change individuals and to reorient them towards wisdom, academic philosophical
prose likely won’t do the job. Instead, we need to become storytellers.
I’ll conclude with a short epigraph that I’m using to mourn the state of
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Kierkegaard scholarship vis-à-vis his parables,
“In a theatre, it happened that a fire started offstage. The clown came out to tell
the audience. They thought it was a joke and applauded. He told them again, and
they became still more hilarious. This is the way, I suppose, that the world will be
destroyed – amid the universal hilarity of wits and wags who think it is all a
joke.”260
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